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Abstract
Where does the myth that ‘Crimea has always been Russian’ come from? How did the
Russian Empire and the Soviet Union ‘make’ Crimea Russian? This dissertation shows how
empires applied settler colonial practices to Crimea, displacing the indigenous population and
repopulating the peninsula with loyal settlers and how Crimean settler colonial structures
survived the fall of the Soviet Union. It argues that this process defines post-Soviet history of
the peninsula.
For centuries Crimea existed within the discourse of Russian imperial control. This
dissertation challenges the dominant view by applying settler colonial theory to Crimea’s
past and present for the first time. This produces two major scholarly contributions. Firstly, it
broadens the geography of settler colonialism, demonstrating that it existed not only in
Western European imperialism but also in Russia’s imperial project. Secondly, it challenges
the ‘uniqueness’ of Russian imperialism.
The focus is on Crimea as a settler colony during the first years after the USSR’s collapse.
The main argument is that the 1990s conflict in Crimea was mainly around decolonization
attempts and resistance by the settler colonial system. Contrary to the analysis of ‘conflict
that did not happen’ it argues that Crimea is a case of a conflict that never stopped since the
late 18th century. It analyses how settler colonial structures fought for their own preservation
in opposition to the forces of decolonization represented by the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar
national movements, maneuvering between the Russian and Ukrainian capitals, which in turn
triggered perceptions of Crimean separatism.
A main theme is control over the narrative. Crimean settler colonial institutions maintained
their monopoly over ‘the truth’ about the peninsula’s past and present. This dissertation
demonstrates how this continued in the 1990s, how Crimean newspapers forged the meaning
of ‘Crimean,’ redesigned boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in order to marginalize
Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar activists. Another important issue is the role of hybrid
institutions including government structures in Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet, which
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conducted subversive operations (informational and military) to counter and reduce the
growing presence of the Ukrainian state on the peninsula.
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Summary for Lay Audience
The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 for many people was the first
time they heard about the existence of this peninsula. A region in the Eastern Europe for
most people of the West was too far away from their home to take the conflict around it
seriously. Meanwhile, the claims of the Russian authorities that Crimea is ‘historically
Russian’ for many seemed like a good enough justification for the annexation. As a result,
the first territorial annexation in Europe since the Second World War received little to no
active response from the world.
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the popular image of Crimea is a result of the
Russian and Soviet imperial policies. I argue that since the late 18th century Crimea has been
a settler colony of the Russian Empire, Soviet Union, and now – Russian Federation. In other
words, the history of Crimea is similar to the history of other settler colonies of Western
European empires. Therefore, the fact of settler colonization has to be at the basis of any
analysis of Crimean past and present. Through the analysis of the political events in Crimea
during the 1990s, this dissertation demonstrates that the fall of the Soviet Union did not bring
decolonization to the peninsula. Quite the contrary, local institutions fought to preserve the
colonial status quo and prolonged a conflict between the colonizers and the colonized. In that
fight, Russian state, a former metropole, pretended to be a non-participant, but in fact
actively interfered into Crimean domestic politics.
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Introduction
On January 15, 1992 the official newspaper of the Russian government Rossiiskaia
Gazeta published an article dedicated to the rising conflict between Russia and Ukraine
over the Crimean Peninsula. That article was about a letter by a group of Soviet
“distinguished military commanders,” high ranking officers of the Soviet Fleet, who
appealed to the Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk.1 The commanders argued against
the decree of 1954 that transferred Crimea from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR.
They also asked the Ukrainian President to prevent the division of the Black Sea Fleet
and to keep it under the joint command of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS). What is interesting in this letter is that the signatories presented the Ukrainian
President with a historical narrative of Crimea that argued for the Russian right to this
territory. The letter argued that “The incorporation of Crimea into Russia [the Russian
Empire] by no means meant colonization of this area. Quite the contrary. Crimea had
always been a privileged part of the Russian Empire. Russia was its patron and a
missionary.”2 Two paragraphs later: “Prior to the war [Second World War] the Greeks
and Turks were expelled. During the war Hitlerites annihilated the Karaites and Gypsies
of Crimea. In 1944 under the cruel will of Stalin all Tatars were deported from Crimea.
Therefore, everything non-Russian was carefully scraped out [my emphasis] of the
republic. Crimea became purely Russian, with only a certain portion of Ukrainians […]
Therefore, Crimea – is a historical territory of Russia and the Russian people.”3
Military commanders are not historians and do not have to see how elimination of the
indigenous population of the territory does not make it ‘historically native’ for another
ethnicity. The arguments presented in this letter were common at that time. The struggle
between Russia and Ukraine over Crimea often employed history as a political tool. In
this struggle tactical victories were often on the side of those who were able to control the
narrative about the past and present. For various reasons, neither the Ukrainian state or

1

“Rossia i Krym”, Rossiiskaia Gazeta, January 15, 1992, 5.

2

Ibid.

3

Ibid.

2

activists, nor Crimean Tatars were able to outweigh Russia’s historical claims to this
land. The ‘historical circumstances’ of indigenous elimination and re-settlement of the
Crimea’s space ‘worked’ and still ‘work’ as a legitimate justification for territorial
annexations in the 21st century.
This study offers a new view on Crimea and the processes that occur there. It argues that
over the last two centuries Crimea has been reshaped and constructed as a settler colony
of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. This centuries-long settler colonial project
involved complex ideological, political, demographic, economic and historical decisions
by the imperial government that aimed at securing Crimea as part of the empire and
justifying the legitimacy of the Russian presence in Crimean territory. In order to prove
this argument, this study uses the theories from postcolonial and settler colonial studies
and tests them in a Crimean historical context. Previously, these theories have not been
applied to the history of Crimea. One of the main conclusions, as a result, is that the
history of the Russian imperial and, subsequent, Soviet domination in Crimea in principal
is not much different from the history of the British (and generally European) imperial
domination in settler colonies all over the world. The methods which the Russian
imperial authorities used to secure Crimea as an imperial space, methods that were in
essence continued by the Soviet government, were similar to (if not copied from) those of
other European empires in their overseas colonies. The decision to apply settler colonial
theory to the history of Crimea linked to the insufficiency of popular images regarding
Crimea’s historical past and, therefore, its present. This study deconstructs the popular
image of the peninsula’s past and present and demonstrates how Russian and Soviet
Empires forged a Crimean historical narrative and further used it for political purposes. It
further gives voice to alternative visions of Crimea, Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian, which
undermine the Russian argument about the unanimously pro-Russian region. The
application of post-colonial lens to the history relations between Crimea and Russia
allows a researcher to step away from the Russian imperial myth, reassess the existing
knowledge about Crimea and better understand the current political dynamic in the
region.
The bulk of this study is not on the historiography of Crimea, but on the post-Soviet
transformation of the peninsula during the first half-decade after the disintegration of the
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USSR. Historians and political scientists, as well as politicians and wider public, often
looked at post-Soviet Crimean transformation through the lens of a separatist movement,
where a rebellious unilaterally pro-Russian region fought with the state center for its
autonomy or/and its right to join a neighboring state. This research shows that the
analysis of Crimean post-Soviet social and political processes requires a broader context.
In order to understand the post-Soviet events in Crimea, as well as the current situation
on the peninsula, one has to take the international and imperial context into account.
Upon taking control over the peninsula in the 18th century, the imperial center reshaped
its cultural and political space. It replaced the local population with settlers and forged a
narrative of ‘Russian Crimea.’ Therefore, ‘the separatist movement’ in Crimea is a direct
result of the imperial settler policies, displacement of the Crimea’s indigenous population
and its cultures that cannot be simply reduced to ‘historical circumstances.’ This research
shows that the Crimean settler colony did not disappear with the empire, but survived and
adapted in the post-imperial environment. The settler colonial institutions, institutions
that maintained the settler colonial regime, preserved formal and informal connections to
the former imperial center – post-Soviet Russia – and used those connections in order to
protect imperial power structures in post-imperial time. Furthermore, this research shows
how informational resources and control over the story of the past and present
transcended into a space of active politics that was meant to define Crimea’s future. All
this becomes clear if one places the history of Crimea’s post-Soviet transformation and
the history of Crimean separatism in post-colonial and settler colonial discourse. The
political struggle between Kyiv and Simferopol was never reduced to the sphere of
domestic problems of Ukraine, but existed as a triangulated conflict between Kyiv,
Simferopol, and Moscow.
The proclamation of the Ukrainian independence in 1991 was a challenge for the local
Crimean elites. Traditionally alienated within the Soviet Ukrainian politics, local
Crimean communists feared that the loss of oversight from Moscow might lead to the
deconstruction of the Crimean settler colonial institutions within an independent Ukraine.
This, in turn, would deprive Crimean communists of their political and economic power
in what they saw as their domain. Therefore, maintaining a controlled conflict, which
‘hung’ Crimea as a contested space between Ukraine and Russia allowed local Crimean

4

elites to preserve their personal power, and gain a level of institutionalized autonomy
within the Ukrainian state. They did this through the continuous support of the Russian
cultural, political and historical narrative, and resistance to decolonization. When the
leadership of Crimea changed in 1994, and the forces behind Yurii Meshkov tried to
disrupt this balance in Russia’s favor, this cost them their power. It further narrowed the
power of Crimea’s settler colonial institutions but did not destroy them. Crimea’s place
between Ukraine and Russia most accurately reflected the peninsula’s state within the
Soviet Union after it was transferred from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR in
1954. The way to secure this space politically and informationally

for Crimean

authorities was to propose various forms of integration between Crimea and Russia, or
Ukraine and Russia in which the peninsula had to serve as a “bridge” between the two
states.
The Ukrainian government supported this balance, having no political, or financial
resources to deal with a region and its problems that Ukrainian politicians had little
understanding of. Ukrainian activists in Crimea, on the other hand, were not numerous,
but very active. Their informational resources could not possibly match up to the
informational resources of the settler colony or the Russian state. However, their cultural
and political activism, already a very unusual (and therefore intriguing and interesting)
social phenomenon in early 1990s, allowed them to begin formulating an alternative
narrative of Crimea – as a territory of a unitary Ukrainian state. The very conflict around
the separation of the Black Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine happened due to the
local initiatives of Ukrainian officers, who were willing to serve in Ukraine and did not
see any timely or adequate reaction from their government in Kyiv. The narrative about
Ukrainian Crimea, formulated by local activists and supported (some would argue –
insufficiently) by the state, never dominated the public space, but it was dangerous for the
settler colonial institutions and Russia’s political presence in a long term.
The ability of the Crimean settler colonial institutions to preserve power and control over
political, economic and financial resources facilitated the marginalization of the Crimean
Tatar decolonization movement. The indigeneity of Crimean Tatars and their claim for it
appeared to be one of the most uncomfortable challenges for the settler colonial
institutions. While the Ukrainian claims for indigeneity in Crimea were easy to debunk,

5

most often ridicule, the demand of Crimean Tatars for their rights as indigenous people
were much harder to resist. As it often happens historically in settler colonies, the very
presence of the indigenous nation disrupts the colonizer’s claims for indigeneity and
emphases the foreignness of their power. The conflict over land that happened between
the local Crimean authorities and Crimean Tatar activists in 1990s was more than just a
conflict over property. In the most simple terms, it was a conflict over who got to control
the repatriation process. In a broader context, it was a conflict over the fate of
decolonization, the fate of Crimea – whether Crimean Tatars dissolved in the
‘multinational caldron’ of the peninsula, as settler institutions wanted, or become a
separate political force (with appropriate political and national rights) that is able to
protect its indigenous sovereignty.
The marginalization of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar movements happened according
to a similar logic. Having control over the informational space and the post-Soviet
cultural and political discourse, Crimean settler colonial institutions (as well as Russian
media) were able to define the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ of Crimean politics. Therefore, they
often employed Soviet-era cultural and political stereotypes in order to forge an image of
Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars as aggressive nationalists and extremists that were going
to disrupt a peaceful life of the Crimean population. In the case of Crimean Tatars, their
Muslim faith in combination with the history of Soviet propaganda, played an additional
role in provoking hostility towards them. Both Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar demands for
national equality were presented as unreasonable demands for privileges, attempts to
forcefully assimilate/colonize the Russian-speaking population of Crimea. Crimean
newspapers, as well as Russian media played an important role as settler colonial
institution in order to invoke, reinforce and support these myths. In turn, the use of those
myths was an important factor of mobilization of the Russian-speaking majority of the
peninsula.
The role of Russia as a (former) metropole in this conflict was obvious, but formally
external. Russian government successfully employed the democratic rhetoric of
‘protection of the Russian-speaking people’ in the post-Soviet area in order to cover its
interference into domestic affairs of other countries behind a façade of the international
law. The domestic political processes within post-Soviet Russia itself made Crimea part
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of the post-Soviet nation-building issue, a matter of pride for the fallen empire. For the
Russian nationalist thought the foreign political status of Crimea was painful; the fact that
this status was Ukrainian made the pain even worse. Therefore, supporting the
dominance of the pro-Russian political, cultural and historical narrative about Crimea
was a matter of preserving control over this space. This control over the Crimean
Peninsula provided leverage that allowed the Russian government if not to frame, then to
influence Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy. Having no sovereignty over Crimea, the
Russian state maintained its military presence, as well as formal and informal contacts
with the local Crimean state institutions. Russian politicians and state institutions
financed the pro-Russian civic movements in Crimea (some of which were paramilitary),
conducted propaganda through the newspapers of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, through
the Russian Orthodox Church. Russian intelligence services operated on the territory of
the peninsula openly, as part of the Black Sea Fleet. These contacts helped the Russian
government get support of Russian interests from the inside of Ukraine, even when this
was contrary to the decisions of the government in Kyiv. The intersection of the Russian
intelligence, Russian Orthodox church and pro-Russian civic movement in Crimea and
their role as agents of Russian influence is a very complicated but important topic that
awaits its future research.
Most of the existing scholarship on Crimea bases itself on a narrative that comes out of
the Russian or Soviet imperial center. The political power of scholarly research for some
time has been a matter of analysis by Indigenous scholars in other places of the world.
This research touches on this topic in relation to Crimea. It also demonstrates that there is
more than one possible narrative about Crimea and that the currently dominant one is a
result of the consistent Russian imperial policy that started with the first annexation of
Crimea by the Russian Empire in 1783. This legacy of control over the narrative, past and
present, is an important element of the analysis that this study introduces. It shows that
imperial rhetorical power was and remains a powerful instrument that allows the (former)
empire to maintain control over the (former) colonies and to shape the way people in
Crimea and around the world understand the Crimean Peninsula. Ultimately this means
that the inherited instruments of imperial propaganda in Crimea became effective tools to
control the Crimean population. Meanwhile, Russian control over the popular and
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political image of Crimea as a ‘historically Russian land’ operated more meaningfully in
the international framing of geopolitical events than the real popular support of this
image by Crimean population.
Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview
Contrary to their statement that Crimea was not a colony, the military commanders
mentioned above, described exactly a process that fits into the analytical and theoretical
framework of settler colonization. Previously, histories of settler colonialism and the field
of postcolonial theory have been exclusively applied to the history of Western European
empires and their colonies. The application of those theories allowed social scientists to
critically reassess the histories of the imperialism, race and gender relations, as well as
criticize current policies of the Western settler colonial states (such as United States,
Canada or Australia, just to name the few) towards the indigenous population of their
respective countries. Histories of settler colonialism, in particular, deconstructed the
historical myths that settler colonial states used in order to justify their policies of
elimination towards the indigenous cultures, this further disrupted an image of Western
civilization as paragons of democracy. Arguably, such scholarly criticism eventually
enabled changes in some of the imperial policies and contributed to democratization
(although, very slow as many would argue) of Western societies.
Due to a generally lower interest of Western scholarship to the field of Eastern European
studies, in addition to a decades long separation by an ‘Iron Curtain,’ post-colonial
theories and concept of settler colonialism received little to no application in the context
of Eastern Europe. As this research will demonstrate, this eventually led to a problem
when Western scholarship often follows Eastern European imperial narratives without
critically assessing them. A general understanding of ‘Russia’ (a term that is often, rather
mistakenly, applied to various state formations from the times of Kyivan Rus´ through
Tsardom of Muscovy, Russian Empire and the Soviet Union to the contemporary Russian
Federation) as a center and the main producer of knowledge about Eastern Europe
created a situation in which Russian historical narrative often dominates the knowledge
about regions that are less popular among scholars. Therefore, the application of settler
colonial lens to the history of Crimea is an attempt to challenge the domination of a
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Russian historical narrative and begin to reassess the existing knowledge about the
peninsula and its cultural and political dynamic.
Settler colonialism is a type of a foreign invasion, which results in replacement of the
indigenous population of the occupied land with foreign colonizers. Patrick Wolfe
describes settler colonialism in a following way: “…the colonizers come to stay,
expropriating the native owners of the soil, which they typically develop by means of a
subordinated labor force (slaves, indentures, convicts) whom they import from
elsewhere.”4 He further formulates settler colonization as a range of imperial policies that
result in the same outcome – elimination and replacement of the indigenous:
“...settler-colonization is at base a winner-take-all project whose dominant
feature is not exploitation but replacement. The logic of this project, a
sustained institutional tendency to eliminate the Indigenous population,
informs a range of historical practices that might otherwise appear distinct
– invasion is a structure not an event.” [my emphasis]5
On the most basic level the application of this definition of settler colonialism to Crimea
suggests an explanation of how the population of the peninsula was gradually replaced by
settlers in course of two centuries, how the indigenous peoples of the peninsula were
either eliminated, displaced or marginalized to the state of national minority in their land.
Wolfe’s definition is important in multiple ways. It demonstrates that talking about settler
colonialism means talking about a system of power and institutions that act over time,
often inconsistently. Their actions aim at replacing the indigenous people with settlers,
depriving the former of their identity, indigeneity, and sovereignty, while claiming a right
of settlers to be the only “native” masters in the territory. “Invasion as structure, not
event” means that formal decolonization does not ‘restore the pre-colonial balance.’ The
act of entering a foreign land, occupying and controlling it while removing the
Indigenous from the land does not stop when the generation of settlers is replaced by the
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generation of their children, born in the colonized space. Colonizer’s offspring eventually
claim the ‘local’ identity in the colonized space (by creating a ‘settler’s myth’),
proclaiming themselves the indigenous people. In eyes of the colonized Indigenous
people, the colonizers remain foreign invaders, even those born in the space of the
colony.
The elimination, displacement of the indigenous and their replacement with the
colonizers goes beyond the physical act: settler colonization aims to create a new society
with its own culture, history and ‘local’ identity. Lorenco Veracini identifies multiple
types of indigenous displacement that all relate to various challenges of the indigenous
sovereignty by the colonizer: in addition to physical displacement that also includes
ignoring the presence of the indigenous, ignoring their diversity, traditions and history,
attempts to assimilate them within other national groups or within the colonizers’ society,
redefining parameters of who can be recognized as a member of the indigenous group
and so on.6 Veracini goes on by saying,
“The very possibility of the settler project – a collective sovereign
displacement - is premised on what historian of the ‘Angloworld’ James
Belich has defined as ‘mass transfer’, the capacity of shifting substantial
clusters of peoples across oceans and mountain ranges.”7
In other words, settler colonialism has very close relationships to the sovereignty of the
colonizer and the colonized, their interaction and competition. Throughout the 19th and
20th centuries Russian and Soviet Empires challenged Crimean Tatar sovereignty on
multiple occasions, disrupted their traditional way of life and religious practices,
displaced the population physically and culturally, reshaped the Crimean geographical
space to make it Christian, Russian, Soviet (see Chapter 1).
One of the important features of settler colonization is the role of women in formulating
the future ‘local’ population. One of the distinctions Veracini makes between regular
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extractive colonialism and settler colonialism is permanence of the society and its ability
to sustain and reproduce itself.8 Scholars of woman’s history add an important argument
to this distinction, arguing that the appearance of the colonizers’ (white) women in the
colonies changed the nature of colonization. Theda Perdue, for instance, notes that the
appearance of white women in North American settler colonies resulted in the outbreak
of racism against the native population, as the interracial marriages were no more socially
acceptable.9 In turn, Margaret Jacobs points to the instrumentalization of the traditional
European patriarchal gender roles of women as mothers in the attempts to colonize and
assimilate the indigenous children of the North America and Australia through the system
of boarding schools.10 The writing of Ann Stoler, in turn, further demonstrate the
connections between the race, gender and colonialism in the Dutch East Indies. In
particular, Stoler focuses on a complicated colonizer’s task to remain ‘civilized’ and
‘European’ while being far away from Europe. The author demonstrates how the empire
implemented racial boundaries and policed sexuality of both colonizers and the colonized
in order to avoid ‘cultural mixing’ and ‘degeneration’ of the white settlers.11 Due to the
lack of primary sources this research does not address the role of women in Crimean
settler colony. The settler colonial context, however, requires to identify the importance
of this topic for the future development of application of the settler colonial theory to
Crimean history.
The problem of race and gender in the colonies, as well as the link between them arises
from the sphere of imaginative geography. One of the first scholars who demonstrated
this connection was Edward Said with his concept of Orientalism.12 At its core
Orientalism is a study of the Western identity, created in opposition to the self-
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constructed image of the ‘Other’ – the Orient. Said argues that the West created a number
of cultural stereotypes about the East and that those stereotypes hardly resemble reality.
In the meantime, cultural stereotypes are easy to instrumentalize, since they provide
comfortable reference points, used to justify the inequality between cultures. Said’s texts
focused a lot on the language and texts of the empire, demonstrating how language can be
used as an instrument of subjugation of a different nation or class. Orientalism is one of
those texts that shows connection between culture and politics, broadening the meaning
of the latter term to include social relations (racial, gender, class) and inequalities into
politics in addition to a classical political process.
Edward Said received a fair amount of criticism for presenting the West and the East
(Orient) as homogenous entities and not taking into account the internal differences and
inequities within them. In addition, as it appears today, Said completely omitted the
problem of Eastern Europe on his imaginative map – that is something what Alexander
Etkind called “a hole in the image of the world.”13

However, his methodological

approach – analysis of cultural rhetoric, symbols and how they transfer into every day
politics – remain fruitful. Orientalism, in fact, says more about the Western countries and
cultures than about the ‘East.’ Apart from providing a history of cultural, rhetorical and
political domination of the West over the East, Orientalism provides guidelines that
demonstrate that in a hierarchical situation, hierarchy is often created through a control
over the narrative. The dominance of the West over the Orient based itself not just on the
brutal armed force, but on the ability to determine how events were being recorded and
interpreted. This is a very important point, since it also speaks to the idea of artificially
constructed historical narrative and the necessity to decolonize historiography of former
colonized societies. To an extent, imperial control over the historical narrative puts
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imperial history in the field of political science, while the history itself becomes an
instrument of power, one of the colonial institutions.
The ability of the invader to determine the narrative and interpretation of events, to install
cultural hierarchies (by proclaiming that the invader is more ‘civilized’ than the
colonized), based on socially constructed and culturally contingent (biased) criteria, gives
him power that extends beyond his own community to influence the subjugated culture as
well. The extent of that power and the psychology of the colonized subject became an
object of the study by Frantz Fanon, a psychiatrist, philosopher and revolutionary from
Martinique. Fanon’s Black Skin White Masks and the collection of essays published in
The Wretched of the Earth explore the psychological aspects of colonial subjugation.
Fanon’s writing focuses mostly on racial subjugation and how it influences both the
colonizer and the colonized. In Black Skin White Masks he argues that the ‘civilizational’
rhetoric and racism of the colonizer creates an inferiority complex in the mind of the
colonized.14 The black person becomes willing to escape his/her blackness by trying to
copy the cultural traditions of the colonizer, by trying to ‘fit into’ the civilized society.15
The irony, however, is that in a colonial situation the ‘white mask’ is never good enough
for the colonizer to accept a colonized black body as equal. In the meantime, this same
mask removes the person wearing it from his/her own cultural community. Black body in
a ‘white mask’ occupies an in-between cultural space. Colonization creates a hybrid
culture, and both colonizers and colonized antagonize it. Both Fanon and Said touch on
the question of exotics, sexual curiosity of the European colonizer about the nonEuropean body. The sexualization of the Other, male and female, according their works,
was yet another instrument of colonization – the hyper-masculine image of the nonEuropean males painted them as both extremely sexually capable and violent.16
Therefore, as stated by Gayatri Spivak, white European men saw it as their duty to
protect exotic non-European females from non-European males and used this duty as a
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justification for colonization.17 The accusations of aggressiveness, that colonizers pose to
the colonized is somewhat related to this fear for white female bodies. The questions of
gender, race and colonization thus have become closely tied in postcolonial analysis.
Studies of race and gender in a colonial context parallel Foucault’s concept of body
politics but placed into a colonial situation. Empire locks the colonized person in his/her
own body, sexualizes this body, and also defines it as inferior. This same empire polices
its white and non-white subjects in order to prevent any ‘mixing’ between them, to keep
the blood and the culture ‘clean’.
Franz Fanon’s essay “On Violence” published as part of The Wretched of The Earth
collection gives us additional characteristics of the colonizer and the colonized, as well as
relationships between them. The essay itself explores the process of decolonization and
argues that it is impossible to decolonize without violence: “…decolonization is quite
simply the substitution of the ‘species’ of mankind by another.”18 According to Fanon,
“Decolonization is truly the creation of new men. But such a creation cannot be attributed
to a supernatural power: The ‘thing’ colonized becomes a man through the very process
of liberation.”19 In other words, decolonization goes beyond a simple process of
dismantling the colonial institutions and fixing the legislation to a new standard of
equality. The important element of Fanon’s ideas lays in the sphere of psychology.
Decolonization is a process during which the colonized community reinvents itself,
creates itself from scratch, removes the legacy of colonization together with the cultural
stereotypes and the creators of those stereotypes – the colonizers.
Fanon also argues that the colonizer is well aware of the violent nature of true
decolonization. This is why the colonizer lives in a constant fear of revolt.20 The violence
of the colonizer against the colonized aims to prevent a possible revolt with the use of
force. And when decolonization begins, colonizers often use pacification rhetoric, calling
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on the colonized to avoid violence, to be ‘reasonable’, appealing to (colonizer’s)
“civilized” values, and ‘common sense.’ Those appeals come from the colonizers’ fear
and necessity to preserve the colonial status quo.21 Ironically, this rhetoric of the
colonizers often gets support from the colonized intellectuals, who have adopted the
values of the colonizer.22 This is why the violence is so important in Fanon’s view – it is
the only guarantee that decolonization is not sabotaged by the colonizer, who is also in
control of the cultural narrative (by defining the norms of moral and fair conduct).
Fanon’s writing was revolutionary and also grounded in scholarly analysis. It is important
to understand that Franz Fanon did not theorize on colonialism in general but analyzed a
very particular situation in Northern Africa after the Second World war. Fanon’s analysis
of inequality primarily relates to racial inequality, of course. It is an intellectual response
to colonization of black bodies first, rather than a reflection on subjugation in general. It
seems, however, that while being very specifically related to a particular situation and
particular group of the colonizers and the colonized, Fanon’s texts allow the reader to
extract a certain general pattern of colonial relations that could be also true for other
colonies and other colonized subjects. Race as a social construct historically serves as one
of the major, but not the only, characteristic that has been used by the colonizers in order
to justify their actions all over the world. Fanon’s findings in the sphere of colonized
psychology proves that colonial relations are as much psychological as they are military,
economic and cultural. This means that psychological analysis of colonization should be
tested and extended to other colonial situations. Fanon’s texts demonstrate the extent to
which the process of colonization affects the identity of the colonizer and the colonized.
This analysis goes beyond culture and politics and therefore is often harder to identify.
What is important is that colonization exists in a metaphysical space in addition to all
other spheres of life.
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Based on the writing of Edward Said and Franz Fanon, Homi Bhabha explored the
problem of hybridity in a colonial context in The Location of Culture.23 Bhabha presents
a very interesting interpretation of boundaries and borderlines between different cultures.
He proposes to exit the binary approach to those boundaries and to look at them as if they
are not the place of strict limits, but a “place from which something begins its
presencing.”24 Bhabha argues that the national “imagined communities” in Benedict
Anderson’s terms are not homogenous, but are a result of negotiations between various
parts of those communities, which create hybridity.25 The image of the homogenous
nation is a myth, and therefore it should be deconstructed. Just as there are boundaries
between nations, there are also boundaries within nations. Colonized space, according to
Bhabha, is a space of hybridity and ambivalence, it is a space where cultures overlap and
inter-mix into a hybrid in which a + b = more than c. It is a space, where the cultures of
the colonized meet the symbols of the colonizers and translates them into indigenous
terms, where the meaning of the things said is not always equal to the sum of meanings of
separate words in a statement. The hybrid that comes as a result is neither fully ‘inner’,
not fully ‘outer’ culture (but a ‘borderland’), it therefore influences and modifies cultures
of both the colonizer and the colonized. The important contribution of this idea is that
colonialism is not a ‘one-way road’, not a unidirectional force in which colonizers impose
their culture on the colonized, as it is often believed to be. There is no simple binary of
oppressor and oppressed, the subject (agent) and the object of cultural influence.
Colonization, in fact, influences both sides and modifies their cultural and political
norms. The idea that the imperial image of the ‘Other’ is in fact the mirror image of the
colonial ‘Self’ surprisingly repeats itself in one postcolonial text after another. This idea
is visibly present in the writing of Said, Fanon and Bhabha.
In addition to the concept of settler colonialism, Bhabha’s concepts of ambivalence and
hybridity, as well as Fanon’s writing on decolonization and psychology of the colonized
will be very useful for this analysis. Upon closer look it seems that modern colonial

23

Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, London and New York: Routledge, 2012.

24

Ibid., 7.

25

Ibid., 7.

16

empires used very similar methods of ‘pacifying’ that occupied territories and forcing
colonized population under control. If those methods were similar, this might suggest that
the methods of deconstruction of imperial narratives could be similar as well. This
research suggests, that the texts of postcolonial theorists could and should be tested in the
context of Eastern European experience. Not only this will complicate the knowledge
about Eastern Europe but enrich the theory itself.
Multiple scholars in the field of settler colonialism show that settler colonial structures of
power use propaganda and history as instruments of power in order to cover the actual
aims of their policies. Through the informational instruments the colonizer justifies his
actions, and aims to represent himself, the invader, as a victim or generous giver. The
replacement of a local population always has to happen ‘in a lawful way,’ not in reality,
but in representation and history. The colonizer controls the discourse, including that of
indigenous people, and paints himself as innocent of violence or wrongdoing.26 In the
meantime, because the colonizing structure has institutional control, it has the power to
change the parameters/reasons for oppression as well.27 In the rhetoric of the colonizer
the colonized is always presented as ‘lesser’: less human, less civilized, closer to the
wilderness/ nature, childish, less masculine, exotically sexualized. The colonizers, in the
meantime, paint themselves as ‘benevolent givers’, whose aim is to ‘save the human-like
creatures’ from themselves. It is always colonizers who bring culture and civilization to
the colonized, who have to maintain purity of their own race (by ‘protecting’ white
women and children from unworthy influence of the colonized). The “White Man’s
Burden” by Rudyard Kipling is a classic example of these views.
Eastern Europe and Post-Colonial Studies
There are surprisingly few studies that apply postcolonial theory and literature to analyze
the Eastern European historical context. Even today postcolonial and settler colonial
theory serve as instruments of analysis of the Western imperialism, a history of
communication between the so called ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds. Eastern Europe, and the
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history of the Eastern European imperialism largely remains outside of the scope of this
analysis. Alexander Etkind addresses some of the reasons for the existence of what he
calls a “hole in the image of the world.” One of the main reasons, according to Etkind, is
the ‘in-betweenness’ of the Eastern European ‘Second world’: for the postcolonial
scholars, the Eastern European ‘Second world’ was hardly much different from the West,
since it did not support the colonized nations in their struggle for decolonization. In the
meantime, for the advocates of the modernization theory, the ‘Second world’ was hardly
different from the ‘Third’, as they both were just previous modernization stages,
compared to the ‘First’ world.28
There seems to be a certain tradition in the Eastern European imperial studies that tend to
describe the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as ‘unique’ instances of imperialism,
much different from Western European imperialism. For quite a while scholars in Eastern
European and Russian Studies were not even sure, whether Soviet Union constituted an
empire at all. For some, the application of this term to the Soviet Union was rather a
question of perspective. Mark Beissinger argued, for example, that due to the politization
of the term ‘empire,’ its application usually comes as a result

of accusations of

imperialism from one or more subjugated nations.29 Other scholars, like Ronald Suny,
Ilya Gerasimov, Sergey Glebov also tend to open their discussion of empires by stating
the fluidity and instability of the concept.30 Therefore, when editors and contributors of
Ab Imperio formulated the concept of the ‘New Imperial History’ in early 2000s, it
seemed that taking a route that was parallel to the postcolonial studies was a conscious
choice.
The concept of the ‘affirmative action empire,’ applied to the Soviet Union by Terry
Martin on the one hand provided a valuable insight into the history of Soviet national
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relations. Martin’s argument that Soviet Union was at the highest stage of imperialism
and therefore created its empire specifically in opposition to imperialism – as an antiimperial state is especially valuable for this research.31 Speaking on a similar topic,
Ronald Suny says that the Soviet Union (and the Russian Empire) was an empire, where
the class of communist elite performed the role of a metropole and did not think in
national terms.32 He also believes that the Soviet Union fell apart, because it was too
successful in performing the ‘development’ mission of non-Russian peoples, forging nonRussian nations that eventually demanded independence.33 In different ways, both
Martin’s and Suny’s arguments seem to contribute to the perception of the Russian and
Soviet imperial exceptionalism. However, United States have also been formed as an
anti-imperial state, while at the same time being one of the most prominent examples of
settler colonialism. It would be interesting to analyze the extent to which Martin’s
‘affirmative action’ is similar or different to the concept of sociocryonics by Olúfémi
Táíwò. Táíwò defines sociocryonics as an imperial policy of “cryopreserving social
forms, arresting them and denying them and those whose social forms they are the
opportunity of deciding what, how and when to keep any of their social forms.”34 In the
context of the African continent sociocryonics was a policy of inventing and supporting
the ‘indigenous’ traditions, while denying the indigenous society a right to modernize and
using the absence of modernization as an argument in support of indigenous inferiority.
One of the recent challenges to the idea of Russian imperial and Soviet imperial
exceptionalism was a collection, edited by David Rainbow and dedicated to the history of
racial relations in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.35 In the opening article of the
collection Vera Tolz argues against an existing tradition of the Russian studies to
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simplify Western concepts of race and reject the applicability of those concepts to the
Russian Empire.36 She further demonstrates that the concept of race in the Russian
Empire existed and therefore were utilized in defining state policies.37 Furthermore,
contrary to the official propaganda of the Soviet Union as a state without racism, Brigid
O’Keeffee and Adrienne Edgar demonstrate how the concept of race informed social
practices in the Soviet Union.38
Historiography of Crimea exists outside of all those discussions. As a periphery of an
empire, Crimea rarely becomes an object of study in itself. Rather, it appears in historical
analysis as a place where the history of the empires (Russian, Soviet, other) takes place.
Historically, the history of the Russian imperial annexation of Crimea in late 18th century
has been widely described as colonization. The application of the word colonialism to
Crimea and Southern steppes of what now is Ukraine was common for the 19th century
Russian historiography. One of the contemporary proponents of this approach is Edward
Lazzerini.39 Despite the use of the term, there are not that many scholars who describes
Crimea as the Russian colony. Those who do, usually study the history of Eurasian region
and internal cultural boundaries within it. For example, Michael Khodarkovsky analyses
the history of Muscovy/Russian imperial relations with the ‘Wild Steppe,’ which leads
him to an argument that “Russia was no less a colonial empire than any of the other
Western European powers.”40 The scope and the time period of Khodarkovsky’s focus
however, is slightly earlier than the period when the Russian settler colonial project
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begins in Crimea. Besides, the concept of settler colonization, allows for a broader
argument both in terms of the scope of colonization and in terms of its length.
Since 1970s there have been several serious studies of the history of Crimean Tatars.
Alan Fisher’s The Crimean Tatars that came out in 1978 presents a short survey of the
history of Crimean Tatars during the age of Crimean Khanate, Russian Empire and the
Soviet Union.41 Due to being one of the first English-language works on the topic in the
20th century, this survey became one of the classical texts, summarizing the history of
Crimean Tatars. Fisher’s narrative, however, at times follows the path of the Russian
historians. For instance, he describes the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Empire as
a peaceful act by an Enlightened monarch, with no mention of repressions against the
local population that followed this act. Contemporary works on a similar topic by Brian
Williams address the issues of Crimean Tatar identity creation and their repatriation to
their homeland.42 Williams presents a rather balanced narrative, when it concerns the
focus of his research – identity formation, while again repeats commonly accepted ‘truth’
about the 18th century annexation of Crimea. One more monograph that is worth
mentioning here is a study of Crimean Tatar social memory by Greta Uehling.43 This
research presents rather interesting results of a number of field trips to Crimea during
which the author recorded the process of memorization and dealing with trauma among
the Crimean Tatar people, their perception of their community, and their homeland.
One of the monographs that this dissertation comes relatively close to in terms of the
topic and chronology is The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition and Conflict by
Gwendolyn Sasse.44 Sasse uses an interesting approach in which she looks at the history
of the post-Soviet Crimea problem as a center-periphery struggle between the
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government in Kyiv and the local Crimean elites. While Sasse provides an interesting and
deep analysis on the Crimean problem, it seems to be lacking some internationalization.
The presumption that the conflict over Crimea was an internal Ukraine’s problem is in
fact a reflection of the Russia’s settler colonial policies implemented after 1991. In a
dialogue (extended in time) with Sasse this dissertation offers an alternative view of
Crimean question that is focused on international aspects of the conflict.
Methodology and Sources
The chronological focus of this research lays between 1991 and 1997, starting with the
year that marks Ukraine’s declaration of independence, when Crimea officially became
part of a non-Russia centered state, and ending when the Ukrainian and Russian
governments signed the so called “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership” in
which both sides mutually refused any territorial claims to each other. However, parts of
the thesis are outside this chronological focus, to provide context, since the Russian
settler colonial project in Crimea started long before 1991 and continues today and this
requires some exploration, what came before and after.
This study uses a variety of sources and research methods. The primary sources include
newspapers, archival documentation of the Central State Archive of Civic Organizations
of Ukraine; records of the Russian parliamentary meetings, and oral interviews. The
various methodologies used in this study include locating and data analysis of primary
documents, discourse analysis and oral history.
In order to analyze Crimean post-Soviet political and social dynamics it was necessary to
accumulate media texts that were a primary source for political, social, economic and
cultural news within Crimea during the period in focus. As daily newspapers were one of
the primary sources of information in Crimea, this study analyzes materials from two
most common newspapers on the peninsula, as well as the most common newspaper in
the city of Sevastopol – Krymskaia Pravda, Krymskaia Gazeta (previous names –
Sovetskii Krym and Kurortny Krym) and Slava Sevastopolia. All selected texts had to fit
into one of the following categories: articles describing national relations in Crimea;
political propaganda in support of the political initiatives of the local Crimean authorities;
articles discussing the political status of Crimea, Sevastopol, Black Sea Fleet;
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texts written on historical topics; articles describing political relations within the
triangular Kyiv-Simferopol-Moscow; texts on religious topics.
In addition to Crimean newspapers this research analyses texts published in the
Rossiyskaya Gazeta (“Russian Newspaper”) – a newspaper of the Russian government
that appeared in 1990. Although this newspaper is Russia-centered, it did include texts
presenting Russian points of view (official and analytical) on the issues relating to
Russia-Ukraine negotiations, Crimea, Black Sea Fleet, and the status of Sevastopol and
Crimea. The rhetoric of these sources allow the researcher to touch on the analysis of the
Russia’s post-Soviet identity crisis related to the loss of the empire and fear of further
deconstruction of the state.
The same limitation applied to the selection of archival sources. This research uses
documents from the Ukrainian Central State Archive of Civic Organizations (TsDAHO
Ukrainy) and published collections of documents on Crimea, related to the deportation
and repatriation of Crimean Tatars. In particular, the TsDAHO Ukrainy contains the
following funds that are used in this research: Fond 1 – Central Committee of the
Communist party of Ukraine; Fond 270 – Narodny Rukh Ukrainy (“People’s Movement
of Ukraine”); Fond 271 – Ukrains´ka Respublikans´ka Partiia (“Ukrainian Republican
Party”); Fond 272 – Demokratychna Partiia (“Democratic party”); Fond 333 –
Ukrains´ky Natsionalny Komitet Molodizhnykh Orhanizatsii (“Ukrainian National
Committee of Youth Organizations”). Those fonds have been selected among others,
because they contained at least fragments of information on the activities of the
respective organizations in Crimea. Either the movement represented by those
organizations was weak, or the documents related to the activity of those organizations
remain in private archives of their former members. The documents related to the routine
party documentation (e.g. financial reports, local administrative issues related to
construction or food supply) were generally omitted.
This research also includes 19 oral interviews with Crimean Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar
civic activists, journalists, politicians and navy officers, who took an active part in the
processes under research in early 1990s. The principle of selection of respondents for oral
interview included the following criteria: the respondent does not permanently live on the
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territory of Crimean Peninsula; the respondent participated in social activism in Crimea
during the 1990s, and/or the respondent was a journalist reporting on Russia-Ukraine
relations during the stated period, and/or the respondent was on active military duty in the
Black Sea Fleet and transferred to the Ukrainian Naval forces, or the respondent is a
Crimean Tatar national, who participated in the Crimean Tatar national movement. Due
to the Russian occupation of Crimea and continuous political repressions against active
and potential political opponents to the fact of the annexation, this research cannot
include persons, whose participation in the research could put them at risk. All oral
interviews are used upon receiving written consent from participants. The participants
received detailed information about the parameters of their participation and their right to
withdraw from the research at any time. The use of names of the respondents in the
research is consentual as well.
Records of the Russian State Duma that are available on the official website of the
Russian parliament serve as an additional source that enables an analysis of the Russian
political debates in relation to Crimea, Black Sea Fleet and Ukraine in general. This type
of sources demonstrates the importance of the Crimea question for the internal Russian
political process of nation and state-building. Due to their limited availability, this
research only included records since the year 1994.
The fact of the occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 puts certain
limitations for this study in terms of source selection. Due to the reasons of personal
security of the researcher and respondents, as well as scholarly ethics, it was impossible
to access sources or conduct interviews on the territory of the occupied peninsula or
Russian Federation. As a result, archives and materials that relate to the researched topic
and exist within the archives of Simferopol and Moscow (and do not have electronic
copies) were inaccessible. This, however, does not influence the general framework of
this research that analyses Crimea as a Russian settler colony. The inability to access
some primary sources only sets research goals for the future studies that should broaden
and further complicate the narrative sketched in this research.
The main analytical method of this research is discourse analysis. The focus of this
analysis is not so much on particular events and their sequence, as on the cultural and
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political context which allows those events to happen and shapes them and their
interpretation and collective remembrance. To an extent this relates to Foucault’s method
described in the Archeology of Knowledge. According to Foucault, discourse is a set of
statements, organized in a particular way and produced under the influence of a particular
time and space. Discourse analysis focuses on the power relations that exist in people’s
expressions and practices. Every text and every image (material or imaginary) that forms
the discourse of Crimea’s past and present should be analyzed through settler colonial
lenses, in order to separate indigenous and imperial narratives. This kind of approach sets
a task that is almost impossible to reach within a single study. However, it provides a
scholar with a set of instruments that can further allow scholars to deconstruct and (using
Paulette Regan’s term) “unsettle” the existing knowledge (and its bearers) about Crimea.
In addition, this method allows one to define the “Russian influence” broadly: in the case
of post-Soviet Crimea this phrase includes the settler colonial legacy that determined(-s)
social relations within the peninsula as well as direct interference of the Russian actors
into Crimea’s social and political processes.
The analysis of discourse on the level of a personal expression often leaves questions like
motives and ideology open. Statements that formulate discourse or that exist within a
particular discourse are not always conscious. In the case of Crimean settler colonialism
this means that actors do not always know that their words and practices fit into a
particular mode of behavior that we define as settler colonial. Neither do they operate
with terms that scholars use as their analytical instruments. As it often happened in settler
colonies, colonization created a ‘parallel reality’ (often defined as myth, lies or
manipulation by the colonized), which nevertheless remained the only “true reality” for
the colonizer. The immediate difference between the realities of the colonizer and the
colonized is that the former is the only reality that can publicly manifest itself.
Colonizers’ reality becomes the ‘common knowledge’ for the society in which it
operates.
Chapter Overview
Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of the Russian settler colonial project in Crimea
before 1991. Over the course of 200 years of Russian imperial and Soviet colonization of
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Crimea, the peninsula’s space has been written into the general cultural and political
space of the empire. The settler colonization of the peninsula meant the displacement of
the indigenous local population and their replacement by Russian-backed (and often
Russian speaking and ethnic) settlers. This substitution influences all spheres of civilian
life, and it reshaped the Crimean space itself. The very notion of what Crimean means
and who Crimean is changed. It is not a coincidence that Soviet authorities often referred
to Crimean Tatars as to ‘Tatars’ or ‘former Crimean Tatars’. The result of the
colonization policies of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union created ‘new’ Crimeans
– mostly Slavic people, born in Crimea, whose ancestors (usually parents or
grandparents) came or were moved to Crimea in the not so distant past. Being born in
Crimea allows those people to claim this land as their home in contrast to Crimean
Tatars.
Chapter 2 of this study looks at the post-Soviet identity crisis in Russia, Ukraine and
Crimea in particular. This crisis was closely linked to the attempts of the Russian state
and political elites to define the ‘new’ Russia, as well as Russians both within and outside
the Russian Federation. As a result, two terms emerged: Russkii (ethnical category) and
Rossiianin (political category) that both translate into English as “Russian.” The entrance
of those terms into Russian foreign policy influenced the relationships between Russia
and former Soviet republics. Russians outside of Russia became an instrument of the
foreign policy of the Russian state, a pressure point that kept former Soviet republics
within the Russian orbit. The uncertainty of Ukrainian post-Soviet identity as well as the
emergence of local identities (Crimean as one of them) were parallel to the identity crisis
in Russia. The choice of identity and political allegiance was not pre-defined in Crimea,
especially because it was directly linked to the problem of prestige. This chapter sets a
broad cultural and political context in which the post-Soviet transformation of Crimea
existed. It further looks and the post-Soviet identity crisis – a topic that in itself is not
new – through the postcolonial lens.
Chapter 3 focuses on the political processes within Crimea itself. It argues that the main
goal of Crimea’s post-Soviet leadership was to preserve their personal (political and
economic) power. In order to achieve this goal, Crimean political leaders fought to
preserve the settler colonial institutions in Crimea. It was their personal, as well as
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institutional interest to allow as little change in Crimea as possible. The proclamation of
Ukrainian independence and repatriation of Crimean Tatars put this settler colonial
‘peace’ at risk. This chapter addresses the challenges that Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar
national movement posed to the settler colonial institutions of Crimea. It further shows
ways in which Crimean settler colony adjusted to a new reality and resisted the challenge.
Chapter 4 focuses on the role of Crimean media as institutions of a settler colonial power.
In a settler colonial context the control over the narrative is one of the most important
instruments of power. Crimean newspapers and the narrative that they supported
maintained the settler’s monopoly over the truth as well as the dominance of the proRussian informational discourse. Arguably, the lack of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar
influence in the informational sphere was one of the most important reasons why
decolonization did not happen. Newspapers effectively marginalized the Ukrainian and
Crimean Tatar movement, while mobilizing resistance of the Russian-speaking
population of Crimea against the imaginary threats, coming from Ukrainian and Crimean
Tatar nationalists.
Chapter 5 brings an international dimension to the story. In the previous chapters Russia
is constantly but invisibly present in the picture. This chapter, however, shows direct
Russian political interference in Crimea. Russian and Crimean politicians paid frequent
visits to each other, and Russian deputies even participated in political protests on
Crimean territory. This chapter pays special attention to the Black Sea navy as a hybrid
settler colonial institution that formally responded to both Ukraine and Russia, was cofunded by both states, but in fact was under full Russian control. This chapter further
explores the hybridity of local Crimean authorities that operated under Ukrainian
sovereignty, but often defended Russian state interests and Russia diplomatic demands at
the negotiation table. Finally, this chapter looks at the ways in which Black Sea Fleet
command conducted public attacks on masculinity of the Ukrainian navy officers in order
to support the perception of Russian national prestige in Crimea and diminish the
political influence of the Ukrainian state institutions within the peninsula.
All of the chapters in general provide a relatively brief overview of the continuity of the
Russian settler colonial project on the territory of Crimea. This continuity is strikingly
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persistent throughout centuries of history: Crimean settler colony survived some drastic
political changes, wars and revolutions, as well as dissolution of empires and creation of
new ones. Arguably, this same settler colonial project exists in Crimea today.
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Chapter 1

1

Putting Crimea In a Settler Colonial Context

Russian settler colonization of Crimea that started in 1783 went beyond a simple
resettlement of the Russian imperial administration, military and settlers from other parts
of the empire. Imagining Crimea as a colony, where settlers simply ‘came’ is a
simplification of the narrative. This is why the concept of settler colonization with its
broad scope is important. The process of colonization of Crimea involved a range of
measures, including a creation of a settler’s myth, displacement (direct and indirect) of
local population, disruption of local cultures, traditions and way of life. Eventually,
settlers did not just ‘come’ to Crimea. They brought their own ‘world’ and pushed the
existing Crimean ‘world’ out, putting the local population in a position of foreigners on
their native land.
Settler’s myth as the main justification/ explanation of the settler colonial process is very
important. It reflects the empire’s rhetoric that it uses to describe the occupation of a
foreign land and indigenous displacement in positive (today we say – democratic) terms.
It starts with the official language of the imperial documents that is then preserved in
historiography. It makes historiography a political instrument: in a settler colonial context
the commonly repeated statement about winners, who control history becomes more true
than anywhere else. The Russian settler’s myth about peaceful annexation of the Crimean
Peninsula survived until today. It remains widely repeated by historians. This statement,
however, does not really reflect on what actions constitute violence. Religious
persecutions, constant suspect of treason on the basis of religion and nationality,
disruption of local traditions, deprivation of land and other economic resources may not
be examples of physical violence, but those are important enough factors that allow us to
argue that the annexation of Crimea was violent.
The concept of settler colonialism enables an argument that relates to chronology as well.
For some reason historians who talk about Crimea as a colony do not apply the term
beyond the 19th century. Somehow, as it appears, a colonized territory stops being a
colony, once the empire controls it ‘for long enough’. Once settlers and their children
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become the majority of the Crimean population, the peninsula automatically becomes a
part of the ‘Russian land’ (a phrase that has different meanings, depending on the time
period). This, however, is an element of a settler’s myth on its own. It allows the empire
to describe the displacement of indigenous people as part of a ‘natural process’ and
therefore claim one’s own indigeneity on the occupied land. This chapter focuses on the
application of the concept of settler colony to Crimea. It argues that a foreign invasion
does not become less foreign on the premise that empire controlled the occupied territory
for long enough and formulated a settler’s myth.

1.1 Crimea As a Settler Colony: “Colonizers Come to
Stay”45
The formal incorporation of Crimean Khanate into the Russian Empire took around 15
years of political and military struggle between the Russian and the Ottoman empires as
well as the forces inside the Crimean Khanate itself. As a result of a Russo-Turkish war
of 1768-1774, which ended with the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji, the Crimean Khanate,
which had previously been a client state of the Ottoman Empire, became formally
independent. In fact, Crimean Khan became a client of the Russian imperial crown. Sahib
II Giray was elected as Khan while Russian Empire maintained a certain military
presence on the territory of Crimean Khanate. In 1775 Devlet IV Giray overthrew Sahib
and returned to the throne that used to belong to him during the Russo-Turkish war. He
then appealed to the Ottoman sultan to cancel the treaty which recognized the
independence of Crimea and to return to the former Ottoman patronage over peninsula.
However, already in 1777 Russian troops occupied Crimea, overthrew the ruling Khan
and brought another Khan, Sagin Giray, to power.
The intervention of the Russian Empire into Crimean Khanate involved a complex of
measures, aimed at securing control over peninsula. Those measures were not always
military and to a large extent relied on the ability of the imperial authority to dictate the
narrative about the ongoing events. This control over the narrative, the ability to speak for
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Crimea and its population grew with the increase of Russian influence on the peninsula.
In 1778 Russian troops organized and fulfilled the deportation of Crimean Orthodox
Christians (mostly Greeks, Armenians, Georgians, Bulgars) from the territory of Crimea
into the newly created Novorossiyskaya gubernia (New Russia Governorate). The official
reason for such removal was to “protect” fellow Orthodox believers from the “Muslim
oppression”.
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The Christian church existed in Crimea since 4th century, therefore,

Crimean Christians hardly needed protection of the Russian empress. This deportation,
however, helped Russian authorities to undermine and socio-economic structure of the
Crimean Khanate (Crimean Christians performed important economic roles within the
state)47 and to ‘settle’ the steppe of the northern Black sea region.
The discourse of ‘settling the empty land,’ or ‘taming the wild nature’ is very common in
a settler colonial context. It closely connects to the colonizer’s understanding of the level
of development of the population that occupies the land prior to the colonization. In her
comparative study of British, Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Americas Patricia Seed
shows that the worldviews of the colonizers (and not the local traditions of the colonized)
defined the colonial system that formed in the colonized space.48 For instance, Seed
mentions the British understanding of land ownership according to which they saw the
land that was not agriculturally developed as “wasted” and “empty”. And therefore, they
saw their own right to take it.49 Of course this meant that any land, occupied by nomadic
people, fell under the category of “wasted.” British colonists evaluated the land
ownership rights according to their own traditions and did not consider the cultural
nuances of the indigenous peoples. Similar to their European counterparts in North
America or Australia, Russian officials declared the need to ‘settle’ the Novorossiyskaya
gubernia – the land that was occupied by Nogai nomad – and therefore they encouraged
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Western colonists to come to the Southern steppes of what now is Ukraine. 50 This policy
of ‘settlement’ reflected in the plot of the Dead Souls by Nikolai Gogol: the main
character – Pavel Ivanovich Chichikov – comes to the town N to buy serfs that previously
died but were still registered as alive. In the 11th chapter of the novel Chichikov says that
dead serfs were to be ‘transferred’ (legally, not literally) to the Tavricheskaya and
Khersonskaya gubernia, “where the lands now are being given away for free, just settle
them”.51
The fact that the land of Northern Black Sea region needed to be ‘settled’ speaks to one
more similarity between the British and Russian imperial policies – that is a certain
variation of systematic xenophobia towards the nomadic people.52 Nogai are one of the
communities within the Crimean Tatar people, but the rhetoric of ‘settlement’ seems to
only appear regarding the lands which were under control of nomads. The Muslims of
Crimean Khanate already were the ‘Other’ for Orthodox Christian Russian Empire.
However, while the Manifesto of Catherine II guaranteed (at least verbally) the rights of
Crimean Tatar people on the peninsula, the rights of steppe nomads seem to not been
considered.
In his article, dedicated to the period of the Crimean annexation by the Russian Empire
Andreas Schönle argues that Crimea became a self-representation project for Catherine
II, upon its annexation.53 He argues that for Catherine Crimea was supposed to resemble
the garden of Eden; the Russian imperial project of creating gardens across Crimea was a
project of pacifying Crimean wilderness. Schönle does not use the concept of settler
colonization, but what he describes effectively fits into the classical example of
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colonizer’s ‘taming of the wilderness’ in the colony. The garden, created by Crimean
Tatars, according to Schönle, were not organized enough, as good as wild in eyes of the
Russian imperial administration. This in turn is another argument in favor of the settler
colonial concept. For the colonizing empire, especially during the times of
Enlightenment, bringing civilization into wilderness is a classical approach towards the
newly occupied land. If Catherine was an enlightened monarch, as historiographical
tradition seems to suggest, this ‘civilizational’ aspect of her government’s policy towards
the colonized peoples needs to be considered in the first place.
The Manifesto of Catherine II allows to draw additional parallels between the Russian
and British colonialism. Besides the same chronological period – the annexation of
Crimea by the Russian Empire coincided in time with the golden age of British
colonialism – the text of the Catherine’s Manifesto repeats arguments that are similar to
those used by the British empire to justify the colonization of non-European nations. The
Manifesto of Catherine II uses rhetoric, which scholars of the postcolonial studies
describe as ‘benevolent colonialism’. This term refers to the colonizers’ argument that
colonization brings the ‘light of civilization’ to the colonized. This narrative, completely
created by the colonizer, describes the colonized peoples as ‘uncivilized’, ‘childish’,
‘unable to govern themselves’. The rhetoric of the colonizer often aims at emphasizing
the moral and cultural superiority over the colonized, colonizer appears less violent (less
‘wild’), more reasonable and of course generous, because the act of colonization is said to
‘give a chance’ to the colonized, an opportunity to one day match up to the civilized
society. According to Catherine’s Manifesto, Russian Empire granted independence to
Crimean Khanate, but Crimean Tatars “started acting contrary to their own benefit” and
their Khan “was preparing to return them to the yoke of the former rule”. Therefore, “we
[the empress] were forced to […] accept loyal Tatars under our patronage, give them
freedom, to elect another lawful Khan instead of Sagib Giray and to install his rule”.
These costly operations that involved the army did not bring complete peace, and
Crimean Tatars started a new “revolt”. A new invasion of the Russian Empire, according
to the Manifesto, was the only way to bring peace among Crimean Tatars. The empress
came to the conclusion that former control of the Ottoman empire over Crimea was a way
to restrain Khanate’s aggression against the Russian Empire. This is why she believed
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that “turning them [Crimean Tatars] into an independent land, while they are uncapable
to reap the fruits of such benefits [my emphasis], serves as [a cause of] trouble, additional
costs and effort for our troops”. That said, according to Catherine II, Crimean Khanate
was unable to remain a peaceful independent state, and because there was a risk that
Ottoman empire might return its control over Crimea, Russian empress decided (was
‘forced to’) to incorporate the land. The empress also promised to protect the proprietary
and religious rights of newly incorporated clients and to grant them rights that were equal
to rights of other peoples within the empire.
This Manifesto became the foundation of the settler’s myth, which was meant to explain
and justify the rightfulness of the imperial annexation of the peninsula. According to this
myth, the annexation did not constitute an aggression, but a benevolent act of bringing
civilization into the wilderness, an act of appeasement. The Manifesto of Catherine II
rhetorically treated Crimean Khanate as an object of policies of two empires – Russian
and Ottoman. Russian Empire saw its right to annex the peninsula to preserve the security
of its own South-Western borders. This attitude, as we will see below, persisted and
transferred into the historical narrative about Crimea. Arguably, the attitude towards
Crimean Khanate as a quasi-state with no agency persisted in Russian historiography
until today. From the times of this annexation, the history of Crimea became a part of a
general imperial historical narrative. In a settler colonial context history merges with
politics closer than anywhere else, it simply becomes one of the institutions of power that
are there to reinforce the imperial domination. Franz Fanon, Homi Bhabha and Edward
Said paid specific attention to the problem of historiography of a colonized space. Fanon
describes that historiography in a following way:
“The colonist makes history and he knows it. And because he refers
constantly to the history of his metropolis, he plainly indicates that he is the
extension of this metropolis. The history he writes is therefore not the
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history of the country he is despoiling, but the history of his own nation’s
looting, raping, and starving to death.”54
Russian classical historians, creators of the Russian historical narrative in the 19th century
saw the annexation of Crimea as a natural process, an act of self-defense that was
necessary to protect peace in the region. In other words, they were establishing a tradition
(a consistent narrative), developing the settler’s myth, started by Catherine’s Manifesto.
The image of Crimean Tatars has traditionally been negative in Russian (and Ukrainian)
historiography since its inception in the 19th century. Therefore, hardly anyone doubted
the validity of the empire’s justification for the annexation. For example, the author of
one of the first general histories of Russian state, Nikolai Karamzin, saw Crimea as a
traditional source of a threat to Muscovy. He calls it “a new nest of predators, known
under the name of Crimean Tatars, which disturbed our Fatherland until the latest
times.”55 Similarly, Vasiliy Kliuchevsky talks about the history of relations between
“Russia” and Crimean Khanate as of a constant struggle in the region. While doing so he
uses the rhetoric that describes Crimean Tatars as “hordes of bandits” (shaika
razboinokov) – as a violent society with a constant criminal behavior.56 Therefore, the
suppression of that threat “posed a territorial aim [to the Russian Empire] in the South.”57
Apparently, not only was the expansion to Crimea of interest to the imperial authorities,
but also its right. According to Kliuchevsky, the problem of expansion to the south-west
“was posed [in front of Catherine II] by the centuries-long commands of history,” it was
necessary “to move the Southern border of the state to its natural measures, towards
Northern shore line of the Black Sea with Crimea and the Sea of Azov and up to the
Caucasian mountains.”58 The argument that the annexation of Crimea was necessary to
remove the threat coming from the aggressive Crimean Khanate is reminiscent of
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arguments used by the US authorities to justify their expansion to the West during the
same historical period. In the American context, the lands were occupied and conquered
in order to ‘establish peace’ and this process did not stop until the colonists reached ‘the
natural measures’ (using Kliuchevsky’s term) of the continent.59
Another classical Russian historian, Sergey Soloviov, described the annexation of
Crimean Khanate in the following way:
“There is no reason to say much about the historical importance, for the
whole world, of the acquisition of the Northern shores of the Black Sea
by Russia, in other words: by Europe.
The Steppes, which for so many years were a free space for nomadic
hordes, through which nearly all people plundering the European
Christian world went, all of those Scourges of God, now those Steppes
entered into the borders of the European Christian state, surrendered to
civilization, became a bread basket of Europe, and accommodation for
their colonizers.”60
Crimea became a space against which the Russian Empire could self-identify: while it
Europeanized the empire itself, it opened opportunities for the Orientalization and
exoticizing of the Crimean local population. It is interesting to see how according to
Soloviov the Russian Empire became a part of the European civilization, compared to the
Crimean Khanate. The rhetoric of “civilizing” the uncivilized copied the Western
colonial rhetoric and, from the time of Soloviov, the image of Crimean Khanate as noncivilized entered historiography. Soloviov’s text mirrors the temptation of certain Russian
political and intellectual elites of the empire at the time to join the ‘club of European
civilized nations.’ Crimea, with its mostly Muslim population that used to be under
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control of the ultimate ‘Other’ in European eyes61, the Ottoman empire, allowed the
Russian Empire to create their own Orient, their own ‘East’ and to ‘Europeanize’
themselves in eyes if the Europeans. Alexander Pushkin was one of the first to describe
Crimea in oriental terms in his letters and poems and, therefore, to create an oriental
image of Crimea in the imperial ‘high culture.’62 Pushkin sees Crimea as an exotic land,
where violent Tatars (“whip for peoples”) used to wallow in “luxurious laziness”.63 In
another poem Pushkin sees Crimean shores in their “marital shine” that caused him
“feverish anxiety” (sexual?) when he saw it.64 This kind of anxiety wasn’t unusual for the
colonist traveler when arriving to the colonized land. Edward Said builds his study of
Orientalism around similar texts of the European colonizers. Orientalizing Crimea wasn’t
unusual as well – many European travelers did so in their texts, imposing their cultural
stereotypes about exotic East onto the local Crimean Tatars.65
The incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Empire changed that ethnic composition of
the peninsula. The proportion of Crimean Tatars, the majority population before 1783,
reduced gradually throughout the 19th century, while the proportion of Slavic settlers was
gradually increasing. Although the Manifesto of Catherine II promised to protect
religious and proprietary rights of the empire’s new clients, the incorporation of Crimea
into the Russian Empire brought changes to the social and economic structure of the
peninsula. A constant emigration of Crimean Tatar people throughout the 19th century
happened due to massive land deprivation and tightening state control over the Muslim

61

Said, Orientalism, 59;

More on the “Turkish Other” see: Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other. “The East” In European Identity
Formation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 39-62.
62

Although in “The letter to baron Delvig”, written in 1824, Pushkin talks about coming to Europe from
Asia after getting off a ship in Crimea.
63

A quote from the poem “Bakhchisarayskiy Fontan” (“The Fountain of Bakhchisaray”) by Alexander
Pushkin.
64

A quote from “Puteshestvie Onegina 1825-1830” – the last chapter of the poem “Yevgeniy Onegin” that
Pushkin removed from the final version of the text.
65

See for example: Roman Koropeckyi, “Orientalism in Adam Mickiewicz’s Crimean Sonnets” in The
Slavic and East European Journal, Vol. 45 #4 (2001): 660-678.

37

religious institutions.66 Catherine II established an institution of Muslim Spiritual
Assembly, which was supposed to maintain spiritual autonomy from the state.67 In fact,
the religious policy of the Russian Empire on the newly acquired land was to break the
spiritual connections between Muslims of Crimea and of the Ottoman Empire, and to
ensure loyalty of Crimean Mufti to the Russian throne. According to a scholar of
Crimean Tatar history Valerii Vozgrin, imperial authorities deported the most
authoritative mullahs from Crimea, repressed pilgrims who travelled to the Ottoman
empire and introduced loyalty checks for candidates who were to take any religious
positions. From now on, any Crimean Tatar who visited the Ottoman empire or received
education abroad could not become mullah, Mufti was elected among three candidates,
approved by the governor.68
Another serious change that came to Crimea after the annexation related to land
ownership and rights of Crimean Tatar peasants. Pre-19th century Crimean Khanate had
ten forms of land ownership, including the communal ownership over certain lands. For
instance, peasants had a right to use the pasture lands and woods of nobility – a rule,
based on the Sharia laws.69 However, the principles of land ownership in the Russian
Empire were different, land could only be privately and state-owned. As Valeriy Vozgrin
says in his monograph, the first stage of implementation of the new land ownership rules
was to declare the land that formerly belonged to Khan and to emigrants as “empty” –
pustoporozhniy – without any consideration about the local peasants that lived on the
land. The imperial authorities also started to redistribute lands among local and Russian
nobility that caused serious damage to Crimean forests and orchards, destroyed by
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colonists.70 New land owners exploited the fact that peasants could not prove their
ownership over land, peasants were also often forced to work for new land owners in
form of a statute labor; Brian Williams believes that this practically turned Crimean Tatar
peasants into serfs.71 The complex of those actions provoked emigration of Crimean
Tatar people to the Ottoman empire. Together with an extensive use of natural resources
and inability to organize agriculture in dry lands of Crimea, this caused economic crisis
in the region and therefore, more emigration. In return, imperial authorities encouraged
migration of Slavic and European colonists to Crimea.
Despite these serious changes that started with the beginning of the Russian settler
colonial project in Crimea, historiography (both classic and contemporary) continues
repeating the settler’s myth about the peaceful incorporation of Crimea into the Russian
Empire. Alan Fisher, one of the classical scholars of Crimean history in the Englishspeaking world, believes that Catherine II was an Enlightened and progressive monarch,
who decided to use soft power and minimal changes, after Crimea’s annexation.72
Already mentioned Andreas Schönle, upon describing policies that constitute classical
examples of settler colonialism, repeats a common statement that Catherine’s Manifesto
guaranteed the preservation of local rights and traditions in Crimea.73 In her monograph
about the Crimean War Mara Kozelsky demonstrates that the war of 1853-1856 was a
turning point in the Russian Empire’s religious tolerance towards Muslim population of
Crimea.74 The author shows that the war escalated the Russian fear of ‘internal enemies’
and opened ways for further ‘Othering’ of Crimean Tatars in the imperial society. This
‘othering’ came simultaneously with the rise of Orthodox nationalism of Nicholas I and
creation of historical myths about the origins of the Russian state.75 Eventually, this
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brought a policy of state xenophobia against the non-Christian population. But before she
turns to the main point of her research, she also repeats a common statement that the
incorporation of Crimea went almost unnoticeably for the local population.76 In his
article on the analysis of Orientalism in Adam Mickiewicz’s Crimean Sonnets Roman
Koropeckyi says that “Russian policies in Crimea were aimed at absorbing the former
Khanate as painlessly as possible”.77 Brian Williams cites Alexandre Bennigsen to
support the claim that the annexation of Crimea was a “humane affair”, happened “during
one of the most liberal periods in Russian history”, and that imperial authorities did not
use any forceful methods to convert local Crimean Muslims to Christianity.78 (Therefore,
Crimean Tatar population fled Crimea en masse despite the “noble intentions” of
Catherine II”.79) Williams believes that the narrative about Russian mission civilsatrice in
Crimea survived through the Soviet times and is widely accepted by post-Soviet Russian
historical narrative.80 While he criticizes this kind of historiographical approach, at times
he seems to share it, at least in the following phrase: “As was the case in other colonial
empires, the impact of the Russian colonial rule on the Crimea was seen by the native
population as having been negative in spite of the benefits this community undoubtedly
received from their colonial rulers…”81 The thesis about benevolent Russian
colonialism82 in Crimea survived since the time of Catherine II and entered into Western
historiography: the native population of the land can’t evaluate the impact of the empire’s
colonial rule, empire does this instead.
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There seems to be another historiographical approach that distinguishes the governmental
policies towards the traditions of local Crimean people and measures taken by separate
Russian landowners/colonists. This kind of distinction allows to ‘transfer’ responsibility
from the government of the colonized territory towards the private practices. From the
point of view of settler colonial theory (where colonization “is a structure not an event”)
this approach is not constructive. A collective work on the history of Crimea, published
by Russian historians in 2015 does not directly talk about civilizing missions of the
Russian Empire. The language of benevolent colonialism is not openly present in the text,
however, the authors still tend to justify colonization by the “high price” which Russian
state paid in struggle with Crimean Khanate. The authors describe this struggle as a
conflict of civilizational worlds: “semi-nomadic steppe [world] and settled agricultural
[world]”: “The Russian peasant honestly did not understand how his plowing on a tiny
piece of untaken land could bother the steppe person, while the Crimean and Nogai Tatar
[…] saw it as his inherent right to sell this peasant and his wife”.83 Here again we see
how the colonized becomes an aggressor and the colonizer invades a foreign land for the
purpose of self-defense. According to the text, after the annexation the peninsula became
devasted due to the mass emigration of the local population.84 The authors describe the
unsuccessful attempts of the local governor and provincial authorities to solve the
problems and Crimean Tatars and to stop the exodus. Among the reasons for emigration
the book mentions “the lack of trust” to the authorities from Crimean Tatar population,
“conservatism” of certain groups of Crimean Tatar people and mistakes of local
administrators, made without orders from the higher governors of the territory.85 Some
recent examples of Ukrainian historiography seem to follow a similar pattern. A recent
book by distinguished Ukrainian historians Stanislav Kulchytski and Larysa Yakubova
Krymski Vyzol (Crimea’s Knot) mentions a “tolerant attitude” of the government towards
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the local population.86 On the following pages of the text (see a chapter on imperial
policies of colonization, for example) the authors talk about the ways in which those local
traditions were being ruined by colonizers. The book describes the devastative effect of
imperial colonization of Crimea in the spheres of demography, economy, natural
resources, culture, religion of the local population. The imperial government and its
representatives in Crimea enabled and often actively supported the expulsion of local
population from Crimea. Therefore, it is unclear what is the analytical value of the
statement about the tolerant attitude of the empire towards Crimean locals. This small
episode demonstrates how hard it might be to break away from historiographical
traditions, constructed and supported by the empire for several centuries. Unfortunately,
Ukrainian historiography made critically small progress towards deconstruction of the
imperial narrative, while Ukrainian historians often supported this narrative.
Scholars of the 19th century Russian Empire mention that the imperial authorities did
think about their subjects in ethnic terms, at least in the second half of the century. Pavel
Polian argues that the imperial center created and used ‘a map of loyalty’ of non-Russian
nations, which defined the policy of the imperial center towards the borderlands,
populated mostly by non-Russian people.87 Those non-Russian people were seen as a
potential threat to the integrity of an empire – Crimean Tatars were only one of the border
nations that was seen as a source of a threat. Therefore, ‘settling’ the borderland and
pushing the local people away from their land was a method to secure the empire. At the
same time, during the Crimean war, Russian emperor Alexander II encouraged Crimean
Tatar population to leave the Crimean Peninsula and called them “harmful population”.88
Valeriy Vozgrin quotes Russian newspaper of 1887 which said: “In order to enforce
Russian rule on the newly acquired territories [Crimea] it was necessary to populate it
with purely Russian people”.89 Edward Lazzerini says that the analysis of police reports
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of the time in Crimea “easily creates the impression that Tatar-Russian relations were
inevitably and permanently hostile; that the authorities (central and provincial) would
have liked nothing better than to see the peninsula emptied of its dominant native
population; that provincial officials were fundamentally and typically indifferent to the
needs of those for whom they were responsible; that chauvinism always deeply colored
Russian attitudes, and that Russification, once embraced as official policy in the early
1880s, represented its logical extension; that the interests of Tatars were mostly
unprotected and local concerns were mostly subordinated to imperial dictates”.90 In
order to fulfil this policy the government granted land to retired soldiers and conducted a
(forced) resettlement of Russian women so that they could become wives for these
soldiers.91 The use of women in colonization is a widely researched topic in Western
historiography. Traditionally, for the empire, white women were bearers of ‘pure’ culture
and civilization, an instrument that allowed to ‘civilize’ the new land.92
The deprivation of the indigenous of their land, a restriction on the indigenous people in
exercising their culture, traditions, religious autonomy constitutes violence. Crimean
Tatars fled their homeland en masse throughout the whole 19th century. This migration
happened due to the systematic invasion by the empire into the foreign land (again –
“invasion is a structure, not an event”). Contrary to the tradition that sees the annexation
of Crimea as a peaceful process, the absence of mass physical murder of the population
does not make the process peaceful. The imperial government and its representatives in
Crimea enabled and often actively supported the expulsion of local population from
Crimea and encouraged resettlement from other imperial territories. The narrative about
the annexation of Crimea in 1783 demonstrates how hard it might be to break away from
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historiographical traditions, constructed and supported by the empire for several
centuries. Unfortunately, historians made very little progress towards the deconstruction
of this imperial narrative.
The narrative about peaceful colonization is common for settler colonial societies. Every
colonizer wants to justify his presence in a colonized space and finds the reasons why the
empire is not responsible for the death of the indigenous cultures and peoples. For
instance, contrary to the history and narratives of the United States, Canada manifested
itself as a ‘peaceful colony’, where rights of the indigenous peoples were not violated.
This, however, did not prevent Canadians to erase Indigenous people from their land,
geography, cultural space and historical narrative. This myth about peaceful colony also
ignored the history of residential schools for Indian children in Canada.93 The history of
the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Empire in late 18th century, as we see above, has
a similar myth of ‘peaceful colonization’ that persists in monographs until present day.
The narrative proposed by Catherine II in which she promised to defend the rights of
Crimean locals appears in many contemporary texts. Ironically, those same texts often
prove the inconsistency of this narrative. But, as we saw above, authors tend not to go far
enough to directly deny it. In the meantime, the cultural memory of Crimean Tatars
themselves describes the episode of the 18th century annexation as a national tragedy.
Brian Williams addresses the differences in historical interpretations throughout his book.
In the opening pages he mentions the historical struggles between national histories in
Eastern Europe and says: “All too frequently Westerners take the nationalist jargon and
historic claims to land of this sort by competing national groups at face value and do not
subject them to critical scrutiny”.94 One might add that due to the historical role of Russia
as an imperial center, Westerners tend to take Russian nationalist jargon and claims to
land at face value – in historiography and in geopolitics. Crimea is a perfect example of
this.
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1.2
The Settler Colonial Project Survives the Fall of
the Empire: Crimea in the 20th Century
The revolution in the Russian Empire of 1917 and the creation of the Soviet Union
brought the national problem to the center of the state’s attention. Terry Martin believes
that communist elites paid close attention to the national problems of the Austrian and
Ottoman empires and the reasons why those empires fell. Their anti-imperial rhetoric and
national policies were meant to prevent similar processes within the Soviet Union.95 A
settler colonial project in Crimea was paused for the time while the Soviet state
experimented with the positive discrimination of non-Russian nations. After the
experiment with korenizatsiia ended, the Soviet state returned to policies, aimed at
homogenization of the Soviet nations into one Soviet people. Due to its geographical
specificity Crimea became a melting pot where settlers – representatives of different
nations – developed their Crimean identity. Soviet authorities played an important role in
this process, shifting Crimea’s demography, geography, culture, economy and history
according to the needs of the empire.
The policy of korenizatsiia did not quite fit into the communist ideology on national
relations. As Yuri Slezkine put it “Nations might not be helpful and they might not last,
but they were here and they were real.”96 Not being able to erase national diversity, party
leaders started a program that Terry Martin defines as an ‘affirmative action,’ when ‘less
developed’ had to be manually ‘brought up’ to the level of more progressive peoples of
the Union.97 This formulation comes from the idea of a linear progress of different
societies. It demonstrates that the Soviet government did think about nations in
hierarchical categories. This hierarchy existed not only in thoughts, but in institutions as
well – the level of autonomy of each Soviet nation depended on its ‘level of
development’. Therefore, the reduction of the autonomy level signified changes in the
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hierarchy. Anatoly Khazanov points out that the blending of nations in the Soviet Union
was actively enforced through the reduction of institutional autonomy of different
nations.98
During the late 19th century and early 20th century Crimean Tatars had several cultural
waves that provoked nation-construction. Those processes were similar and parallel to
nation-building of neighboring Ukrainians and Russians and were mostly connected with
the name of Ismail Gasprinski and later Young Tatars. The forceful installment of the
Soviet power in Crimea resulted in eradication of some of the national activists, but also
brought the local Crimean variation of korenizatsiia. In 1921 Crimea was organized into
the Autonomous Soviet Socialist republic that was abolished in 1945 after the deportation
of Crimean Tatars. Brian Williams believes (and so do representatives of Crimean Tatar
National movement) that Crimean ASSR was a national autonomy of Crimean Tatars
created in recognition of Crimean Tatar national rights.99 The existence of their own
autonomous republic put Crimean Tatars at a relatively high position among the Soviet
nations. According to Williams, korenizatsiia in Crimea allowed the development of
Crimean Tatar culture and language, completed a process of construction of Crimea as a
national territory of Crimean Tatars. During this time, archeological studies proved the
indigeneity of Crimean Tatar people in Crimea.100 Just like for other nations korenizatsiia
for Crimean Tatars ended with political repressions of the new intellectual elites (in
Ukrainian context this period is called ‘executed Renaissance’), thousands of Crimean
Tatars were deported to Siberia in 1930s.101
The national policies in the Soviet Union had both territorial and ideological dimensions.
In the 1930s, Stalin turned to what Erich Brandenberger defines as “Russocentrism.” He
advocated that the Russian national group was the dominant, ‘elder brother’ in the ‘union
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family’.102 Not only did this precipitate an ideological shift in the cultural and historical
representation of non-Russian nations, it also included a twist in the Soviet borderland
politics. The concept of ‘borderland’ lines or regions, according to Terry Martin,
appeared in Soviet official documents in 1923.103 These regions were populated by
mostly non-Russian nations and were used by the Soviet authorities to influence the
national minorities of neighboring countries (mostly Ukrainian in Poland) – so called
“Piedmont principle” by Terry Martin. For instance, the autonomy of Crimean Tatars in
Crimea, according to Brian Williams, could serve the aim of spreading communism in
the Muslim Middle Eastern countries.104 In 1930s, however, the Piedmont principle got
an ‘inverted’ understanding. Rather than using national minorities within the Soviet
Union to influence other countries, Soviet state was now afraid of the foreign influences
on non-Russian peoples. This resulted in what Martin calls ‘Soviet xenophobia” – a fear
that turned non-Russian peoples of the USSR into potential enemies, and a threat to the
unity of the state.105
In 1944, the Soviet government accused Crimean Tatars of collaboration with Nazis and
forcefully deported them outside of Crimea into the Central Asia. As a result of the
deportation, the Soviet government made a number of steps that aimed to erase the
indigenous presence in Crimea. Crimean ASSR was turned into a regular oblast; the
abolition of national autonomy for Crimean Tatars, therefore, reduced their status within
the hierarchy of nations. From this time, Soviet official documents do not refer to
Crimean Tatars by their name – communist party documentation often refer to them as to
“Tatars that used to live in Crimea”, personal identification papers said “Tatar” in the
lines that registered nationality. The deprival of the indigenous population of their name
comfortably fits in the Lorenco Veracini’s description of ‘sovereign displacement’,
conducted by the colonizer in the colony. In addition, Soviet government started
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changing geographical names and changed Crimea’s historical narrative. Together with a
wave of settlers that were brought from Russian and Ukrainian republics, these actions of
the Soviet government created a completely different cultural, geographical and ethnic
space – the indigenous people were completely removed and had to be assimilated
elsewhere, settlers created a new community in Crimea – from now on this community
could imagine itself as local.
The tradition to explain the deportation of Crimean Tatars with their alleged
‘collaboration’ with Nazis is a yet another example of the settler colonial narrative
distortion. Up to this day the historiography, including that of Crimean Tatars
themselves, talks about the Crimean Tatar collaboration with Nazi Germany as the reason
for the deportation. Crimean Tatar historians and activists often try to vindicate their
nation, arguing that the whole group is not responsible for the collaboration of the few.
The point here is not whether or not representatives of the Crimean Tatar nation were
fighting in German military units. Representatives of many other Soviet nations did so as
well. The point is to undermine the legitimacy of the nation’s presence in its native land,
by presenting them as traitors against the Soviet Fatherland, to put the nation in an
inferior position on Crimean land, so that Crimean Tatars must spend the next 80 years
trying to prove that they were not traitors, while side-stepping the question of their
national rights. In the meantime, of course, the aim was to secure a border, to settle
Crimean Peninsula with ‘more loyal’ population in the case of the future wars. A
potential conflict with Turkey after the Second World war might serve as one of the real
reasons for the deportation. Crimean Tatars were not the only nation that was deported
from Crimea.
After the Second World War, Crimea, as much of the rest of the war-affected territories,
was devastated. Its agriculture was in ruins, and an overwhelming majority of its pre-war
population was either killed or deported. Therefore, the main goal of the Soviet
authorities during the next decade after the war was to settle Crimea and to restore its
agricultural production. The economic necessities of the peninsula, how they were seen
by the government, required more people, able to work in agriculture – peasants from
collective farms, mostly from Russian and Ukrainian Republics. During 1944 alone
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Soviet government resettled 62 thousand people to Crimea. As of 1947 there were 2337
families that had been previously resettled to Crimea, however, more than a half of them
left back to their original place of residence due to complicated living conditions.106
From 1949 to 1954 Crimea, and southern regions of Ukraine (Mykolaiv, Kherson,
Zaporizhzhia, Kyrovohrad, Stalino, Dnipropetrovsk regions) received approximately 108
400 families. According to the Ukrainian Communist party reports, “a significant
number” of settlers had to return to their original homes because of the poor living
conditions on the new place.107 In 1967, the Crimean regional party committee sent a
report to the secretary of the Ukrainian Communist party Central Committee Petro
Shelest, informing them about 101 707 families (406 828 people) who were living in
Crimea as a result of a planned resettlement program.108 Unfortunately, this document
does not go into details about specific time spans during which people arrived to Crimea.
In the meantime, it does say that 162 000 people came from the Russian Soviet republic,
while 244 700 people came from Ukraine.109
Resettlement proceeded according to a state plan. For instance, the plan required the
movement of 17 thousand families to Crimean collective farms (Kolkhoz) and additional
800 families to Soviet state farms (Sovkhoz) between 1954 and 1958. This meant that in
1955, Crimea had to receive and accommodate at least 3000 families.110 In her article,
dedicated to the settlement process, Elvira Seitova notes that starting from 1956 the
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number of families that Crimea had to accept in a year increased to 4-5 thousands.111 The
state promised the settler to provide them with preferential treatment: housing (or loans to
build a house), jobs, household (property around the house). The government also created
a system of reimbursement that allowed settlers to surrender their property to the state at
the place of their origin and to receive the same kind of property in Crimea; the
government also funded transportation of property.112
In earlier stages of settlement, the government redistributed the property and housing of
the deported people. However, the need to build new houses appeared really quickly; a
shortage of housing was the main problem for settlers and the government for years to
come. In 1958, due to dissatisfactory living conditions, 1722 settler families, who moved
to Crimea that same year, abandoned their new homes.113 Here is one illustration of the
living conditions:
“... 1408 families [of those who moved in 1958 – M.S.] were assigned
living space in houses of Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz workers as well as
premises that are not suitable for living /barns, kitchens etc. ...In the
Kalinin Kolkhoz in Zuiski area settlers are placed in a tobacco drying barn,
which is completely unsuitable for living; in the meantime, 16 houses with
minor unfinished places are not being completed by the builders.”114
Together with the planned settlement, Crimea had to receive a flow of settlers that were
not included in the government program. Allegedly, many of them came to Crimea
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hoping to receive preferences that came with settling the ‘empty region.’ Sometimes they
succeeded. For example, in 1963 the Crimean regional committee of the Communist
party reported on a labor shortage in the region, and appealed to the Secretary of
Ukrainian Central Committee Mykola Pidhorny to allow preferences for 4260 families
(more than 10 000 able-bodies persons of working age) that moved to Crimea outside of
the state plan.115 The unplanned migration is a rare topic in Communist party documents.
Usually, it is mentioned in connection with conflicts, when unplanned settlers try to ‘fill
the spots’ in the state plan and to receive preferences. However, there is no doubt that
people moved to Crimea outside of the plan as well as within the state programs. The
level of the governmental control over this process is a question for further research.
However, we can at least say that migrants had to meet certain criteria to be able to be
registered in Crimea.
In 1956 the government partially rehabilitated Crimean Tatars and other deported nations.
The administrative supervision by the enforcement services was lifted (at least officially)
as a result of Khrushchev’s destalinization. Deportees could now leave special
settlements. However, destalinization did not go far enough to allow deported nations to
return to their homeland, or to get financial compensation for the lost property. On March
15 1954 Crimean secretary of the regional committee Dmytro Poliansky appealed to the
secretary of Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist party Oleksiy Kyrychenko,
asking to forbid “all [those] administratively resettled in 1944 to return and live on the
territory of Crimean region.”116 Consequently, Oleksiy Kyrychenko appealed to
Khrushchev stating “Crimean region is a border area and settling it by former special
settlers [in this case Bulgarians, Greeks and Hungarians – M.S.] is undesirable.”117
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These same limitations were applied to Crimean Tatars as well, after their rehabilitation.
It seems like ‘the wind of change’ of destalinization allowed Crimean and Ukrainian
party functionaries to predict what rehabilitation of deported peoples could bring for
Crimea, and they wanted to avoid it. It was due to Stalin’s politics, condemned by 1956,
that deported people became special settlers. But former special settlers were undesirable
in a border region due to the same iteration of Soviet xenophobia that lead to the
deportation in the first place.
The communist party could denounce and condemn the deportation, but the deportees
had to remain aliens, or they had to blend with the rest of the Soviet peoples. Their
repatriation to Crimea would allow them to physically concentrate and to tie their identity
to their land, undermining the legitimacy of settlers’ presence, and so undermine the
project of a new Crimea, launched by the government. As we saw above, the 1950s and
1960s were the times when Crimea was in need of agricultural labor. Even so, the mostly
agricultural population of Crimean Tatars was not allowed to repatriate. The
liberalization of Soviet politics forced the government to change decorations, but the
system of displacement remained in place. Ironically, the party officials indirectly
acknowledged this motivation. Communist party documents often argue that repatriation
of Crimean Tatars would undermine the living standards of Crimean settlers, since they
would have to return property to repatriates.118 Party documents also mention worries of
Crimean settlers regarding the possible return of Crimean Tatars, since they “find their
property and claim their rights for it.”119
The metropole controlled the discourse and changed it according to the times. Since
1956, the documents of Central committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party show
frequent appeals from local Crimean party groups, emphasizing the risks of “nationalistic
activity of some parts of Crimean Tatar intelligentsia.” According to those appeals,
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Crimean Tatar activists “...use their visits to Crimea to find different historical and
archival sources, which would prove that Crimea is allegedly native Crimean Tatar land,
and to demand their return to Crimea, based on these sources” (1958).120 The party was
clearly aware of the importance of historic claims to the Crimean space by Crimean
Tatars, and of the threats this posed to the system that was being established. In June
1955, the Crimean regional committee requests Oleksiy Kyrychenko to ask Khrushchev
to allow the renaming of Crimean geographical landmarks in the following way:
“Crimean region has a number of geographical landmarks /mountains,
rivers/ with Turkish and Tatar names that remind our people the times of
hard suffering from bandit hordes of Turkish sultans and Crimean
khans…With the aim to restore the names that correspond to the historical
events and natural environment, to specify and arrange the existing names,
CC CP [Central Committee of the Communist party] of Ukraine asks
permission to change names of the listed geographical landmarks and to
give them names that correspond to the historical events and interests of our
people.”121
This was a process of further adaptation of the land to the new realities – the colonizer
needed to write himself in the geography of the colonized space, and to erase the signs of
an indigenous past. Of course, this is also a way to claim this space, to recreate its image,
to give a colonizer an argument for his own indigeneity. The rhetoric is important: a
colonizer presents the colonized as an aggressor that has to be ‘tamed’ and ‘forced to
peace’ (let’s remember a plethora of American movies about ‘Wild West’ to compare).
Therefore, it becomes necessary to revoke the old myth about “bandit hordes” and to
villainize Crimean Tatars. The memory about them had to be wiped off.
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The process of claiming of the space included Crimean museums and the Soviet
historical narrative as well. The historical narrative, in the meantime, presented Crimean
Tatar past as that of a ‘primitive,’ ‘uncivilized’ nation, which was always dependent on
the Ottoman empire and never had its own statehood.122 In addition, Soviet
historiography constructed Crimea as a historically Slavic land. One such book called
Sketches of Crimean History was published in 1951 by Pavel Nadinski.123 Nadinski’s
monograph claimed that Scythians were “direct ancestors” of Eastern Slavs and therefore,
Crimea was an indigenous Slavic territory.124 Not only this contradicted the work of
Soviet archeologists of 1920s, such claim connected Crimea to the general Russo-centric
historical metanarrative of the Soviet state and allowed to describe Crimean Tatars as yet
another colonizers of the historically Slavic land. In response to the book by Nadinski,
the Academy of Science of the USSR organized a conference in 1952, to standardize the
historical narrative of Crimea.125 Even for the ideologically dominated historical
community of the USSR Nadinski’s connection between Scythians and Slavs sounded
too unsubstantiated. Participants of the conference agreed that there was a need to
emphasize the presence of Slavs in Crimea as early as medieval age.126
Forging the origin myth is common for the settler colonial space. Walter L. Hixon defines
this kind of historical policy as historical denial. He says:
“Historical distortion and denial are endemic to settler colonies. In order for
a settler colony to establish a collective usable past, legitimizing stories
must be created and persistently affirmed as a means of naturalizing a new
historical narrative. A national mythology displaces the indigenous past…
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Becoming the indigene required not only cleansing of the land, either
through killing or removing, but sanitizing the historical record as well.”127
The approach of the Soviet historiography somewhat liberalized only towards the
perestroika period of 1980s. A collective work by scholars from the Academy of Science
of the USSR Krym: Proshloe i Nastoiashchee (Crimea Past and Present) makes an
attempt to find a middle ground between rehabilitation of Crimean Tatars and not putting
too much responsibility for their repression on the Soviet state.128 For instance, the books
says that Crimean Tatar ethnicity formed gradually under the condition of
multiculturalism of Crimea.129 Therefore, Crimean Tatars appear as one of the
indigenous groups of Crimea. Apparently, this book represented an attempt to create an
ideological basis for the repatriation of Crimean Tatars in late 1980s.
During the second half of the 20th century Crimea’s space was being constructed as a
resort for the whole Soviet Union (“all-Union sanatorium”). This meant that Crimean had
to become a ‘common’ place for all nations of the Soviet Union, to belong to everybody
at once. More importantly, Crimea was a resort destination for the Soviet elite. In order
for the resort to develop better and be able to accommodate common Soviet vacationers
and party elite, the local government changed the inner administrative layout of Crimean
region. Southern shores of Crimea (traditional holiday destination of the Russian imperial
nobility and monarchial family) continue playing a role of resting place for the Soviet
communist party elites. The government also adopted a plan to build more recreational
facilities.130 Crimean economy became heavily concentrated on two spheres: military and
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recreation. These two economic spheres defined Crimea culturally, socially and
economically.

1.3

The Military Aspect of Settler Colonization

Parallel to the resettlement of the agricultural population to Crimea, from the 1950s the
Soviet government started a process of reducing the number of active military personnel.
This surprisingly affected Crimea as well, since a significant number of demobilized and
retired soldiers and officers came to Crimea for permanent residency. Based on the
available sources, we cannot draw a global conclusion about the influence of retired
military personnel in creating a settler colonial system in Crimea. We can only assume
the existence of some tendencies. Besides, when it comes to the influence of the (former)
military on society, the question is not as much about the size of the group, as about the
social status and character (world view/political affiliations/identity) of a Soviet officer
and soldier. The Soviet state supported the prestige of former (and current) officers that
wanted to settle in Crimea, which was likely to influence the way this prestige (as well as
national hierarchies) was perceived by residents of Crimea.
In 1955, a decree by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
reduced the size of the personnel of Tavrida131 military district. According to the report
by the commander of the district, Colonel-General Liudnikov, 530 out of 1,336 officers,
retired that same year, were to settle in Crimea. The report also said that, of the 934
officers who retired during the previous years, 387 stayed in Crimea.132 A different
document provides us with different numbers: 731 officers came to Crimea and registered
themselves between September 1 and December 20, 1955. Most of those officers chose to
live in urban areas – Sevastopol (247 persons) and Simferopol (231 persons).133 This
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meant that roughly one third to a half of the retired officers of the Tavrida military district
chose to stay in Crimea. A similar tendency was in place in the Black Sea Fleet.
According to its commander, Vice-Admiral Parkhomenko, out of 1494 officers who
retired in 1955, 941 stayed in Crimea; out of that group, 530 of them stayed in
Sevastopol.134 In total, from April 1953 to December 20, 1955, Crimea accepted 3268
retired officers.135
The tendency to stay in urban areas can be traced in the primary sources. On April 28,
1956, a secretary of the Crimean regional committee Kliazkin reported that “The majority
of retired officers came for the permanent residency into the cities: Simferopol,
Sevastopol, Yevpatoria, Kerch, Feodosia and Yalta. In those cities we have registered
2008 retired officers, or 86% of those who retired after September 1955.”136 From April
1953 to June 1956, Crimea accepted 5140 officers, 88% of them settled in cities, 2035 of
them stayed in Sevastopol and Simferopol.137 Major Crimean cities were receiving the
majority of retired military personnel. Based on the fact that Sevastopol was a city with
restricted access and a base of the Black Sea Fleet, this kind of tendency made this city
overwhelmingly militarized.
In the 1960s, the Soviet army went through another wave of reduction of personnel; the
law came out on January 19, 1960. Three year later, on January 7, 1963 a secretary of
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Crimean regional committee wrote in his report that as of January 1, 1963 Crimea
received 4559 retired officers. Again, the majority of those people – 3375 officers –
stayed in cities of Simferopol (1151), Sevastopol (1831), Kerch (407), Yalta (196),
Yevpatoria (380), Feodosia (368). The report said that only 20.6% of those people were
not receiving pensions.138 A few months later, on April 14, 1963 a secretary of the
industrial regional committee reported that, as of January 1, 1963 Crimea received 4632
officers, retired as a result of the law of 1960. Again, 4499 of those people stayed in the
cities.139
With a help of the local party organizations, demobilized and retired officers received
housing and jobs in Crimea (in addition to military pensions). Whenever this was
necessary, a state funded their additional education to employ them in new professions.
Of course, this process did not go without problems, but in general, the state kept its
promises. As of December 24, 1955, 586 out of 731 officers, who came to Crimea that
same year from the Tavrida military district, received housing.140 Tavrida military district
and the Black Sea Fleet were leading in providing its retired personnel with jobs. As of
December 15, 1955, Tavrida military district completed the job supply plan by 75%,
Black Sea Fleet fulfilled the plan by 108.5%. For the sake of comparison – Kyiv military
district showed 53.8%, Odesa – 61.6%, Transcarpathian district – 62.6%.141 In exact
numbers, according to the secretary of Crimean regional committee Steshov, between
1960 and 1962 the party organizations found jobs for 3287 officers, additional 236
persons were receiving an additional professional training. In the meantime, as of January
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7, 1963 (the date of the report) only 10 officers were not employed; all of them were
offered a job, but refused, asking for administrative (managerial) positions. The report
also said that from January 1960 to January 1963 Crimean region received 4559 retired
officers, 4140 of them were provided with housing.142 The request for jobs with higher
level of responsibility was not uncommon for the retired officers, though many of them
did go to work in different spheres of production. Apparently, higher ranking officers saw
themselves worth higher social status after the retirement.
While the documents show a desire by the officers to attain a high social status and a
civilian job posting that correlates to that rank (together with military pension and free
housing), they do not show whether their rank within the army justified their request.
What we do see, however, is that the state set up its retired officers to have a higher social
status in civilian life. In addition, in places where the authority of the military was high
(like Sevastopol), naturally the place of the retired servicemen in society was higher. In
addition, we have to note that officers rarely retired without families. Some of them even
created whole military dynasties. Besides, the documents do not reflect numbers of nonofficer military personnel, who also came and settled in Crimea. This multiplies the
number of Crimean residents being connected to the army and fleet, which of course
influenced how society functioned. Just like in other settler colonies this also reserves a
special role of women as creators of the settler population that can later claim its
‘locality’.
Army and fleet by definition is a highly masculine strictly hierarchical structure. It does
not only train people involved in it, but also indoctrinates them. Political instructors were
present in every single unit of the Soviet armed forces. Retired officers came to Crimea
with their specific views of how society and social hierarchies functioned. The settler
colonial structure that existed in Crimea put them at the top of the pyramid. We will see
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how the military will be one of the groups that resisted the attempts of breaking this
structure in the 1990s.
When reading about places like Sevastopol in the documents of the CPU archive, it is not
always clear who is in charge of the city – civil administration, or the military command
of the Black Sea Fleet. After the Second World War the military command made
significant attempts to define the way the city had to be rebuilt – Black Sea Fleet and its
history became embedded in the architecture of the space.143 At some point during the
second half of the 20th century, Sevastopol stopped being a city hosting a military base, it
became a military base. The navy infrastructure went beyond the territory of the city,
naturally the access to it was restricted.
In 1966 a commander of the Black Sea Fleet, admiral Gorshkov requested the Central
Committee of the Communist party of Ukraine to appeal to the central Soviet government
in order to restrict access to Sevastopol and “areas of strategic importance around it” for
civilians due to the worsening of the living conditions of his personnel:
“...after the free access to Sevastopol was allowed, the number of petty
crimes and sexually transmitted diseases in the city went up, the conditions of
utility services worsened. This leads to the worsening of discipline as well as
moral and political state of the personnel, which serves in units, deployed in
Sevastopol.”144
The reasoning, expressed in this piece, is very interesting. It reflects the level of control
of the command over the everyday life of their subordinates. The navy command
traditionally played an important role in the social and political life of the city. The
commander of the fleet, although not a position within a civilian administration, was an
important figure in the city’s hierarchy. The fleet itself constitutes an extended and

143

For more on the post-Second World War reconstruction of Sevastopol: Karl Qualls, From Ruins to
Reconstruction: Urban Identity in Soviet Sevastopol After World War II (New York: Cornell University
Press, 2009).
144

Admiral Gorshkov, Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, to the Central Committee of the Communist
party of Ukraine,” 9 November 1966, TsDAHO Ukrainy, fond 1, op. 24, no. 6162, 45-46.

60

complicated structure that united active military bases, ships, units of support, navy
aviation and military engineering units. The construction department of the fleet built a
significant part of the city of Sevastopol. The town of Balaklava hosted secret nuclear
capable submarine bases. Admiral Gorshkov requested to “close the city for the free
access by Soviet citizens, introduce a special passport regime and to deport people, who
conduct inappropriate lifestyle, out of the city.”145 The access to the city eventually
became restricted, even for tourists. Apparently, this made a possibility of migration to
the city very complicated, restricted only to exclusive groups of society. This also created
a perception of exclusiveness/uniqueness/highness of Sevastopol and its residents among
Sevastopolians.
The influence of the military on Crimean life is hard to undervalue. Therefore, this topic
is one of the major problems for this study. The role of the military in the Soviet society,
its place in the social hierarchy as well as very particular political indoctrination of Soviet
servicemen played an important role for the Crimean community, due to a relatively high
percentage of active and former servicemen living there. The retired military personnel,
who came to live in warm Crimean climate, did not leave the peninsula with the fall of
the USSR and proclamation of Ukrainian independence. Crimea, and the city of
Sevastopol especially, remained a highly militarized society well into the post-Soviet
times.
By 1991 the settler colonial project in Crimea had been going on for around 200 years.
During this period two Russia-centered empires, Russian Empire and the Soviet Union,
occupied the Crimean Peninsula, marginalized its local population and stimulated
migration that ended with a forceful deportation of Crimean peoples in 1944. In addition,
both imperial regimes created very similar historical narratives that were very similar in
content: both presented Crimean Tatars as a ‘backward’, ‘uncivilized’ and ‘aggressive’
nation, both narratives accused Crimean Tatars in treason and cooperation with an enemy
during the war. Finally, both imperial regimes ‘settled’ the Crimean space with the
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population that was considered to be loyal to the empires, eventually this lead to the
creation of a new local identity of the colonizers. As a result, after 200 years of settler
colonial policy Crimea’s cultural, demographic and geographic space completely
changed; the very meaning of Crimean changed. Crimea became a melting pot, a highly
militarized society, where representatives of multiple ethnicities were supposed to melt
together into a loyal ‘Soviet people’. It also became a resort, a holiday destination place
for the communist elite and a tourist dream for most other Soviet citizens.

1.4

Conclusion

The rhetoric of the Russian officials and state propaganda regarding the Russian
annexation of Crimea in 2014 is strikingly similar to the settler’s myth, established by the
Manifesto of Catherine II and subsequent historiographical tradition. In both cases the
empire argued that this annexation was necessary for the benefit of local population that
was willing to join the Russian state. In both cases the empire framed the annexation as a
protection of Crimean residents from anarchy – either political instabilities within
Crimean Khanate, or the disruption of political life that happened after the Ukrainian
Euromaidan. Both myths, ironically, assured the Crimean population about the
preservation of their rights and traditions. After 2014 the Russian administration of the so
called ‘Republic of Crimea’ even granted official status to Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar as
well as Russian languages within the republic. In reality, however, this status is largely
celebratory: Russian continues to be the only dominant language, while Ukrainian and
Crimean Tatar are being restricted unofficially, despite the existing ‘legislation’. The
annexation of 2014 demonstrates that settler colonialism transcends time, that
colonization and its methods are not abstract concepts of the 19th century that are
restricted to the history texts.
Since 1783 the settler colonial project of the Russian Empire and, subsequently, the
Soviet Union continued systematic displacement of the local Crimean population and
replaced it with settlers. Both empires reshaped Crimean landscape, environment as much
as they reshaped cultures and psychology of the colonized peoples. Colonization
happened in the space of history, daily life, geographical landmarks. Eventually, the
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empires were creating (or aiming to create) their own world within the occupied land.
This was done through the range of actions “that otherwise appear distinct”.
In order to avoid a Manichean dichotomy it is important to mention that as everything,
settler colonialism is always a project, performed by people, who make mistakes.
Imperial policies are never absolutely consistent. Imperial administrations ‘make
mistakes’ which enable indigenous resistance. As Homi Bhabha argues, colonization is a
process that influences both cultures, despite the intentions of either of them. Subsequent
chapters address this complexity in a context of post-Soviet period in a broader detail.
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Chapter 2

2

(Post-)Imperial Crisis of Identity

On January 28, 1992 U.S. President George H.W. Bush spoke to the American nation in
his State of the Union Address. Standing in front of a joyful room of Members of
Congress and guests, President Bush announced that United States was entering a new
historical period “as an undisputed leader of the age.” The “failed system” of communism
“died this year” and “by the grace of God, America won the Cold War” – proclaimed
Bush, causing a burst of applause.146 Whether intentionally or not, this speech by the
American President gave more signals to the world than one might expect. This is ironic,
because as Serhii Plokhy shows in his The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet
Union, it was in fact George H.W. Bush who made an enormous effort trying to prevent
the fall of the Soviet Union.147 Many veterans of the Ukrainian national movement
remember the episode that Plokhy describes in his book: a visit of the American President
to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic just few months prior to the proclamation of
independence with the intent to persuade Ukrainian leaders to preserve the Soviet
Union.148
The historic speech of the American President was for sure heard in Moscow. The failure
of the largest empire in the world, a crash of the socialist camp in Eastern Europe and the
loss of some ‘core historic lands’ became a painful combination of challenges that
Russian elites and society have been trying to find answers for since the 1990s. These
challenges increased with the necessity for painful economic and institutional reforms as
well as the general poverty of the population. Those challenges have not been simply
political or economic, but cultural – after the fall of the Soviet Union Russian society
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found itself uncertain of its own identity, future of the state and the very boundaries
between the “Self” and “Other.” In other words, the fall of the Soviet Empire raised
questions an answer to which was known to previous generations. The questions
concerned the understanding of Russia, its boundaries, its place in the world as well as
the very meaning of the word Russian. Those questions rose before a nation that lost its
empire and ‘great power’ status with it. It was a nation that experienced (-s) a serious
inferiority complex and formulated (-s) its foreign relations in an attempt to compensate
it. In 2016, Vladimir Putin made an ironic statement that “Russia’s borders end
nowhere.”149 Over the course of his dictatorship that started in 2000 Vladimir Putin,
consciously or not, has been trying to respond to President’s Bush State of the Union
address, and revenge for the “biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century” as
Putin called the fall of the USSR.150
The Soviet Union fell, but the ‘system’ persisted. The post-Soviet political, cultural and
social dynamic operated within the discourse of the Soviet imperial standards: the style of
rule, worldviews, social hierarchies and unspoken rules were informed by that discourse.
The US President celebrated victory over communism. Meanwhile, the new post-Soviet
president in Russia seemed democratic, modern and whiling to bring his country to the
Western standards. Of course, such process was not supposed to be an easy one. But
eventually, Russia was expected to join the ‘club’ of the democratic ‘civilized’151
countries. The celebrations by Bush based on the presumption that after the fall of
communist Eastern Europe had only one way to go – towards the Western-style
democratic market economy. Post-Soviet history, however, proved that assumption
wrong.
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This chapter provides a general cultural and political context that existed during the early
post-Soviet years and during the early years of the Ukrainian and Russian post-Soviet
state-building. The Crimea question, the competition of Ukraine and Russia for the
peninsula, as well as Crimea’s own post-Soviet settler colonialism existed within the
wider cultural and political processes that began with the fall of the Soviet Union and the
end of the Cold War. Due to the development of the post-Soviet and post-communist
studies, there is hardly any necessity to analyze the transitions of identity in close detail.
However, the introduction of post-colonial lenses and critical theory might add a
somewhat different angle to the known topics. It seems at times that scholarly analysis of
post-communist transition at times becomes too analytical, too distanced from the
Russian cultural context (which is another well-researched topic, of course), too ‘whitewashed’ and mechanical. The ‘unofficial,’ ‘unspoken’ dimension of Soviet relations
(political, inter-ethnic, cultural, hierarchical) persisted. Moreover, the center of the fallen
empire retained a significant informational and cultural dominance within its (former)
colonies.
The identity crisis in Russia and in Ukraine, though of different natures, defined the
social and political responses to conflicts between Russia and Ukraine. This chapter
demonstrates that Russia’s persistent desire to control Ukraine (and Crimea) was routed
in the imperial identity and the desire to restore the status of the ‘great power.’ Ukraine’s
weak responses to Russia’s (mostly informational) attacks, happened due to the
problematic experience of decolonization, not just for ordinary citizens, but also for
intellectual and political elites. Both countries, both societies needed to define their
boundaries. And because the imperial historical narrative inseparably connected
Ukrainian and Russian peoples, both societies often had to define themselves in relation
to one another. Crimea was a microcosm of these complicated Ukraine- Russia
relationships. The population of Crimea, apart from its local specificities, was a Soviet
population and retained most of the popular standards and stereotypes of Soviet society.
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2.1
The Eastern European ‘Mimic Man’: Making
Russia Great Again
Describing/analyzing the crisis of identity with the use of Homi Bhabha’s theory seems
ironic, since any kind of identity, according to Bhabha, is ambivalent and exists in a
constant transition.152 Furthermore, an interpretation of culture (identity) is a form of its
simplification that exists in a particular time and space.153 In other words, one might
interpret Bhabha’s words by saying that the analysis of culture and transition of identity
is an unfulfillable task, because such analysis has little to do with culture. What can be
fruitful for the sake of this research is an attempt to put Bhabha’s ‘mimic man’ in a
cultural context of Larry Wolff’s ‘invented’ Eastern Europe and Alexander Etkind’s
Russia ‘as an empire that colonizes itself’.154 A combination of those three authors might
help to describe the relationships between Russia, its former empire, and the West that at
different historical stages have been if not hostile, then competitive.
The hierarchical division (cultural, political, economic) between Western and Eastern
Europe defines the ‘civilizational standards’ on the continent. Larry Wolff provides an
extensive study of how Western intellectuals of the Enlightenment invented the concept
of ‘Eastern Europe’ as a Western Europe’s ‘Other’.155 This invention built on the
European tradition of defining the ‘Other’ as uncivilized that became a foundation and
ideological justification for the European colonialism. The invention of ‘Eastern Europe’
established a modern hierarchy in which the eastern part of the continent appeared in an
‘in-between space’ between the West and the ‘Orient’. The invention of a hierarchy
within the European continent (or within what was thought of as a European continent)
was a part of a general process of the use of an Enlightened knowledge as an instrument
of power and domination, exercised by the (Western) European empires in their overseas
colonies. Although the division was established back in the 19th century, Wolff starts his
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narrative with the 1946 Fulton speech of Winston Churchill and demonstrates that this
division persisted well into the 20th century.156 Wolff’s argument can (and should)
definitely be extended both in terms of chronology and content. In the 21st century the
mental map of Eastern Europe for many people in the world hardly means more than an
‘in-between space’. Eastern Europe continues to be ‘lesser Europe’ – culturally,
economically and geopolitically. The knowledge about Eastern Europe continues to be
mostly stereotypical: how could it be different if most Western scholars who claim to
study Eastern Europe specialize in Russia and seem to think of the region as
homogenous?
To an extent, Eastern Europe is a Bhabha’s ‘mimic man’ – a colonized individual that
was educated to ‘reach the cultural standards of civilization’ of the colonizer, the ‘Other’
that is “almost the same [as us – civilized colonizers], but not quite”.157 That makes the
whole discourse of Eastern Europe colonial, without making Eastern Europe a political
colony of the West. While trying to follow the cultural example of the West as a superior
civilization, Eastern Europe mimics the West in an attempt to be recognized as equal – an
unreachable goal in a colonial discourse, where the (cultural, political, economic)
domination is exercised through the perception of one’s level of development. This
colonialism is subtle, because it does not involve an actual direct military or political
domination, but only a strong cultural perception of West’s ‘more advanced’ position.
Western scholars of colonialism do not write about it. To them, the history of colonialism
is a story of the ‘First’ and the ‘Third’ worlds. The ‘Second’ world is completely absent
from their ‘map’, creating what Alexander Etkind called “a hole in the image of the
world”.158 One of the characteristics of a ‘mimic man’ is a desire to resemble the ‘master’
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– that example of true civilization of development that the (Western) European
represents. Bhabha’s ‘mimic man’ is somewhat similar to Franz Fanon’s colonized
subject in a ‘white mask’. In both cases the authors talk about the knowledge (and control
over the colonial narrative) as an instrument of power and domination. What is different
is that Bhabha’s ‘mimic man’ is a result of a conscious creation by a colonizer, while
Fanon’s black colonized subject decides to put on a ‘white mask’ to resemble white
person. The result for both colonized is an ‘in-between space’, although Bhabha’s ‘mimic
man’ seems to be ‘more visible’ to the colonizer, since mimicry allows “partial
representation”.159
Alexander Etkind looks at the history of Russian attempts to resemble Western European
empires. He argues that until the 19th century Russian imperial elites treated the nonprivileged classes of society as subjects that needed to be colonized. In the meantime,
they saw the West as their cultural example. As the empire grew and expended its borders
externally, there still remained placed within the empire that Russian authorities and
intellectuals saw as backward and uncivilized.160 Therefore, the metropole and colonies
of the Russian empire existed within the body of the empire, making Russia an empire
and a colony at the same time. Etkind shows the unevenness of the Russian imperial rule
throughout the Russian imperial history. The history of the Russian imperialism to a
significant extent becomes a history of a mimicry, an attempt of the Russian imperial
elites to draw civilizational line between themselves and the lower classes. By drawing
this line, the imperial noblemen of course defined themselves as representatives of the
civilized West. This, however, was not necessarily true for the West. Etkind’s quote of
Rudyard Kipling “the Russian is a delightful person till he tucks his shirt in” only
confirms the existence of the Russian empire in an ‘in-between space’ for the Western
European intellectuals.161
Etkind’s concept of ‘internal colonization’, especially in the context of the Russian
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empire, at times seems confusing. The author himself calls ‘internal colonization’ an
oxymoronic term.162 The text does not suggest a clear distinction between internal and
external colonization in the history of the Russian empire. It also assumes that
colonization does not necessarily have to mean foreign invasion.163 It is not always clear
when the author uses the term ‘colonization’ in the meaning of Russian historians of the
19th century, and when he refers to it from a present-day perspective. The difference
(cultural, educational) between classes and the process of ‘forging of nation’ (‘imagining
communities’) in Europe in the 19th century led to ‘internal colonization’ in practically
every country. In this case, the analytical value of the term for present-day analysis is not
quite clear. Especially in the case of the Russian empire, where Russian imperial
narrative claimed the land of present-day Ukraine and Belarus to create a narrative of a
single nation, a ‘core’ of the Russian empire. It is unclear what kind of colonization,
according to Etkind, took place on the territory of Ukraine and Belarus, ‘internal’, or
‘external’. For the 19th century Russian imperial intellectuals those lands were an integral
part of ‘Russia’, due to necessity to historically connect the Russian empire and Kyivan
Rus. But even those intellectuals saw the differences (at least linguistic) between
Russians and Ukrainians, Orientalized Ukrainians and compared Ukrainian peasants to
Black slaves of North America.164 What Etkind does show, however, is a history of
mimicry of the Russian imperial elites, the attempt of the Russian empire to resemble
Western empires and the exchange of imperial knowledge between empires.
In the context of “Eastern Europe” (as a geographical/political/cultural/mental construct)
Bhabha’s ‘mimic man’ becomes a layered concept. A desire to resemble a ‘civilizational
standard’ encourages Russian empire to import some imperial practices from the West.
Unlike British imperial authorities, however, the Russian empire incorporated elites of
the colonized nations. While racial dynamic was present in the context of the Russian and
Soviet empires, it was also different from the Western traditions of racism and racial

162

Etkind, Internal Colonization…, 2.

163

Ibid., 7.

164

Mykola Riabchuk “Ukrainians as Russia’s Negative ‘Other’: History Comes Full Circle,” Communist
and Post-Communist Studies 49, no. 1 (2016): 77.

70

segregation.165 In the meantime, Russian imperialism contributed to the creation of a
lower layer of ‘mimic man’ that now saw Russian culture as an example of civilization –
those are representatives of non-Russian nations in Eastern Europe who see Russian
culture as their example. Alexander Etkind and Alexey Miller talk about the unifying role
of Russian culture and literature that was meant to become a shared culture among the
subjects of an empire, an element of a “cultural hegemony” and a creator of Russian
nationalism.166 Of course to get such role, Russian culture had to become ‘superior’
within the multiethnic empire. This role of a dominant culture persisted through the fall
of the Russian empire into the Soviet times. Alexander Etkind believes it is wrong to
analyze the Soviet Union as a “reincarnation of the Russian empire.”167 To an extent, this
depends on the point of view. For a Russian scholar the Soviet Union was indeed quite
different from the Russian empire. For the non-Russian nations, however, there was more
continuity in imperial policies. One of such elements that were imported from the prerevolutionary times was the role of the Russian language, culture and history as an
instrument that kept the multiethnic Soviet empire together. This was a method to make
Russians a cultural example for other Eastern Europeans. The role of the Russian
language and culture, defined by the state, put Russians in a position of civilized
colonizers in the region. The idea of a unifying role of the Russian culture persisted into
the post-Soviet era as well, up to these days Russian imperialist thought defines the
territorial claims based on the shared cultural experience – exposure to Russian language
and literature. In addition, as shown by Etkind and by scholars of the Soviet society, both
empires disregarded the peasant class as backward and underdeveloped.
‘Mimic man’ is a product of an instilled inferiority complex. The very definition of this
term by Bhabha presumes the hierarchy of cultures of the colonizer and the colonized.
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From this point of view, Soviet and Russian (post-Soviet) imperialism and anti-Western
antagonism suggest compensatory behavior, an attempt to ‘match’ (and surpass) a
cultural example. The struggle of the Russian imperial, Soviet and post-Soviet Russian
‘mimic man’ has been to be recognizes as equal by the great powers of the West. The fall
of the Soviet Union and the ‘loss’ of the Cold war to the United States and the ‘West’
predetermined the focus of the Russia’s social debate (among other topics) around the
restoration of a ‘great power’ status. For a whole decade after 1991 Russian officials and
informational sources tried to emphasize the importance of Russia in the international
relations. One of the steps towards reaching this goal was to get recognition as a
successor state to the Soviet Union and to keep the permanent membership in the UN
Security Council (as well as later admittance into the G7 group).168 Russian authorities
paid significant attention to the maintenance of their state’s influence within what they
saw as their domain (sphere of influence) – the post-Soviet region. This sphere of
influence was what made the Soviet Russia an empire. In the post-Soviet times this
sphere of influence was what kept Russian Federation ‘great’. The topic of ‘greatness’ of
Russia appeared in various contexts in speeches of Russian parliamentarians, members of
the government, president’s addresses. Most of the times it was directed at the domestic
audience. Simply speaking, there were generally two contexts in which this topic
appeared: to demonstrate that Russia in its new borders was still ‘great’ and influential
(and was recognized as such by the West) and to state that although Russia was going
through hard times, it still retained potential to regain its ‘greatness’ and to restore its
former influence. In other words, in eyes of the Russian politicians Russia was ‘great’,
but humiliated and, therefore, had a right to restore its previous rightful influence.
Given a very complicated economic situation in Russia, especially during the early
transition period in the economy, Russia’s ‘great power’ status was increasingly hard to
maintain. During the early post-Soviet years the Russian government was unable to feed
its citizens and therefore had to accept humanitarian aid from the West. The IMF credit
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program that the West started in Russia to support its economy might have been
economically helpful, but also humiliating. The fact that officials from international
institutions were to decide Russia’s fate was akin to a challenge of Russia’s agency and
sovereignty. During one of the press-conferences in July 1992 President Boris Yeltsin
stated that he would not allow the IMF to “bring us to our knees,” because “Russia is a
great country.”169 In order to maintain the image of a ‘great country’ for the domestic
audience, it was important to emphasize the Russian crucial role in solving various
international problems. Articles in the Russia’s governmental newspaper argued that the
new international system “is impossible without Russia” and that Russia will not be “a
passive observer [statist]” within the international system.170
The desire to emphasize its agency on the international stage and to support the claims
for the ‘great power’ status suggests a need of the Russian authorities to receive
moral/political compensation for the loss in the Cold war. Russian military power and
nuclear power status played an integral role in a construction of this post-Soviet
‘greatness.’ News articles regarding the international negotiations between Russia and the
West (United States), published by the Rossiiskaia Gazeta emphasized the importance of
Russia during these negotiations. Russian observers and analysts described the
negotiations between the American and Russian presidents over the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty II as a conversation between presidents “of two great states.”171
Therefore, the need for cooperation between the US and Russia came out of the fact that
those were “two most powerful nuclear states” – the emphasis here is on a military
power, but not on economic, cultural or any other kinds of exchange.172 It was important
for those contributors to emphasize that Russia was a country that defined the
international agenda as it used to, that decisions of the Russian authorities influenced
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people’s lives globally.
By mid and late 1990s the rhetoric of the Russian President (as well as some experts and
journalists) towards the West became more hostile. The narrative demonstrated an idea
that Russia’s international stance after 1991 was precarious, but at last the state was
getting ready to reclaim its position in the world. In 1995, for instance, the first issue of
the Rossiiskaia Gazeta published an article titled “Superpower Without Tutelage.”173 The
author, Mikhail Shchipanov, argued that United States undervalued the great power status
of the Russian Federation. According to Shchipanov, Russian interests went beyond
Russian borders, as some American officials had argued: “As many political science
experts believe, during the coming year all questions regarding the status of Russia as a
great power will be dropped,” “in Moscow [officials/representatives/negotiators] just
stopped being so submissively susceptible to moral preaching as, for example, two years
ago.”174 At that time NATO was expanding to the East, to the former territories
controlled by the Soviet Union, which caused protests from the Russian leadership. The
narrative about Russia ‘getting back to its feet’ on the international arena had obvious
built-in hints about Western dominance that Russia needed to resist. The ‘great power’
status was necessary for Russia as an element of identity that proved the state’s
‘maturity,’ its ability to ‘match’ the West in terms of power and, therefore, sovereignty
and agency.
The West, especially the United States and the NATO block, were presented to the
Russian public as a threat, as aggressive institutions with aggressive external military,
economic and political behavior. This was an old Soviet image of the Western ‘Other’
that was now employed in the construction of the post-Soviet Russian state and identity.
Identification against the ‘Other’, according to Homi Bhabha is one of the stages of selfidentification.175 The oxymoron-ness of Russia’s self-identification as an opponent of the
West was in the fact that Russia was heavily dependent on Western economic aid.
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Russian politicians had to send positive and friendly messages externally, while
continuing its anti-Western rhetoric for domestic audience. In winter of 1999 Daniel
Triesman, a political science professor at the University of California at that time, argued
in his article in the Foreign Policy that the West should not pay attention to the Russian
anti-Western rhetoric and to leave Russia “a face-saving way” to return to the “cordial
relations” with the West.176 Although this opinion might not be representative for the
Western scholarly community regarding the attitude towards Russia, the quote is ironic
giving the use of a similar rhetoric by Western politicians after Russia invaded Ukraine in
2014. The fact of the matter is, Western countries continued their support for what many
saw as a new ‘democratic’ Russia and did not pay much attention to the gradual
intensification of the anti-Western and anti-NATO rhetoric of the Russian politicians and
opinion-makers.
Another method for claiming ‘great power’ status or to persuade foreign (and domestic)
audiences that Russia had this status was to retain Russia’s domination in the former
Soviet Union. In fact, after 1992 Russian authorities invented a term “near abroad
countries” as a way to refer to the former republics of the Soviet Union. This “near
abroad” was a yet another ‘in-between’ space. For post-Soviet Russian politicians “the
near abroad” was not a foreign territory, but a space of (former) Russian possessions, a
territory of the natural spread of Russian political and cultural influence. Russian internal
social debate over the future of the Russian state constantly involved the discussion of the
‘millions of Russians’ that appeared outside of Russia after the fall of the USSR.
Identifying various groups (mostly Russian speaking) outside of Russia as ‘Russians’
eventually formulated a problem of definition of ‘Russian’ within the domestic space.
Any significant social changes in the former Soviet republics – mostly related to state and
nation building – caused a sensitive reaction from Russian politicians and observers. The
creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (the official way to refer to the
“near abroad countries”) from the Russian point of view was supposed to be a first step
towards further integration and (possible) restoration of the Soviet Union in a new
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format.
Russian diplomacy and President Yeltsin tried to use the structures of the CIS to enforce
a Russian stance on the international stage. Their fight for the CIS control over the former
Soviet military in former Soviet republics resembled an imperial fight for preservation of
control over colonies. During the transition period the former strategic forces of the
Soviet army went under the joint command of the CIS. In reality, however, the
commander of the CIS armed forces Marshall of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov was a
former Soviet Minister of Defense. Marshall Shaposhnikov could hardly be an
independent figure. He responded to President Yeltsin personally, attended meetings of
the Russian Parliament and was fully integrated into the new Russian political and
institutional context.177 What this meant is that while formally the armed forces of the
former Soviet Union (including nuclear weapons) were under joint command, it was in
fact the Russian President who had real control over those forces and represented CIS
militarily on the international stage. In addition to that, as early as in 1992 Russian
President Yeltsin offered the members of the CIS to represent their interests during the
meeting of the G7 group.178 At the time, Russia was not part of G7, but really wanted to
be admitted there. This however had to happen on ‘equal’ terms. The West had to invite
Russia into the G7. Public ‘application’ to join the group was considered unworthy.179 In
1994 during his presidential address to the parliament Yeltsin said that strong Russia is
the most serious guarantor of stability in the post-Soviet area.180 Russian demand for
recognition based on its perception of one’s influence in the region. From the formal
point of view, CIS was a group of newly independent states that agreed to have some
shared institutions during the post-Soviet transition period. But here again a historian
meets a ‘gap’ between official rhetoric and reality: Russian politicians and observers
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often saw no distinction between the CIS institutions and those of Russia, just like in the
Soviet times Russians associated themselves with the whole state, but not with just a
single republic. Post-Soviet Russian authorities acted on a presumption that the world
was divided into domains, and the CIS was their sphere of influence.
Russian policy towards the CIS region was neither internal, nor foreign. To a large extent
Russian policy in “the near abroad” depended on and influenced the Russia’s internal
debate of the national and territorial boundaries of a new post-Soviet country. The idea of
Russians as ‘the most divided nation’ of the Soviet Union appeared in the international
debate right after the fall of the USSR. Russian politicians from different political camps
as well as journalists and scholars contributed to the creation of the image of ‘oppressed
Russian people’ in the non-Russian post-Soviet states. The fact that the term Russian was
under debate in Russian Federation itself allowed the image to include not just ethnic
Russians, but Russian-speaking population of the former Soviet Union. It was then
Russian president and state institutions who proclaimed themselves responsible for the
protection of the Russian-speakers from ‘oppression’. ‘Oppression’ included, for
example, language and citizenship laws in the Baltic states that made the knowledge of
the state language a necessary requirement in order to obtain citizenship. And when the
Ukrainian authorities began to stamp old Soviet passports with the Ukrainian coat of
arms to confirm Ukrainian citizenship, this was also considered an attack on people’s
rights.181 The Russian public saw the necessity to develop a new post-Soviet Russian
statehood. But when other former Soviet republics did the same, those actions were
criticized and labelled ‘nationalist.’ Any successes in Russia made the country a ‘great
state,’ any failures in countries of the post-Soviet region (especially Slavic ones) made
Russia even ‘greater.’ Russian media paid specific attention to the economic problems in
non-Russian post-Soviet republics. For example, Ukraine’s energy resources debt before
Russia became a matter of political manipulation and popular jokes at the time.
Russia’s carrot and stick approach towards the ‘near abroad’ in 1990s often resembled
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the relations between the former metropole and its independent colonies, described by
Franz Fanon. Fanon says that after the fight for independence is over, and the metropole
has to accept the loss of a colony, it sets barriers (political and economic) for the
development of a newly independent state. The fact that metropole’s economy benefited
from the resources extracted from the colony is often ignored.182 The logic of the former
metropole, in Fanon’s words, is the following: “If you want independence, take it and
suffer the consequences.”183 Russian rhetoric about the ‘brotherhood’ of three Slavic
nations (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians) came in hand with the ‘energy
blackmailing,’ when Russian authorities received political concessions from Ukrainian
and Belarusian governments in exchange for lower gas and oil prices. The UkraineRussia negotiations over the separation of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, for instance,
were heavily influenced by the energy debt that Ukraine had before Russia.
Russia’s understanding of its imperial multiethnic ‘Self’ is based on a deeply instilled
privilege that allowed Russian nationals to not see the discrimination towards nonRussian languages and cultures. This is why, when non-Russian Soviet republics
proclaimed independence, many Russians could not comprehend the reasons. In one of
their reports analysts from the Ministry of Science of the Russian Federation called the
new Russian state borders “unusual” for the Russian people.184 A month later, in May
1992, Russian Vice-President Alexander Rutskoy in his article titled “Blindness” said:
“people who did not remember about their nationality for decades, now suspiciously look
at their neighbors…”185 The phrasing in Russian seems to have a note of disappointment,
surprise and bitterness in it: for decades everybody seemed to accept the dominant
position of the Russian culture around the USSR, but suddenly this ‘common sense’ was
under attack. Russia lost the empire and this loss was painful: nobody expected that
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nations of the Soviet Union would suddenly want to build different states, separately
from Russians. Moreover, nobody expected non-Russian nations to manifest their nonRussian-ness so openly: to create\revive their historical narratives, to protect their
national languages, to require Russians to know the local languages of the territories they
lived on. The formal ideology of the Soviet Union was that of the ‘brotherhood of
nations.’ In that brotherhood there was one elder brother – Russian – ‘first among
equals.’ The destruction of that status quo, and even more so – the willingness of nonRussian people (especially Slavic nations – Ukrainians and Belarusians) to self-identify
was hurtful for the Russian identity. The inability to see and identify privileges did not
prevent representatives of Russian minorities from actually feeling oppressed in the nonRussian post-Soviet states.
In his article on the Soviet national policy that was published in Slavic Review in 1994
Yuri Slezkine uses the concept of “USSR As a Communal Apartment” to describe the
approach of the Soviet government and communist ideologists to inter-ethnic relations
and hierarchies. Given the time when the article appeared, it might have been the author’s
way to respond to the abovementioned painful experience of self-identification of the
Russian nation. Throughout the article the scholar talks about the Soviet policy of
korenizatsiia (indigenization) that Soviet authorities (and Vladimir Lenin personally)
launched in 1920s. Slezkine quotes one of the communist representatives Iosif Vareikis,
according to whom “the USSR was a large communal apartment in which ‘national state
units, various republics and autonomous provinces’ represented ‘separate rooms’”.186
Slezkine argues that this policy of the Soviet authorities created separate ‘rooms’ for
every nation, but Russian, due to its imperial and aggressive past.187 Therefore, Russians
of the Soviet Union did not have their own ‘room’:
“In the center of the Soviet apartment there was a large and amorphous
space not clearly defined as a room, unmarked by national paraphernalia,
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unclaimed by ‘its own’ nation and inhabited by a very large number of
austere but increasingly sensitive proletarians.”188
Speaking about the policy of indigenization the author describes the forceful nature of
conversion to the language of the republic in schools and other state institutions. He
emphasized that Soviet authorities did everything possible to make non-Russian
languages “as different as possible.”189 With the official reversal of indigenization in
1930s, the Russian nation gained more influence in the state. Russians increasingly
started to identify with the Soviet Union in general.190 Russians started to “bully their
neighbors and decorate their part of the communal apartment (which included the
enormous hall, corridor and the kitchen where all the major decisions were made) [my
emphasis – M.S.] but they did not claim that the whole apartment was theirs…”191 After
60 years of the Soviet national policy, according to Slezkine, all republics got “a native
control.”192 When the Soviet Union fell, the result of the Soviet national policy, was the
following:
“…the tenants of various rooms barricaded their doors and started using
the windows, while the befuddled residents of the enormous hall and
kitchen stood in the center scratching the backs of their heads. Should
they try to recover their belongings? Should they knock down walls?
Should they cut off the gas? Should they convert their ‘living area’ into a
proper apartment?”193
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The reason for such a long description of a scholarly article is that it well reflects the
thinking of many in Russia during the time when it was written. It demonstrates how
even a highly professional historian still exists in his own cultural and national context.
Upon presenting an idea that Russians were the oppressed nation in the Soviet Union, the
author finishes by asking rhetorical questions about the Russia’s future. The cultural
context in which these questions appeared did not need to explain, for example, how
Russians’ ‘belongings’ appear in rooms of other families of the apartment? Who gave
them a right to knock down walls? If Soviet Union indeed was a communal apartment,
then it would be impossible for residents of a hallway to have property in all the rooms.
The phrasing here suggests an existence of a certain ‘common sense’ – aspects of life that
do not need explanation. Apparently, Russia’s claims (territorial, cultural and other) to
former Soviet republics constituted that ‘common sense’. Contrary to Slezkine’s
arguments, his final rhetorical questions suggest that Russians did claim the whole
territory of the Soviet Union and therefore felt entitled to interfere in domestic relations
of newly independent states. The very crisis of Russian identity came out of the
understanding that it was no longer possible to ‘store belongings’ and to access them at
any time in rooms of other families; that ‘knocking down walls’ could become harder,
when the residents do not recognize the authority of decisions, adopted in the kitchen.
Yuri Slezkine describes indigenization as a forceful experience but does not directly call
it painful for Russians. His description of the Soviet foreign policy, however, suggests
that Russians were oppressed by the Soviet state. An idea that Russians were victims of
the Soviet Union was very popular in late 1980s and early 1990s. Basically, this was one
of the ideas that created an ideological foundation for the proclamation of Russia’s
sovereignty (and later independence) within the Soviet Union.194 These ideas seem
common for the Russian nationalist thought of that time. Indigenization (and especially
Ukrainization as a local variation of that policy) was a painful experience of the Russian
past. This is especially visible in an essay “How Should We Organize Russia” that
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, a Soviet dissident and influential Russian nationalist, published
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in 1990. Solzhenitsyn’s essay is a good example of ‘oxymoron-ness’ of the post-Soviet
culture and politics. On the one hand, the author recognized the existence of Ukrainian
and Belorussian nations that are separate from Russian. On the other hand, his messages
mirrored the dominant historical narrative. In Solzhenitsyn’s views those three nations
were “one people” (odin narod) that came from the Kyivan Rus.195 The essay combined
what looks like opposite proposals for the future of Russia. As anti-imperialist and anticommunist, Sozhenitsyn was sure that Soviet Union had to be dissolved, that Russia had
no resources to maintain an empire and needed to focus on itself instead. On the other
hand, he proposed to create a ‘Russian Union’ that would consist of Russia, Ukraine and
Belarus.196 This project would of course be viewed as imperial by many Ukrainians and
Belarusians. Solzhenitsyn accepted the idea of independence of Ukraine and Belarus. But
such independence had to be proclaimed on region by region basis. That way every
region of Ukraine would have to vote which country to join. This proposal came from an
assumption that many regions of Ukraine would vote to join Russia and not Ukraine.
“Where does this gesture come from – to chop Ukraine off the alive [body] (including the
part where there was never Ukraine, like ‘Wild Steppe’ of nomads – Novorossia or
Crimea, Donbass and up to the Caspian sea)” – exclaims Solzhenitsyn in his address to
Ukrainians.197 In other words, if Ukraine decided to proclaim independence, it would
have to pay for it with its territories. In Solzhenitsyn’s mind, both Russians and
Ukrainians suffered from communists, and therefore, those were communists who were
responsible for the crimes of the Soviet past.198 He acknowledged that “forceful
Russification” of Ukraine was a crime, but to him “forceful Ukrainization” of Ukraine
was also a crime.199
Aesthetically, Solzhenitsyn’s essay reflects the attitude of Russian nationalists to Ukraine
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and Belarus. It reflects this same bitterness and surprise that Alexander Rutskoy called
“Blindness”. It also demonstrates that the author is well aware (at least subconsciously)
of a socially constructed privileges, granted to his nationality, but is not ready to
acknowledge them. Maybe this is the reason why he starts his address to Ukrainians and
Belarusians by claiming that he is “kin” to them: “I myself am almost half Ukrainian.”200
This kind of claim for having relation to Ukraine, coming from Russian nationals was
very common at that time. Making such statement meant that the speaker claimed the
right to express on Ukraine’s matter and not be accused of Russian chauvinism. This kind
of claim for ‘Ukrainian-ness’ appeared in and outside newspaper debates very regularly.
The question of Ukraine for the Russian nationalism, therefore, was two-dimensional. On
the one hand, Soviet tradition, and, therefore, the Russian political establishment,
recognized the existence of a separate Ukrainian (and Belarusian) nation. On the other
hand, Ukrainians were ‘the same people’ (based on the Russian perception of Ukraine’s
similar culture and language) with Russians. This was why any manifestation of
Ukraine’s desire for independence equaled ‘betrayal’ and caused resentment. One of the
ways to prove that would be to look at the use of Ukrainian words samostiynist,
nezalezhnist, svidomist (self-governance, independence, [national] consciousness) in the
Russian language.201 It was (is) common for the Russian information sources to
transliterate (rather than translate) those words and use them in Russian-language texts
whenever it was necessary to express emotionally loaded disrespect to the fact of
Ukrainian independence, culture, language and history.202 Such appropriation of
linguistic elements of another culture had an embedded hint of xenophobia, an attack that
was clear enough to be understood and covert enough to seem appropriate for a public
space.
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Solzhenitsyn, of course, did not represent the Russian authorities in 1990s. The Yeltsin’s
circle was very heterogeneous and changed over the decade. Back in early 1990s it was
generally believed that Yeltsin brought a group of democrats with him. One of the
members of this circle in early 1990s, Galina Starovoytova, claimed that Solzhenitsyn’s
essay had a great influence on the first Russian president.203 She herself expressed very
similar views, describing Russia as a colony of the Soviet Union and preoccupied with
the protection of ‘Russian minorities’ outside of Russia.204 As time passed, the
authoritarian tendencies of Yeltsin’s presidency grew. The small group of democratic
politicians, who indeed supported Yeltsin, did not get the real power in the state.205 In the
meantime, old Soviet military elites and former party nomenklatura (including the
opposition within the Communist party) became the forces that Yeltsin relied on.
Nationalist ideas were not alien to those groups, although, they often took a milder form
than that expressed by Solzhenitsyn. New Russian state adopted pre-revolutionary state
symbols, which corresponded to the nationalists’ view of pre-revolutionary Russia as an
example that the new state had to follow: in 1993 Russian president issued a decree
which changed the Russian coat of arms to the double-headed eagle with three crowns;
in 1990 the Supreme Council of the Russian SFSR adopted a new state anthem –
although it had no words, the composition “The patriotic song” was written by Mikhail
Glinka in 1895; in 1991 the Supreme Council adopted a new flag – another prerevolutionary symbol of the state. Following the example of many post-socialist countries
in Eastern Europe post-Soviet Russia was building a new state on the pre-communist (in
this case – imperial) symbols.

203

Galina Starovoitova, Interview by Vitalii Portnikov, (Moscow, 1997) in Margarita Hewko, Sara Sievers.
The Collapse of the Soviet Union. The Oral History of Independent Ukraine 1988-1991. Accessed March
20, 2020: https://oralhistory.org.ua/interview-ua/566/.
204

Starovoytova seems to be a good example of tragedy of the Russian liberal ideology. Russian liberals
appeared among those who approached power in early 1990s. Their democratic views provided an
ideological shield for the Yeltsin’s government during the first years of presidency. Liberals themselves,
however, were never given power, neither have they played an important enough executive role. In some
spheres, like ‘protection of Russian minorities’, or Russian presence in Crimea Russian liberals did not
differ too much from nationalists in terms of proposed policies. They expressed same concerns, but were
less aggressive and, therefore, less noticeable.
205

Liliia Shevtsova, Yeltsin’s Russia: Myths and Reality (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1999), 17-18.

84

The problem of imperialism within the Russian identity has been a matter of an ongoing
debate among scholars. Vera Tolz, for instance, argues that there has been a certain
tradition of understanding the Russian empire as the Russian nation-state.206 In other
words, national identity is closely tied to the territory of the multinational empire. In turn,
Geoffrey Hosking argued that the history of the Russian imperial building prevented the
development of the Russian national identity.207 The Late Russian Empire, according to
Hosking, did not have citizens that could formulate a civic national identity. What is
more the empire was too multiethnic, its Russian elites were too different from Russian
peasants to rely on ethnic nationalism.208 In other words, according to Tolz and Hosking,
Russian national identity approached the Soviet times being closely dependent on
empire. And the Soviet period hardly changed that. On the other hand, Alexey Miller
argues that already in 19th century Russian nationalists saw a clear distinction between
the ‘core Russia’ and the non-Russian possession of the empire.209 Miller argues that “a
willingness to consolidate the nation…does not at all means a desire to ‘dismiss’ the
empire”.210 Therefore, he believes that the view of Russian 19th century nationalism as a
movement that wanted to create a nation-state out of the empire is a simplification. Miller
states that during the debates on the ‘boundaries of Russian-ness’ Russian nationalists
never tried to claim the whole territory of the state as Russian national space.211 He then
points to the fact that Russian nationalism developed in opposition to the Russian empire,
although it did influence the “official nationalism” of the state.212
These views on Russian nationalism are important here for several reasons. First of all,
the tradition in which Russian nationalism opposes but also influences the official
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ideology of the state is clearly visible since 1990 and even now.213 Secondly, when Miller
argues that Russian nationalists were not trying to turn an empire into a nation-state and
Russify non-Russian territories, it seems very natural to him that Ukrainian and
Belarusian lands constituted a Russian ‘core’ to Russian nationalists. This is true, of
course, but this should bring some important modifications to the Miller’s argument:
although Russian nationalist project in the 19th century did not try to turn the whole
empire into a nation-state, it still envisioned Russification of Ukrainian and Belarusian
lands, an imperial policy. In other words, this project was a direct predecessor of the
‘anti-imperial’ proposal of Solzhenitsyn to create ‘Russian Union’. Miller acknowledges
this, when he talks about the symbolic power of the city of Kyiv for the Russian
nationalist thought.214 From this point of view the concept by Vera Tolz of ‘Russian
empire as a nation state’ seems more valid than Miller would like. In the Tolz’s words:
"… the idea that the new Russia should be primarily the state of Russian
speakers who enjoy a legally defined dominant status, as well as the idea
that the Slavic nucleus of the USSR should reunite, attracts the largest
support within the Russian Federation.”215
This idea of Russian national identity presumes the necessity of imperial control over the
Ukrainian and Belarusian Slavic peoples. The irony here is that such control would not be
considered imperial by proponents of such idea.
This struggle to define the boundaries to a large extend determined the Russian policy in
the ‘near abroad’: appeals to the need of protection for the Russian-speaking people, lack
of clear distinction between Russians and Russian-speakers, territorial claims for Crimea
and Eastern Ukraine, fight against ‘revisionism’ of history, against national symbols of
the former Soviet republics (Ukraine, in particular) etc. Arguably, such crisis resulted in
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the lack of consistency of the foreign policy towards the region. Russian authorities
unofficially supported the war in Transnistria that was meant to prevent Moldova’s
‘unification’ with Romania. Rossiiskaia Gazeta published articles that paid tribute to
Russian ‘volunteers’ fighting against Moldova’s government forces and predicted that
similar scenario could happen in Baltic states, where ‘oppressed Russian-speakers’ could
start an uprising.216 In the meantime, Russian authorities were not ready to get into a
similar conflict with Ukraine. This is why, while Russian Supreme Council expressed
claims for the Ukrainian city of Sevastopol, Russian president and government publicly
denounced such position.217
Apart from those external challenges to the Russian identity, there was a strong fear that
Russian Federation can continue falling apart and follow the path of the Soviet Union.
Not all autonomous republics within the new Russian Federation were willing to sign the
Federation treaty, proposed by Yeltsin. The republic of Tatarstan (as well as Yakutia and
some others) and its local elites, for instance, was able to create a real challenge to the
center: proclaim sovereignty, elect local president and disapprove of the Federation
treaty.218 The lack of unity among the different parts of the Russian Federation in
addition to the permanent political and economic crisis (as well as unprecedented crime
rates) created an atmosphere of depression within the society. The first war in Chechnya
that started in 1994 brought a certain rise of nationalism and patriotism in the Russian
society. Surprisingly, this rise corresponds to the statements about the Russian
international ‘greatness’ mentioned above.
In order to resolve the problem of integrity of a new state Russian authorities began to
forge a new Russian, as a political category – Rossiyane, instead of ethnic Russkie, both
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translated into English as Russians.219 To an extent the introduction of a new political
term might resemble a plan to develop a modern political nationality: no matter the ethnic
background, all citizens of the Russian Federation became Rossiyane. On the other hand,
combined with a public denouncement of ethnic nationalism, such national policy
resembled Soviet national policy of the ‘brotherhood of nations’. Post-Soviet Russian
Federation, just like the Soviet Union, declared the importance of non-Russian national
and cultural rights. In 2000s and especially after 2010 such national policy yet again
resembles gradual Russification campaigns of the past. To an extent this means that what
was seen as a creation of a political nationality in 1990s, turned into the development of
an imperial state. The biggest difference between the Russian and the Western
imperialism is that while the West drew various lines between the metropoles and
colonies, Russian imperialism, in fact, often destroyed those lines and wished to
assimilate colonized minorities. Therefore, while a creation of all-encompassing identity
in the Western context looks like a creation of political nationality, this is not necessarily
true for Russia. The official Russian ideology in 1990s was not ethnic nationalist, but
(state, cultural) nationalism was constantly present, even if not acknowledged; (cultural)
Russians continued to be the dominant nationality. The term Russian continued to be
undefined – the ethnic category was too narrow even for Russian Federation, while the
political category was so broad and flexible that could potentially involve the whole postSoviet region, or at least its Slavic and/or Russian-speaking part.

2.2

Forging a Ukrainian Post-Soviet Identity

Ukraine’s post-Soviet identity and the process of state-building went through a crisis of
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its own. This crisis had some similarities with the Russian one but did not involve any
ambition for great power status. Ukraine did become a legal successor of the Ukrainian
SSR, which automatically made it a member of the UN. Other than that, the whole
system of international relations and internal state building had to be built from scratch.
The newly independent republic inherited a large and heterogeneous population, a system
of economy that was integrated with the economies of other Soviet republics, an
enormous army that it did not at first control, the third largest nuclear arsenal in the
world, and extreme poverty.
Ukraine’s new political elites, at the time of independence, could hardly fit for the role of
state builders. Speaking in terms of colony-metropole relationships, the new Ukrainian
political elites were a Soviet version of colonial administration. Their managerial
experience during the Soviet past did not involve policy creation on a scale of an
independent state, but only fulfillment of instructions that came from the state capital.
Neither did they have much experience in international relations. The Foreign Ministry of
the Ukrainian SSR had mostly ceremonial functions. Russia also ‘inherited’ the vast
majority of the foreign real estate from the Soviet Union. This meant that diplomats of
the new Ukraine often did not even have places to work.
Most top politicians of independent Ukraine were part of the former communist
nomenklatura. The first President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, was elected from a
position of a chairman of the Supreme Council. Previously, he served as a secretary for
ideology in the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party. His main political
opponents belonged to Narodny Rukh (People’s movement) party – a heterogenous group
of proponents of the Ukrainian independence that united people from the nationallyoriented intelligentsia all the way to the right side of the political scale. Their leader,
Vyacheslav Chornovil, came second during the first presidential elections. The Soviet
past of both the government and the opposition defined thinking to a large extent. People
who appeared at the top of the Ukrainian politics came from a Soviet province and
operated with Soviet economic and ideological/humanitarian categories. They had to
build a state for a nation that relatively few in the world had known of and that did not
have a strong memory of statehood in the past. Despite being in opposition, Narodny
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Rukh had a great influence on the new Ukrainian ideology and society, playing a role of
19th century budyteli.220 Their efforts contributed to gradual ‘Ukrainization’ of Leonid
Kravchuk himself.
Ukraine inherited a very large and mixed population. A significant part of the population
was nationally Russian. Another large portion was ‘de-nationalized’ – Sovietized. During
the Soviet times every person was ‘born into’ a nationality. Therefore, an understanding
of national belonging became a blurred concept – some people claimed their belonging to
nationality based on their ethnicity, or ethnicity of their parents. Some people defined
their nationality based on their place of birth. This did not necessarily mean that they
shared a national culture of ‘their’ nationality. Some people identified with ‘Soviet’ pannationality. A study by Paul Pirie, published back in 1996 demonstrated how vague were
the categories of self-identification in Southern and Eastern Ukraine, where the majority
of the population was Russian-speaking, but often identified themselves as Ukrainian.221
The study by Pirie and other similar studied of post-Soviet identities in non-Russian postSoviet states demonstrate the methodological flaws and any official censuses and data
collection regarding people’s self-identification. The vast majority of the Ukrainian
population claimed their belonging to the Ukrainian nation, more than a half of Ukrainian
residents named Ukrainian as their native language. However, each respondent could
have one’s own understanding of those questions and one’s own identity.
One of the most interesting terms in Homi Bhabha’s writing is that of “unhomely world”
and feeling of “unhomed” by the colonized subject. According to Bhabha, to be
“unhomed” does not literally mean ‘to be homeless’. This term refers to a marginalized
feeling, when a person cannot find one’s own place within the dominant cultural/political
discourse.222 Being ‘unhomed’ in a broad sense means being political/culturally
displaced, based on certain characteristics (race, gender, class, nationality etc.). Unhomed
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person distorts the public and private spheres of life by manifesting one’s own ‘in
between’ existence publicly. This manifestation happens when ‘unhomed’ brings public
attention to what’s supposed to stay undefined, within the limits of one’s home.223 In a
hierarchical colonial space feeling of unhomed is more than just a reference to one’s
social, cultural or political state, but also to psychology of a colonized individual that
decided to challenge the status quo. ‘Unhomed’ in Homi Bhabha’s writing refers to a
variety of types of displacement. It ranges from feminist critique of the patriarchal
domestic space to which women are limited to racial discrimination in settler colonial
societies. In the context of national inequality of Eastern Europe the state of ‘unhomed’
might signify a covert unofficial assimilation under the façade of rhetoric of equality. In
the most simple sense this feeling can be described with a quote from 19th century
Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko:
“It does not touch me, not a whit,
If I live in Ukraine or no,
If men recall me, or forget,
Lost as I am, in foreign snow,—
Touches me not the slightest whit.
Captive, to manhood I have grown
In strangers’ homes, and by my own
Unmourned, a weeping captive still,
I’ll die; all that is mine, I will
Bear off, let not a trace remain
In our own glorious Ukraine,
Our own land — yet a stranger’s rather…”224
Born to a family of serfs, Taras Shevchenko became one of the original budyteli of the
Ukrainian sense of nationhood. His sense of ‘unhomed’ comes from a feeling of being
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unfree, whether in his native land, or not. “Our own land – yet stranger’s rather” –
reflects Shevchenko’s understanding of foreignness of the Russian imperial rule in
Ukraine, a feeling of a person that feels alienated and marginalized in his own land. To
the poet this marginalization does not differ from the kind that he experiences ‘abroad’.
Shevchenko’s poems became a foundation for the Ukrainian pantheon of heroes, and, to a
large extend, for a separate Ukrainian identity. Shevchenko himself became one of the
Ukrainian heroic pantheon. His poetry defined the mode of Ukrainian patriotism in the
19th century, and, arguably, throughout the 20th century and post-Soviet decades. The
importance of his figure was so strong that his place in the Ukrainian culture and
symbolic pantheon was not challenged (but, rather, appropriated) by the Soviet rule.
Soviet national policies made bearers of the Ukrainian culture and identity unhomed. On
November 5, 1968 when Kyiv was preparing for celebration of an anniversary of the
October revolution, people on the central street – Khreshchatyk – heard a yelling “Down
with occupants,” “Live independent Ukraine. They then saw Vasyl Makukh, who set
himself on fire and ran to the center of the street. His act of a public suicide was a protest
against the Soviet policy of Russification of Ukraine. By making his own body a living
torch, Makukh did exactly what Homi Bhabha refers to when describes the distortion of
public and private spheres. He reclaimed his agency, his right for an identity and his own
independence by publicly manifesting what no one else could. He brought his own
private problem – that of Russification and assimilation of Ukrainian culture and identity
– into the public domain. Everybody knew of that problem, but nobody dared to articulate
it. He protested by setting his own body on fire – another element of a private domain –
in a public space. For a regime that tried to control people’s bodies and thoughts such act
of reclaiming one’s self was a political act in itself. The reaction of the agents of the
regime – Soviet police and KGB – also confirms this distortion: when they saw a person
on fire and heard his statements, their response was to remove people from overcrowded
Khreschatyk street, to reduce the number of witnesses of this political statement, to keep
private what ‘is supposed to be’ private. Vasyl Makukh died in a hospital. KGB then
tortured his sister and interrogated his family members. They tried to find out whether
Makukh was a member of any underground nationalist organization. His wife Lidia lost
her job and had to live in poverty, bringing up their children. Vasyl Makukh died, but his
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family had to bear responsibility for his actions. On January 21, 1978 Oleksa Hirnyk
followed the example of Makukh and set himself on fire near the grave of Taras
Shevchenko. This place was not as public as Khreshchatyk, but it was symbolic. That
was a manifestation of unhomed near the grave of another unhomed. It signified a
centuries-long continuity of oppression against the group that both of them represented.
In his leaflets Hirnyk called on the Ukrainian people to resist Russian occupation and
Russification of Ukraine. One of the leaflets said:
“In commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the proclamation of
independent Ukraine by the Tsentralna Rada [Central Council] on January
22, 1918. On January 22, 1978 Hirnyk Oleksa from [the town of] Kalush
burned himself, as a sign of protest. Is this the only way one can protest in
the Soviet Union?!”225
The KGB did everything possible to keep this act of protest in secret, it only became
widely known after 1991. That same year, in 1978 a Crimean Tatar Musa Mamut set
himself on fire in protest against the state oppression of Crimean Tatars. An act of a
public suicide in such a demonstrative form is inconceivable, unless a psychology of
unhomed is in consideration.226
One of the main instruments of colonial rule, according to Homi Bhabha, is the power to
create and reproduce stereotypes about the colonized.227 Edward Said’s concept of
Orientalism, as a creation of ‘Other’ bases itself of the Western colonial power to create
stereotypes about the Orient, to substitute the real culture of the colonized with a
colonizer’s artificial construct. In this context, it is important to consider Mykola
Riabchuk’s description of the ‘Khohol’/’Little Russian’ stereotype that was created in the
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Russian empire and evolved through the Soviet times as a representation of Ukrainians.
According to Riabchuk, Russian political tradition created a ‘norm’ of ‘good’ Ukrainianness: they had to accept that Russians and Ukrainians were “almost the same people” and
therefore, be open to cultural assimilation of Russians:
“All ‘Little Russians’ in both pre-Soviet and Soviet times had to be fully
aware of both forms of sanctioning in case they dared to question or
overstep the boundaries of the second formula of ‘almost the same people.’
All of them could be either symbolically downgraded to the level of
backward, uncultured serfs (or, eventually, kolkhoz slaves), or totally
excluded socially from life as obsessed nationalistic freaks or, worse,
malicious criminals.”228
This stigmatization created a situation in which Ukrainian language, as one of the most
evident markers of nationality, became associated with backwardness of the rural area.229
As a result, a migration of predominantly Ukrainophone rural population to the Russianspeaking cities of the Soviet Ukraine did not lead to the Ukrainization of the city, but to
Russification of the rural migrants. This is an example of how a socially constructed
perception of prestige contributes to the creation of social and inter-cultural hierarchies
and leads to assimilation of a subaltern culture. In words of Riabchuk “Most Ukrainians
had to either give up their linguistic-cum-cultural deviations and accept the socially
constructed ‘normality’, or fight an uphill battle for their identity against the powerful
‘common sense’ that automatically requalified their cultural deviation into political
deviation.”230
In Soviet and post-Soviet discourse anecdotes about different nationalities were one of
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the popular ways to spread stereotypes, embed them into the everyday culture and to
assert the dominance of Russians within the hierarchy of nations. Western scholars have
been analyzing Soviet political jokes and anecdotes for decades now. CIA even collected
Soviet jokes about political leader and political system of the state. While jokes about the
Soviet system were common, anecdotes about nationalities were numerous as well. They
often ridiculed accents and a manner of speaking by representatives of non-Russian
Soviet nations. This especially related to the people of Caucasian region and indigenous
nations of the North – on obvious element of the racial dynamic that most scholars of the
Soviet history prefer to ignore. Other anecdotes satirized about national traits of different
nationalities, described Russians as winners in all unsolvable and unpredictably hard
situations. The role and the content of the Soviet (and post-Soviet) anecdotes on international topics as a instrument of cultural (and psychological) domination awaits an
extensive study. In particular, it would be important to compare the ways anecdotes
ridiculed opponents in the Cold war and non-Russia nations within the USSR. Jokes are a
kind of instrument that is subtle and covert, it embeds stereotypes on a structural
subconscious level. A recipient is not always aware or does not see that his or somebody
else’s identity is under attack. In the post-Soviet times jokes targeting nationalities were
very responsive to the current political need. Mid- and late 1990s, for example, were a
time of conflict between Russian and the Baltic states (Estonia, for instance) over the
right of the Russian-speaking minorities. This coincided with the time, when jokes about
‘slow’ Estonians appeared regularly in various comic TV shows in Russia. Similarly,
political problems between Russian and Ukraine coincided with jokes related to
Ukrainians, who constantly ‘stole’ Russian gas, ate salo (pork fat) with garlic and wore
sharovary (traditional Cossack pants). No Ukrainian image went without either of those
elements. Needless to say that given the Russian dominance in Ukrainian television and
popular culture throughout 1990s and 2000s, those jokes targeted not just Russian
internal audience, but also audience of other post-Soviet countries.
These stereotypes and socially constructed hierarchies evolved into the post-Soviet times.
To an extent they exist even today, when native Ukrainian speakers switch to their own
poor and often unusual-sounding version of Russian language, when they come to the big
city. This leads to the creation of the colonized identity – exactly those ‘white masks’
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over the black skin, described by Fanon. These masks exist within national, rather than
racial terms. The existence of these stereotypes and hierarchies lead to several important
consequences that characterized Ukrainian society in 1990s. The first is a responsive
nature of the whole ‘Ukrainian project’ in early post-Soviet years (and to a certain extent
even today). The second, is deep inferiority complex embedded into the society by
centuries of imperial rule, a complex which was common for both nationally-minded
Ukrainians and those possessing ‘Little Russian’ colonized identity. Finally, the inability
to openly analyze and consider the Ukraine’s colonial past from the point of view of a
serious scholarship, rather than simple nationalistic/colonial myths contributed to
internalizing of the historic past and conservation of social complexes and stereotypes
about the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. The inability of the Ukrainian society to openly discuss
and process the complicated past is a product of colonized psychology and lack of control
over one’s own informational sphere. It leads to serious lags of the development of a
civil, rather than ethnic national identity. Taras Kuzio argues that the inability of the
Ukrainian society to develop civic national identity came as a result of its competition
with the ethnic national identity.231
The responsive nature of the ‘Ukrainian project’ refers to the control over discourse. It is
a constant need to justify decisions and actions, as well as respond to the accusation of
the colonizer. In a (post-) colonial situation this kind of work takes most of the available
resources. Therefore, the process of decolonization that involves restoration/reinvention
of the natural culture and identity becomes even more complicated. Early Ukrainian state
builders often focused on the rejection of what they saw as the Russian colonial legacy.
Given the problem of limited resources and lack of cultural instruments of
decolonization, this produced multiple (often ridiculous) historical myths about the glory
of Ukraine and Ukrainians, which replaced the real history and gave way to opponents’
criticism. But what is more important, Ukrainian post-Soviet mainstream (that includes
former Soviet nomenklatura) of course failed to step away from the popular Soviet image
of the Ukrainian culture as only limited to Cossack traditional outfits, food and folk
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songs. Nation-oriented intelligentsia from the Narodny Rukh also viewed the nation in
cultural and ethnic terms and, ironically, did not step far enough away from the Soviet
stereotyping of the Ukrainian culture.232
One of the popular myths that appeared in 1990s was that Mykhailo Hrushevski was the
first president of the Ukrainian state during the period of revolution and prior to the
Bolshevik invasion of Ukraine. The history of Ukrainian statehood of the revolutionary
period returned to the historical narrative. Therefore, the classical Soviet Ukrainian antihero Symon Petliura joined the pantheon of Ukrainian heroes. Symon Petliura was a
socialist Ukrainian politician of the revolutionary era, who headed the anti-Bolshevik
struggle. Soviet mythology created an image of him as an ultimate Ukrainian anti-hero,
representative of the ‘Ukrainian nationalism.’ In the post-Soviet pantheon of heroes
Petliura was joined by the 17th century Cossack hetman (warlord) Ivan Mazepa. Mazepa
was known for his alliance with Charles XII of Sweden against Peter I. This made him an
ultimate Ukrainian ‘traitor’ and anti-hero of the pre-Soviet times. A third character who
appeared in the pantheon, although with restrictions, was Stepan Bandera. He was a
Ukrainian far-right nationalist, whose proponents organized a guerilla war against Nazi
and Soviet armies during the Second World war. In the narrative of a Soviet and Russian
propaganda, Bandera was an ultimate ‘Ukrainian Nazi’, again representing the
‘treacherous’ character of the Ukrainian nation. All three of these characters to a
significant extent were a response to the empire’s narrative. If the empire hated them so
much, Ukrainian nationalist though had to rehabilitate them. In a similar fashion the very
term ‘nationalism’ was rehabilitated in mass consciousness, representing an active fight
for one’s independence, rather than aggression against other nations. In addition,
Ukrainian historians and politicians raised questions of Holodomor, political repressions
of Ukrainian intelligentsia and other crimes of the Soviet state in Ukraine. None of those
changes came easily. Every element that challenged Soviet historiography caused fierce
criticism both inside and outside Ukraine, especially in Russia. Ukrainians were accused
of nationalism and extremism, their claims for the history of Kyivan Rus’ provoked jokes
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that emphasized an artificial nature of such claims.
Soviet Ukraine did not have a historical narrative that was separate from the Russian
history in any way. An ‘absence’ of history (in this case – history of statehood) of
Ukraine was the main argument in hands of those, who believed that Ukraine was an
artificial fake state. Any attempts to create, or recreate, such narratives got under heavy
criticism as ‘falsification’ and ‘rewriting’ of history. Ukrainian political and intellectual
elites, therefore, had to prove to the outside critics and to their very population that
independent Ukrainian state had a (historical) right to exist. Even the very name of the
state became a target. There are two main explanations of what did the name ‘Ukraine’
originally mean. Some scholars argued that in medieval times it often described a
‘country’, a particular territory, united by certain characteristics, literal opposite to the
word ‘abroad’. Mykhailo Hrushevski originally described Ukraine as a border territory –
a description of a small piece of land that gave its name to the whole country. A version
of Ukraine as a borderland became popular among Soviet and Russian scholars. Due to
alleged self-evidence of this version, it easily became politically instrumentalized and
turned into insult. In a perception of many, Ukraine was U-kraina (u kraya = ‘on the
edge’) – a country on the border/borderland [of Russia]. A ‘borderland’ has no right for
agency or history of its own, it is an object of influence, a space of competition between
two rival agents. And if Ukraine is a ‘borderland’ than of course another myth of Russian
nationalists gains a lot of sense – Ukrainian nationality was an ‘invention’ of the Austrian
imperial authorities that competed with the Russian empire.233 This myth has obvious
links to the later Soviet understanding of the Piedmont principle, described in Chapter 1.
The perception of Ukraine as a borderland became an integral part of the Western
scholarship and one of the first elements of the Western narrative of Ukrainian history. It
even got into the broader Western political theories: Samuel Huntington described
Ukraine as a country divided by the ‘clash of civilizations’, a country on the edge of two
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competing civilizations.
It is not always clear what comes first – a myth about Ukraine being a ‘divided’ nation, or
the division itself. The statement that Ukraine is divided between the East and the West
has been around analytical texts as long as an independent Ukrainian state exists. It often
seems however, that the ‘division’ became an ‘invented tradition’, a result of long-lasted
stereotyping of different parts of the country, a result of an imperial rule. Politics and
history of other countries of the world demonstrate that divisions within societies
(different political views, economic and social circumstances, even different traditions)
are more of a norm than exclusion. In Ukraine, however, at least until very recent times,
the geographical division was the main element of political analysis. Further chapters will
discuss the way the image of Western Ukraine was constructed in Crimea. This process
was not a post-Soviet invention, but rather a Soviet tradition. At some point, those
political stereotypes enter scholarship and analytics, embed themselves in beliefs of the
population and to an extent become real – if not in what they project, but at least in
influence on the everyday reality.
One way prove the Ukraine’s right for statehood was through the rehabilitation of the
pre-revolutionary Ukrainian historiography (including Mykhailo Hrushevski as a creator
of the Ukrainian historical meta-narrative) and mass research of the ‘blank spots’ of
Ukrainian past. As Taras Kuzio states, after 1991 Ukrainian historians started asking
questions ‘why?’ and ‘who is responsible?’234 The Ukrainian diaspora played its role too:
A History of Ukraine by a Canadian-Ukrainian Orest Subtelny often was the only nonSoviet history of Ukraine, available to Ukrainians in early 1990s. Ukrainian state and
elites were forging the nation and reviving (inventing) historical roots of that nation in the
past. One of the symbols of the new Ukrainian state – a golden trident – became a direct
reference to the history of the Kyivan Rus’ and its prince Volodymyr. Ukraine linked
itself to the medieval history of its own land, which automatically became a direct
challenge for the Russian historical narrative and Western historical narrative of Russia.
Until that time, the topic of Kyivan Rus’ was ‘reserved’ for the Russian historians, and
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Russians were believed to be the main successor of the Kyiv’s medieval past.235
Another problem was that the creators of the new state- and nation-centered narratives in
Ukraine were bearers of all the mentioned myths as well, even though they themselves
believed they were undoing the empire. They often alienated those parts of society that
did not fit into their own parameters of patriotism, and tended to speak past, rather than
spoke to their opponents. One of the examples would be an attempt of quasi-colonization
(‘internal colonization’) of Ukraine’s East and South by nationally-minded Ukrainian
intelligentsia through the organization of music festivals (Chervona Ruta festival as an
example) and other cultural and political initiatives.236 As noble and positive as those
initiatives were for the development of Ukrainian culture, they weren’t and couldn’t be a
basis for dialogue between different parts of the country. Actions of the nationallyminded intelligentsia, put in the Soviet political context and the context of Russian
informational domination, provoked the creation of myth about the nature of those
initiatives. Pro-Ukrainian intelligentsia often lacked strategy and/or clear path to the clear
goals, reducing their actions to self-reassuring symbolism. Being the bearers of the
imperial myths, they often went to the opposite side of the spectrum, presuming that
undoing myths means enforcing their direct opposites. As a result, those colonization
attempts provoked resistance and often reinforces the existing cultural myths. They did,
however, contribute to deconstructing of stereotypes between different parts of the
country. But this effect was smaller than could be expected.
As much as during the Soviet times, in the post-Soviet decades Russian language
remained to be a Ukraine’s link to the world culture, literature and scholarship. The lack
of financial resources, the lack of professional translators and the lack of attention of the
state to this issue contributed to the situation, when Ukrainians read Russian language
translations of the world’s literature. This automatically made Russian language
compulsory for any person who wanted to be an educated member of society and
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contributed to the stereotype high culture and scholarship could not be in Ukrainian
language. University of Kyiv Mohyla academy, established in 1992, might have been one
of the most successful projects that addressed this issue. It was found by a group of
Ukrainian intellectuals as a university that was meant to educate a new post-Soviet
generation of the Ukrainian intellectual elite. From the start the university had two
languages of operation – Ukrainian and English. This encouraged students to build direct
links between Ukraine and the world culture and exclude Russian language and Russian
state from the role of an intermediary.
The problem of Russian control over the media in Ukraine in 1990s appeared in this text
already. Following chapters will show that it was an important factor of Russian (post-)
colonial control over Crimea. There is a need to emphasize that Russian presence in the
Ukrainian media space was a challenge that prevented the internal dialogue, supported
internal myths and contributed to the recreation of the (post-) colonial inferiority
complexes. In many spheres Ukrainian actors (whether ‘pro-Russian’ or ‘anti-Russian’)
existed within the political and cultural frameworks, set by the foreign Russian actors.
The very dichotomy of ‘pro-Russian’ and ‘anti-Russian’ (nationally-minded) Ukrainians
came out of the post-colonial/ post-imperial political discourse.
Finally, whether nation-minded or ‘pro-Russian’, more than anything else, post-Soviet
Ukrainians were hungry people. Extremely harsh economic conditions created a sense of
nostalgia for the Soviet past as early as within the first half of the 1990s. This kind of
nostalgia, in fact, was common for the countries of the former socialist camp. Hard
economic conditions, complicated transformation to market economy as well as the
Soviet mentality (lack of understanding within all social groups of how market economy
functions) often led to a situation, when people voted for economic populists. Economy,
or perception of economy, also often defined political orientation of people. And if the
economic condition in Russia was better, then it became much easier to campaign in
favor of closer economic (as well as political and cultural ties) with the north-eastern
neighbor. Post-Soviet stereotypes, perception of national prestige and inferiority
complexes combined with never stopping economic crisis. Russia was in its own crisis,
but everyone believed (and all Russian media said so) that the economic conditions in

101

Russia were much better than in Ukraine. People were stockpiling what they could and
often had nothing to feed their children with. Many of them did not have time or desire to
consider problems of nationality, identity, future of their country or its political
orientation.

2.3

Conclusion

After the fall of the Soviet Union Crimea appeared in between of the two nation- and
state-building projects that were often being created in opposition to each other. Crimea,
as part of the sacred pantheon of Russian imperial mythology became a part of the postSoviet Russian nationalist discourse. Imagined as a place of the Russian glory, Crimea
seemed to offer to Russians what they had lost with the fall of the Soviet Union –
mightiness and greatness of their state. The importance of Crimea for the Russian postSoviet nationalist thought came out of the dominant historical narrative that which
defined Crimea as an integral part of the Russian culture and history. There was no
economic, strategic or any other rational reason for the post-Soviet Russia to remain
involved in the internal Crimean politics. The only reason based on the imperial legacy
and nostalgia for the historic ‘glory’ that Russians read about in the history books. It was
a matter of a national pride that Crimea (and Ukraine) remained within the Russian
sphere of influence; in future this sphere could potentially become an outpost for the
restoration of the empire. In other words, Russian post-Soviet state and Russian postSoviet nation got trapped in the Russian imperialist narrative, formulated by the Russian
and Soviet empires.
The Ukrainian state and nation-building project often developed in opposition to the
Russian state, as well as in opposition to the Soviet past. This often meant (re-) inventing
the historical narrative and national identity, proving one’s own right for statehood. The
latter was a reflection of deep inferiority complexes, instilled in members of a very
heterogenous group of those who called themselves ‘Ukrainian.’ Having no other
political, cultural, economic example other than the Soviet, Ukrainian political and
intellectual leaders often tried to build a state that would be different from the Soviet, but
with the Soviet instruments. Early 1990s in Ukraine seem to have been a time of
energetic social activism, but very passive state. Ukrainian intelligentsia often had to

102

prove to the Ukrainian population itself that Ukrainian language and culture were not a
point of shame, not a sign a rural (and therefore ‘uncivilized’) background. In places like
Crimea, this last statement was even harder to prove than elsewhere, due to the
competition with the Russian nationalist project and overall political environment of
Crimea.
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Chapter 3

3

Challenge to the Status Quo and Response of Crimea’s
Elites

Crimea entered the post-Soviet historical period as a Russian settler colony. The political,
economic and cultural power on the peninsula laid within the settler colonial institutions.
The uniqueness of such position was in the fact the Crimea appeared as part of a unitary
and independent post-Soviet Ukraine, while the source of its colonial system was in
Russia, in a metropole of a former Soviet and Russian empires. Crimean elites, who were
at the top of the settler colonial institutions, were isolated from the politics of the
Ukrainian SSR and traditionally oriented at Moscow. This traditional orientation predefined their allegiance in the post-Soviet era. Crimean settler colonial institutions and
people in charge of them went to an extensive effort in order to protect the settler colonial
status quo on the peninsula, as it assured the preservation of the existing power relations.
The history of the ‘Crimea’s’ fight for autonomy in the 1990s, therefore, was nothing else
than a fight of the local political elites and settler colonial institutions for the preservation
of their traditional powers and structures. This fight happened through the use of the
available colonial resource, like land distribution, culture, propaganda in the media,
policing and administrative resource. In addition, it relied on the political, cultural and
economic help and support from the (former) imperial center (see Chapter 5). A
component of that fight remained purely external, as a controlled conflict on a territory of
Ukraine was a useful political instrument for the Russian authorities. That instrument
allowed to question the territorial integrity of Ukraine and increase or decrease the
intensity of a pro-Russian separatist movement in Crimea, depending on the political
loyalty and foreign policy orientation of the Ukrainian elites.
The timeline of this struggle begins with a mobilization of the Crimean communist elites
by the end of 1990. This was when the Crimean regional deputies proclaimed the
republican status of the peninsula and declared sovereignty of ‘Crimeans’ over the
peninsula. The rise in political status of the Crimean region and its elites corresponded to
a general Ukraine’s drift towards independence from the Soviet Union and therefore,
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could be seen as a blackmailing tactic, aimed at preservation of the USSR. The split
within the Crimean political circles that came with the election of Yurii Meshkov as a
president of Crimea in 1994 marked a temporary replacement of the Crimean communists
with the overtly pro-Russian populists at the top of the Crimean settler colonial system.
Both camps, however, despite being political opponents, existed within the pro-Russian
settler colonial discourse and envisioned Crimea as a ‘historically Russian’ land.
Arguably, the appearance of the overt pro-Russian populists at the top of the Crimean
institutions stopped the Crimea’s drift towards larger conservation of the status quo. The
election of Meshkov and pro-Russian Crimean Supreme Council eventually gave
Ukrainian central authorities enough excuse to interfere and increase their presence on
the peninsula.
The communist settler colonial status quo did not equal to an immediate secession from
Ukraine and joining Russia, but an intermediary status between the two states, akin to the
one that Crimea had during the Soviet times. The Soviet image of Crimea as an all-Soviet
resort and a home port for the Black Sea Fleet defined the image of Crimea’s preferable
future – that in close alliance with Russia, transmitted by the local press and authorities.
The Black Sea Fleet, as a settler colonial institution that was de facto controlled by the
Russian government actively participated in this fight for the Crimean status quo. Russian
anti-communist atmosphere of early Yeltsin’s years was not the most preferable
environment for the early post-Soviet Crimean elites. This was another reason why
joining Russia was not desirable for them. However, the ability to maintain contacts with
the Russian politicians and state institutions gave leverage to the Crimean elites in their
fight with the Ukraine’s center. It also provided political bonuses for the various Russian
politicians that could be used in a domestic Russian political struggle. This intermediary
status of Crimea seemed also relatively comfortable for the (former) communist elites of
the independent Ukraine. Having no deep understanding of the Crimean social and
political environment, Ukrainian elites relied on the information they received from the
communist Crimean counterparts. Crimean autonomy, therefore, was a slim balance that
‘froze’ the conflict and postponed it until better times.
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This settler colonial balance, however, did not correspond to the desires of two
decolonization movements – Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar – that appeared in Crimea
with the fall of the USSR. The pro-Ukrainian movement was part of a general Ukrainian
democratic and anti-communist trend, aimed at ‘national awakening’ and state-building.
The Crimean Tatar decolonization movement was an extension of a decades-long
Crimean Tatar fight for their repatriation and restoration of their national rights on their
indigenous land. Both these movements in Crimea were in a similar position, as they both
challenged the settler colonial status quo and aimed to redefine Crimea in a new way.
Both these movements often supported each other and coordinated their efforts, despite
the fact that a substantial part of the pro-Ukrainian activists happened to share the
imperial stereotypes about Crimean Tatars. Both these movements were ‘othered’ by the
settler colonial institutions in a similar way – through repression and accusations of
extremism

on the one hand, and employment of democratic rhetoric for imperial

purposes on the other hand.

3.1

What Does the Status Quo Look Like?

In the morning of August 19, 1991 Soviet radio announced the creation of the State
Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP) in the USSR. In their address to citizens
of the Soviet Union, members of the Committee, headed by the vice-president of the
USSR, announced that President Gorbachev was unable to perform his duties due to his
health condition. They also criticized the politics of perestroika, and argued that the
power in the USSR lied in the hands of forces that were willing to destroy the state. By
August 22 it became clear that the Committee lost and that what would later be described
as a coup d’état failed. However, throughout the day of August 19th little was that clear.
Members of the Committee pulled the Soviet troops to Moscow and for some time had it
under control. Their fate to a significant extent depended on the reaction of the Soviet
republics to the coup. The August coup served as a trigger, a last straw, for the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. The reaction to the coup from the regional communist
elites illustrated their desire for personal survival and the increased independence from
the center that they were gaining.
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As it came out later, after the coup failed, the Central Committee of the communist party
of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic sent out instructions to the regional committees of the
Communist party telling them to support the Committee. However, the central Ukrainian
authorities, the republican parliament and its chairman Leonid Kravchuk, did not rush to
recognize the new regime, demonstrating a split between the party and the state
authorities of the republic. Neither did they publicly oppose it. Later Kravchuk claimed
that during the private meeting with the Committee’s envoy to Ukraine, general Valentin
Varennikov, he refused to impose martial law. Kravchuk formally argued that
Varennikov did not have a written document from GKChP that could confirm his
authority, neither was there a need to tighten control over Ukraine’s population.237 This
kind of political flexibility as a special feature of Kravchuk’s character became one of the
symbols of the early post-Soviet years in Ukraine.238 It seems, however, that Kravchuk
was not the only possessor of such flexibility, even if he appeared to be one of the best.
The unspoken culture of Soviet politics made the ability to maneuver and to predict ‘the
direction of the wind’ a question of survival. About eight hundred kilometers from Kyiv,
the head of the Crimean parliament Mykola Bahrov adopted a similar ‘wait and see’
strategy. This, of course, would allow him to take the side of a winner in the conflict and
argue that the choice had been made immediately. Several years later, when Bahrov was
writing his memoirs, he claimed that his only goal was to preserve peace in Crimea.239
The August coup was quelled in Moscow as a result of public demonstrations and
Yeltsin’s decisiveness combined with the indecisiveness of coup organizers. But it
showed how loose the chain of the Soviet command was, how autonomous the regional
elites were, and how non-ideological the political system was.
Several years after the coup there still was some uncertainty as to who stood behind it and
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what its goals were. Some even presumed that Gorbachev himself saw the ineffectiveness
of his reforms and the risk of the dissolution of the state and therefore inspired a
conservative revolution.240 The coup itself seemed unusual to the Soviet politicians in
Ukraine. Memoirs of multiple people reflect that many experienced this time as one in
which they constantly expected to be arrested by the secret police. One of the leaders of
Ukrainian Narodny Rukh, dissident and Soviet political prisoner Viacheslav Chornovil,
remembered that he was at a music festival, “Chervona Ruta” in Zaporizhzhia, when he
heard the news about the coup. Chornovil remembered that somebody woke him up in
the morning, bringing the news about the coup: “I calmly replied to him that the coup is
probably not something serious, because right now I am here finishing my sleep, seeing
dreams, and not [staying] in a prison cell of some kind…”241 Deputy chairman of the
Ukraine’s parliament at that time, Volodymyr Hryniov, believed that Ukraine’s refusal to
sign a new union treaty within the USSR could be one of the triggers of the coup. He
described the coup as “a poorly prepared action, with no elaborate strategy,” a sign of
despair of the ruling elites.242 In his interview Hryniov also mentioned that the absence of
immediate arrests by the KGB was one of the signs that the coup was not well-organized,
or was not planned to be a serious act.243
The Central Committee of the Communist party of the Ukrainian Soviet republic sent
directives to support the coup. But the party itself at the time was already split, and it no
longer had the overwhelming control over the state and society that it had possessed in
the past. Multiple sources claim that most regional committees in Ukraine were split
between the elder majority of the conservative ‘hardliners’ and the younger generation of
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communist reformers. The former were accustomed to following the party line.
Therefore, they followed the direction of Gorbachev’s perestroika in spite of their own
internal opposition to it. The latter supported the perestroika, but they often lacked
political experience and remained the minority within their respective regional
committees. One administrative step below the regions, in the district committees the
situation was similar. Leonid Kravchuk believed that not only did the secretaries of
district committees had the most power due to their constant communication with people,
most of them in Ukraine belonged to the group of conservative hardliners.244 Crimean
regional committee was no different from others in terms of these internal divisions. In
the Crimea specifically, the party hardliners did not like Kyiv politicians’ slow movement
towards Ukrainian sovereignty in the late 1980s, especially that of Leonid Kravchuk.245
The tendency towards the creation of autonomous republics in late 1980s and early 1990s
demonstrates that the problem of regional alienation was common throughout the Soviet
Union. Towards the end of 1980s the power of local (regional) elites within the Soviet
Union grew as the center had an increasing number of challenges to respond to.
Therefore, in Crimea issues like the repatriation of Crimean Tatars gradually became a
local problem of the Crimean regional committee, rather than an issue of concern to
Soviet central authorities.246 Thus, Crimean authorities in Simferopol gained more
authority over Crimea’s internal problems. Meanwhile, Leonid Kravchuk emphasized
“the unbelievable centralization” as a characteristic of Moscow’s control over the
republican authorities in Kyiv.247 The Soviet center was simply losing control over
certain regions and seemed to focus on keeping the union together by controlling the
republican centers. To an extent this means that Russia’s problem with the sovereignty of
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the Republic of Tatarstan and the war in Chechnya had similar background reasons with
the problem of Crimean separatism within Ukraine – a pattern of alienation among local
elites from the center and their desire for more political and economic control over
regional and local affairs. With Crimea, however, the situation was more complicated,
since Russian political and governmental actors actively interfered. The system of power
that formed in Crimea towards the end of the 1980s suggests that the peninsula was a
relatively isolated region that was formally subordinated to the vertical of power of the
Ukrainian SSR, but culturally and politically oriented at Moscow. In other words,
Crimea’s settler colonial system remained in place and was oriented at the metropole,
despite its existing formal status as part of and subordinate to Ukraine.
Memoirs by Mykola Bahrov that came out in 1995, as well as his interview with Mykola
Veresen’ shortly after, leave an impression that the author never abandoned the strategy
of adjusting his views to the dominant opinion of the time in order to stay safe. More or
less this could probably be expanded as a characteristic of the elites at that time. In the
meantime, according to Andriy Klymenko, Bahrov did not share as conservative an
approach to Crimean politics as the first secretary of Crimean regional committee, Andriy
Hirenko.248 In his memoirs Bahrov argues that he had never supported the idea of
Crimean separatism, but did fight for Crimea’s political and economic autonomy within
Ukraine.249 Galina Starovoytova even argued that during the referendum for the
independence of Ukraine. Mykola Bahrov came into personal agreement with Leonid
Kravchuk and had to assure him that Crimea supported Ukrainian independence. In
return, according to Starovoytova, Kravchuk promised Bahrov that he would grant
autonomy to the Crimean Peninsula.250 Whether this was a real agreement or just a
conspiracy theory popular among Russian politicians, this kind of maneuvering fits into
what seems to be a portrait of Mykola Bahrov as a political figure. It also to a large extent
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characterizes the political climate of Crimea in early post-Soviet years. Following this
same pattern of behavior, Mykola Bahrov supported the Russian annexation of Crimea in
2014.
In The Crimea Question Gwendolyn Sasse looks at the peninsula as a culturally,
historically, ethnically and geographically distinct region of Ukraine, “a world in
itself.”251 Crimean political elites traditionally had a very close connection to Moscow
and were somewhat alienated within the political structure of the Ukrainian SSR. Crimea
had been a holiday destination for all Soviet elites and therefore, the secretary of Crimean
regional committee traditionally had personal access to the Soviet Secretary General as
well as members of the Central Committee and other high-standing politicians from
Moscow. It was part of the routine of the regional representatives to meet and greet
Moscow visitors at the Simferopol airport, to entertain them, to attend closed parties and
to get drunk with the Soviet leadership.252 Such a short distance to the first persons of the
state was a matter of prestige, as well as responsibility. In the meantime, the way Mykola
Bahrov describes the position of Crimean party officials in the Ukrainian SSR, it seems
that traditionally they had little chance of career advancement within the republic.253 This
contributed to the internal alienation of Crimea within Ukraine and added to the reasons
why orientation towards Moscow traditionally looked more advantageous for the regional
elites. For the Crimean elites, the peninsula was more of a part of the Soviet Union, rather
than of Ukrainian republic within the Soviet Union.
None of the Soviet republics had control over the Soviet military. According to President
Leonid Kravchuk, during the coup of 1991 the authorities of the Ukrainian SSR had no
military forces to protect them in case of a possible attack.254 General Morozov, the first
defense minister of an independent Ukraine, confirmed that in early months of the
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independence the commanders of the Ukrainian military districts reported to Moscow.255
In early months after the fall of the USSR Russian president and government went to an
enormous effort to preserve the control over the former Soviet military, by trying to
transfer it under the ‘joint’ command of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The
Black Sea Fleet constituted a separate military district, and the commander of the fleet
reported personally to the Soviet Ministry of defense. After the fall of the USSR the fleet
was transferred under the control of the CIS, as part of ‘strategic forces’.256 The fleet
itself was not restricted to the city of Sevastopol, but included warehouses, airfields,
military bases, cultural institutions and military media that spread out across Crimea. This
made it one of the dominant military and political forces on the peninsula.
The presence of a military force that responded to Moscow even after the fall of the
Soviet Union is a key factor in the analysis of the Crimean colonial status. Apart from
being a Soviet resort, Crimea also hosted a Black Sea Fleet that was spread around the
peninsula. Due to the high social status of Soviet military and its significant presence in
Crimea, the fleet command constituted yet another group of Crimean elites that oriented
themselves toward Moscow, not Kyiv. Both the historical narrative of the ‘Russian’ (here
again the imperial term has been confused with the national) Black Sea Fleet as well as
political indoctrination served as strong arguments in favor of preservation of the Russian
control over the fleet.257 Admiral Igor Kasatonov, appointed to the position of fleet
commander immediately after the coup of 1991, owed his appointment to his
commanders in Moscow. During the early post-Soviet years admiral Kasatonov became
an influential military as well as political figure. His personal authority as a second-
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generation commander (his father commanded the Black Sea Fleet as well) made his
political opinions, choices and statements influential not just for the town of Sevastopol,
but also within the rest of Crimea. Admiral Kasatonov was highly respected within the
fleet both by the pro-Russian side and even by some Ukrainian officers.258 Admiral
Eduard Baltin, who replaced Kasatonov in 1993, seemed to have less personal influence.
However, his very position as commander of the fleet made his opinions influential and
he often defined public opinion. The ability of Moscow to maintain control over the
Black Sea Fleet during the early 1990s enabled this large military (settler colonial)
structure to remain a powerful instrument of political influence and militaryinformational subversion that assured Russia’s direct influence in Crimea, unmediated by
Ukrainian officials. The political stance of the fleet command was important for the
political debates within the peninsula, since fleet officers and their families were also
voters in elections. Institutions of the fleet conducted open and subversive informational
operations, coordinated pro-Russian political protests and even used force against
Ukrainian armed forces in order to reach small tactical and strategic political victories
(See Chapter 5).
The structure of the Soviet Crimean society, as well as Soviet societies in general, put
military and communist party functionaries in the most dominant positions. In Crimea,
however, due to its relative geographical isolation, and its status as a border region, the
local elites did not have any competition from other social groups. The Communist party
or Komsomol, even on the very bottom level, gave people the necessary administrative
experience, management skills and social connections to set them up for successful
political careers in the post-Soviet era.259 Those people knew how the Soviet society
functioned, how the decision making process worked, and how one does politics in an
environment that presumes strict control. By the time the Soviet Union fell, the former
party officials were basically the only social group that was prepared to take power – in
the government, on the emerging market, or both. Therefore, it is not a surprise that in
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post-Soviet spaces, former party or Komsomol officials evolved into post-Soviet political
and business elites.
Emerging organized crime operations also became an important factor in politics and on
the market as well, but they quickly came into cooperation with the political elites.
Crimea had regional (according to their area of operation within the peninsula) and ethnic
groups of organized criminals, most famous being Seilim and Bashmaki. At times their
power within cities (Sevastopol, for instance) was bigger than that of official state
authorities.260 The connection between organized crime, politicians and (former) Soviet
security services created another connection between political and economic power that
requires further research. The political flexibility of Mykola Bahrov, and as we later will
see, admiral Igor Kasatonov, were not unique for the early post-Soviet politics. All
leaders, at all levels of state service appeared in front of a choice, and their first priority
was to preserve their own careers (and sometimes freedom). By the late 1980s not many
people in the Soviet Union still believed in the orthodox ideas of Marxism-Leninism.
However, Soviet political practices and narratives often informed the worldviews (and
the image of the future) and were used as a ‘common sense’ during the political agitation
of post-Soviet times. Post-Soviet rhetoric of ‘brotherhood’ between Russia and Ukraine,
understanding of Russia’s regional political and cultural lead (as a former center of a
Soviet empire) was common among people from various political camps. In Crimea, for
example, even forces that were considered ‘anti-Russian’ felt necessary to emphasize the
non-radicalism of their policies towards Russia.
Another important way in which Crimea oriented at Moscow was its economy, which
concentrated around the supply of the military. By late 1980s, the Black Sea Fleet had
around 150,000 military personnel (not including civilians, working for different fleet
structures).261 In addition to that, Crimea hosted a number of factories that produced
strategic military equipment (military ships, missile control systems, parachutes,
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torpedoes, tank sights etc.) and employed another 100,000 people.262 This made the
Soviet Ministry of Defense one of the major employers on the peninsula, a population of
which in late 1980s was around 2.2 million people. In addition to direct military
employment, Crimea also hosted industries that served the military indirectly. Crimea
had a well-developed fishing industry that employed experienced navy personnel after
retirement. In Northern Crimean areas settled after the Second World war, farms and
factories produced fresh and processed fruits and vegetables. Southern Crimea boasted
multiple institutional resorts. Different institutions all over the USSR distributed
vouchers among their employees that allowed people to spend holidays in Crimea.
Although the number of tourists was very high, their trips were often funded by the state
and therefore did not bring profits to the state budget.263 Large portions of the Crimean
economy were oriented at the state center and were controlled at the central Soviet Union
level. This means that a substantial part of Crimean society depended on Crimea’s
economic ties with Moscow. This made Crimea’s position within Ukraine largely
symbolic and mostly politically irrelevant.
By the late 1980s, due to the Soviet national policies in the border regions and large
Soviet military presence, Crimea became possibly one of the most Sovietized regions of
the Soviet Union. The population of Crimea consisted almost completely of Sovietized
settlers and their children (see Chapter 1). Coming as settlers, they were not bound by
social traditions and norms of their homelands and therefore the Soviet identity had no
local national traditions to compete with. This population was “indoctrinated,” denationalized and often politically passive. This population also had a higher concentration
of people, who exercised privileges (national, social) that were less common in other
regions of the USSR. Due to the high concentration of retired military servicemen, Soviet
(not Ukrainian and not Crimean) social and national hierarchies became embedded in
Crimean life. The high concentration of military-industrial production on the peninsula
made this region dependent on the Soviet state defense programs, which provided
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Crimean factories with orders and, therefore, money flow. The presence of the Black Sea
Fleet meant that a significant portion of active military personnel and their families lived
in Crimea, where their future was directly dependent on the future of the fleet. The
presence of the fleet as well as high ranking resorts assured Crimea’s better supply with
necessary products at times of deficit. Therefore, Crimea was a relatively privileged
region within the Soviet Union, with many direct ties to Moscow, and its inhabitants
viewed any changes in that status quo as a threat to their relatively high ‘quality of life.’
Hence, they would view any shift in Ukraine’s power in the region as a threat to their
own interests.

3.2
Preserving Settler Colonial Status Quo: A Fight for
Autonomy
The fall of the Soviet Union, the proclamation of the independence of Ukraine, and the
repatriation of Crimean Tatars to Crimea became the main challenges for the settler
colonial institutions on the peninsula. The fight for autonomy that Crimea’s elites
conducted throughout the 1990s was a part of the effort to preserve the Soviet-era status
quo on the peninsula and to allow as little change as possible. Crimean cultural, political
and social space was a settler colonial construct of the Soviet empire. The official
branches of local power on the peninsula served as colonial institutions of power that
were meant to preserve the settler colonial regime. Therefore, the history of the political
struggle of Crimean elites against the constructed threat of ‘Ukrainization’ and
‘Tatarization’ of the peninsula was not simply a separatist movement. Neither was it
solely a struggle between the state center and periphery, but a fight of the colony –
colonial institutions – for their survival, reproduction and connection with the metropole.
Crimean elites fought to preserve Soviet life and the privileges that they had enjoyed in
Crimea prior to 1991. Contrary to the arguments of some scholars, Crimean autonomy
did not prevent a conflict, but changed its nature. Crimean autonomy conserved the
settler colonial regime and prevented decolonization. Therefore, a ‘conflict’ (though
hidden, not military) still took place and slowed the social transition away from the
Soviet past. In addition, the path towards autonomy was a fight of the Crimean political
elites for personal power. The presidential competition between Mykola Bahrov and
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Yurii Meshkov was a competition between people of a very similar worldview and
political orientation, but different tactical approach.
It was common at the time to use democratic rhetoric and to appeal to international
standards in order to promote one’s own (often imperialistic and undemocratic) agenda.
The last year of the Soviet Union in Crimea was a year of referendums. Crimea (as a part
of the Ukrainian SSR that was itself a part of the USSR) held three of them: on the status
of the peninsula (local referendum), on preservation of the Soviet Union (all-Soviet
referendum) and on Ukrainian independence (all-Ukrainian referendum). Gorbachev’s
perestroika and glasnost’ among other things created a ‘political fashion’ of democracy
and plebiscites. This was the beginning of what Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way refer to
as ‘competitive authoritarianism’.264 The existence of a new fashion did not automatically
bring democracy the same way as the existence of democratic form does not necessarily
assure the democratic content. Crimean leaders tended to dress their words in democratic
garb, but underneath it was the same old system – they relied on Moscow to grant them
the power to control local politics and culture in Crimea. Ukraine was not part of their
equation as far as they were concerned. Both Mykola Bahrov and Leonid Kravchuk
demonstrate in their memories that referendums served as political tools to maintain the
status quo.265 The results of the referendums could be interpreted and twisted according
to the need of those who conducted the interpretation. The percentage of people voting
for or against a particular question in this case was important: those polling numbers were
necessary to confirm political decisions that had already been made. One such twist could
be found in Bahrov’s memories in relation to the referendum on the Ukraine’s
independence. He says, in particular, that Crimean people voted for the independence of
Ukraine, but not for Crimea to be a part of this independent Ukraine. Moreover, he said
that Crimeans supported the independence of Ukraine, because they wanted to be a part
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of the Soviet Union.266 This interpretation, by the way, was not exclusive to Bahrov and
existed in the Crimean press as well.
The referendum on the status of Crimea was the first referendum ever held in the USSR.
This was the first serious challenge to the integrity of Ukraine from the local Crimean
elites. It took place on January 20th, 1990 – about half a year after the Supreme Council
of the Ukrainian SSR proclaimed the state sovereignty of Ukraine within the Soviet
Union. The referendum asked the Crimean population whether it was necessary to
‘restore’ the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (that existed prior to 1945)
as an equal participant of the new Soviet Union treaty. In other words, Crimean
population was to decide whether Crimea had to become an autonomy within the
Ukrainian republic. And whether that autonomy should decide on its membership in the
USSR separately from Ukraine’s center.267 More than 90% of voters, according to the
official results, answered positively to the referendum’s question. The rhetoric of the
‘restoration’ of the republic pointed to the status of Crimea within the Soviet Union prior
to 1945. According to Bahrov, the problem of the status of Crimea was a direct response
to the proclamation of the Ukrainian sovereignty:
“The increasingly active movement of Ukraine on the path towards
sovereignization, support of this point of view by the majority of republic’s
authorities and deputies of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, as well as a
simultaneous rise of nationalistic spirit caused reasonable caution of the Russianspeaking majority of Crimea.”268
In an interview Andriy Klymenko, who served as a secretary of ideology in the Crimean
regional committee, described the campaign for the Crimean autonomy in a very similar
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way: as a response to the increasing national awakening in Ukraine, a risk that Ukraine
might leave the USSR and thus threaten the Moscow connection of the Crimean
authorities.269 What caused a special concern, according to Bahrov, was the law on
languages of the Ukrainian SSR that proclaimed Ukrainian as the only state language of
the republic. Although that law was mild towards non-Ukrainian speakers, its adoption
caused anxiety (mostly constructed by the media) that is very common in a situation
when the privileged group is about to lose its privilege. In 1996 the journalist from
Moscow Volodymyr Kovalenko described such Russian anxiety of the late Soviet and
early post-Soviet times in the following way: “In other words, it is a liquidation of the
domination that is often perceived as oppression. But those are, of course, different
things.”270 It is worth noting that this ‘fake oppression’ is common for many societies and
for many debatable social issues. It is common, for example, to hear that deconstruction
of male privilege or white supremacy oppresses white male population in North America
or elsewhere with a similar racial and gender dynamic. In other words, liberation
movements are often perceived as movements for oppression of the dominant group by
members of that group. Moreover, framing members of those movements as “radicals”
proves to be an effective instrument of diminishing their efforts. The anxiety of the
Russian-speaking population in the post-Soviet republics is of the same nature. The only
substantial difference is that the Russian state has been willing to construct and
instrumentalize that anxiety (by speaking of them as victims of independence
movements) and to use it in its foreign policy.
In Crimea’s political and social context, this anxiety had a settler colonial component as
well. In 1989 it became apparent that the repatriation of Crimean Tatar people to their
homeland was a question of time. By 1991 the majority of Crimean Tatars still lived
outside of Crimea and therefore, this nation did not constitute a significant portion of the
Crimean population. When Mykola Bahrov and the rest of the Crimean authorities spoke
about “taking into account the points of view of all Crimeans”, this was another settler
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colonial distortion of the narrative, since the original Crimeans – Crimean Tatars – had
no access to the decision making process over the status of their land.271 The local
referendum (on the autonomy of Crimea) of January 20, 1991 was perceived by Crimean
Tatars as an attempt of the colonial institutions to preserve their own power and to
prevent the disruption of the status quo that would come with the repatriation of several
hundred thousands of the indigenous people. Even the National Movement of Crimean
Tatars (NDKT), which was more moderate and tolerant of the Soviet government,
protested against the format in which Crimean autonomy was being constructed: “At this
stage the formation of structures of the Crimean ASSR is happening in a counterpoise to
the reconstruction of the national unity of Crimean Tatar people and its equality, this
means all power responsibilities are being concentrated in those structures of the Crimean
ASSR…”. While they did not reject the creation of the Crimean ASSR, they wanted it to
be a form of Crimean Tatar statehood, as opposed to the “form of the government
[created by] by ‘incoming ethnicities’” – exactly what Crimean autonomy became to
be.272 A younger, and more radical, generation of Crimean Tatar activists – Organization
of Crimean Tatar National Movement (OKND) also issued a number of statements
condemning the referendum. As a result, Crimean Tatars, who had already repatriated to
Crimea and could participate in the referendum, boycotted the voting.273
Crimean authorities were very conscious about the unavoidable repatriation of Crimean
Tatars to Crimea and feared it. Decades of campaigning by Crimean Tatar activists and
other Soviet dissidents along with gradual opening of the USSR to the world pushed the
Soviet authorities towards sanctioning the repatriation. In words of Andriy Klymenko:
“Everybody understood the unavoidability of repatriation and its consequences. This is
why it was important to appear at the top of this unavoidability”.274 The debate over land

271

Bagrov, Krym: vremia nadezhd i trevog, 98.

272

Natsional´noe Dvizhenie Krymskikh Tatar, “K voprosu o Kurultae 01.05.1991.” Accessed April 4,
2020: http://ndkt.org/k-voprosu-o-kurultae-01.05.-1991-g.html.
273

Gulnara Bekirova, Piv stolittia oporu: kryms´ki tatary vid vyhnannia do povernennia (1941-1991).
Narys politychnoi istorii (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2017), 371.
274

Andriy Klymenko, interview by author, August 8, 2018.

120

between repatriated Crimean Tatars and Crimean authorities will be discussed below. For
now it is important to note this hypocrisy that arises every time that Crimean authorities
had to deal with the indigenous repatriation. On the one hand, the overall Soviet policy
dictated that Crimean Tatars would repatriate to Crimea, receive land and equal national
rights. On the other hand, Crimean authorities (none of whom was Crimean Tatar)
distributed substantial portions of the land and organized a referendum on the status of
the peninsula prior to the indigenous repatriation and later said they were unable to
provide land to repatriates due to the fact that all land had already been distributed.
Again, this speaks to the definition of settler colonialism as a “structure, not an event” – a
range of related policies “that otherwise appear distinct.”
Another bitterly ironic aspect of that referendum was the way Crimean authorities coopted Crimean Tatar existence and their historical rights in order to enhance the settler
colonial status quo. Mykola Bahrov argued, for instance, the autonomy of Crimea was
necessary to preserve the inter-ethnic peace among the multi-national Crimean
population.275 Crimean Tatar activists demanded repatriation and restoration of their
autonomy in Crimea for years prior to the referendum, but every time the Soviet
authorities stated that these goals “had no reasonable basis”.276 Suddenly, just few years
later the ‘reasonable basis’ was found by the local Crimean elites. The fact that Crimean
Tatar organizations boycotted the referendum did not prevent the Crimean authorities
from arguing that Crimean autonomy was necessary in order to protect the national rights
of Crimean Tatars. In addition, Crimean newspapers launched an informational
campaign, arguing that Crimean autonomy before 1945 was territorial and not national.
As was mentioned in the first chapter, this might had been true in form, but not in the
content, since during korenizatsia Crimean Tatars were perceived as the indigenous
nation on the Crimean Peninsula. Crimean autonomy was cancelled by the Soviet
authorities after the removal of indigenous people from Crimea. Therefore, in 1990 the

275
276

Bagrov, Krym: vremia nadezhd i trevog, 103.

“Povidomlennia Derzhavnoi komisii, stvorenoi dlia rozhliadu zvernen´ hromadian z chysla kryms´kykh
tatar” in Kryms´ki tatary: statti, dokumenty, svidchennia ochevydciv edited by Yurii Danyliuk (Kyiv:
Ridnyi Krai, 1995), 264-266.

121

Crimean settler colonial institutions pointed to the history of indigenous autonomy in
Crimea and used that history to argue for the colonizer’s autonomy. By doing so they
tried to preserve their own existence at time of political turmoil and increasing challenges
from Crimean Tatar movement and Ukrainian state.277
In 1995 Bahrov argued in his memoirs that his political activity had nothing to do with
separatism, but only with fighting for ‘Crimean interests’. He argued that Crimea had
close cultural and historical ties with Russia, but economically it would be more
beneficial for Crimea to be an autonomous region within Ukraine.278 In cultural and
national spheres he stood for ‘equality’, but this looked like a Soviet-style equality, where
all non-Russian nations had to ‘fit in the empty spaces’ left by the dominant
Soviet/Russian culture and be as ceremonial as possible. Bahrov’s ideal for the Crimea’s
status was a double protectorate of Russia and Ukraine over the peninsula.279 In other
words, the Soviet system was the ideal and Bahrov fought for it, adopting his political
rhetoric according to the current political climate. The idea of a “double protectorate” in
Crimea existed in the political sphere for a while. Retrospectively it looks like a way for
its proponents to ‘freeze’ the Russia’s claims on Crimea until the time when Russia was
ready to reclaim that space, while maintaining Russian and pro-Russia political agendas.
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During all three referendums that took place in Crimea in 1991 the Crimean authorities
and media (that existed within the Soviet/pro-Russian discourse and was state-controlled)
campaigned for the preservation of the status quo. First, they promised Crimea’s
prosperity and autonomy during the January 20, 1991 referendum. Then, they joined the
Soviet communist party to argue for the need to preserve the ‘Soviet homeland’ and only
reform the union treaty during the all-Soviet referendum of March 17, 1991.280 Prior to
the referendum of December 1, 1991 on the independence of Ukraine, they argued that
Ukraine would not survive on its own, as an independent state.281 As a result of the first
referendum, the Ukrainian Supreme Council adopted a law that ‘restored’ Crimean
autonomy.
The intermediary status of Crimea between the two states, seemed to be the acceptable
compromise for all sides at the time. One of the reasons why Crimean communists were
not willing to join Russia immediately was their fear of Yeltsin’s decommunization
efforts. Autonomy within Ukraine with Ukraine’s former communist leadership
guaranteed that Mykola Bahrov, Leonid Hrach and the rest of Crimea’s political elites
would remain in power and not witness their influence dissolve among numerous Russian
political movements. Such intermediate position – with pro-Russian rhetoric, but
autonomous status within Ukraine – seemed to be the best possible solution for all sides.
For Ukrainian leadership Crimean autonomy postponed (if not solved) the problem of
territorial integrity. Post-communist Ukrainian elites and Crimean communists had a
level of mutual understanding. General Morozov says that Kravchuk (and therefore, the
authorities in Kyiv) often assessed the situation in Crimea based on the information,
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provided by Bahrov.282 In that regard, Bahrov was a comfortable counteragent for
Kravchuk. For the Russian government and president, the intermediate status of Crimea
allowed them to preserve their pressure point in Ukraine without getting into the
international conflict over territory. In case of necessity it was always possible for the
Russian authorities to use Crimean elites in order to make the Ukrainian government
more flexible. This, however, was not a shared interest among all of the Russian
politicians. For Crimean elites the autonomy turned Crimea (and its precious property)
into their personal domain; they also got much space to navigate between Ukrainian and
Russian states in case political situations required that.
Mykola Bahrov claims that his fight for Crimean autonomy was not part of a separatist
campaign, however, that looks like a retrospective adjustment of his political views.
During a press conference by the Crimean regional committee in November, 1990 the
present members of the party officials treated the referendum on the Crimean autonomy
as “a first step” on the way towards the “restoration of the statehood” of Crimea and
possible future change of its territorial belonging.283 On its way towards autonomy
Crimean communists took a similar path to the sovereignty of Crimea, as did other
autonomies and republics within the Soviet Union. Just like Ukrainian authorities in
Kyiv, Crimean deputies first adopted a Declaration on the state status of Crimea
(November 12, 1990), which proclaimed the “restoration of the statehood”.284 Then, on
September 4, 1991 the Supreme Council of Crimea adopted a declaration on the
sovereignty of Crimea. This was followed by the events of May 5 and May 6, 1991, when
Crimean deputies voted for the proclamation of Crimea’s self-determination
(samostoyatelnost´) – a vague term that sounded similar, but not identical to
independence – and adopted a constitution of the republic. These declarations were
immediately followed by decrees in which local authorities took control over state and
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Communist party property located in Crimea.285 Each of those declarations marked
another step further towards distancing Crimea from Ukraine, and followed a similar
pattern to the Ukrainian SSR which used similar measures in its path towards state
independence. By following a similar pattern the Crimean elites arguably wanted to claim
similar legitimacy for their actions, suggesting (although not openly) that they were
following precedent that was set up by Kyiv. In that regard Bahrov’s rejection of
separatism accusations seems unconvincing. Moreover, each of the declarations by the
Crimean Supreme Council did not fit into the legal framework of the unitary Ukrainian
state, while Ukraine’s right for independence formally existed in the Soviet constitution.
Declarations by the Crimean elites often appeared in response to Ukraine’s distancing
from the Soviet state structures. For example, the declaration of sovereignty of Crimea
appeared eleven days after Ukrainian parliament proclaimed Ukraine’s state
independence. In other words, the route that Crimean elites took towards the autonomy to
a large extent looked like a blackmailing campaign aimed at keeping the authorities in
Kyiv inclined to stay within the Soviet Union or any integration projects that were meant
to replace it.
Both Bahrov and Meshkov were oriented towards Russia in their worldviews, as well as
cultural and political experience. Communist elites of Crimea, just like various proRussian social, political and human rights activists around Meshkov, did not disagree
over a preferred cultural image of Crimea, its historical narrative and the desired interethnic dynamic. Bahrov might have been slightly moderate in his views, leaning towards
the classical Soviet rhetoric of the ‘brotherhood of nations’. This was the main reason
why Meshkov and the pro-Russian ‘Republican Movement of Crimea’ (RDK) were able
to take the political initiative and gain support from all of the pro-Russian movements in
Crimea. Demands and statements by RDK were ‘sharper’ and clearer. They also
coincided in time with the beginning of tensions over the Black Sea Fleet and rise of the
‘Ukrainian nationalist scare’ in the Crimean press. But after Yurii Meshkov became
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Crimea’s president, he adopted a very similar moderate national rhetoric.286 This rhetoric,
however, did not reject the fact that both leaders saw Russian-speaking people as their
main electoral base. During the presidential campaign both Mykola Bahrov and Yurii
Meshkov had very similar programs. The only significant difference was the speed at
which candidates promised to move towards establishing closer ties with Russia: while
Bahrov argued for the gradual increase of Crimean autonomy that could create a legal
basis for a possible transfer of the peninsula, Meshkov argued for an immediate
referendum on the status of Crimea.287 Meshkov also argued for the introduction of
Russian currency in Crimea, creation of the ‘republican guard’ and direct energy
negotiations between Crimea and Russia.288 Both Bahrov and Meshkov saw Crimea as a
‘bridge’ between Russia and Ukraine – an obvious reference to the Soviet ‘brotherhood
of nations’ rhetoric that favored the Russian speaking population. The idea of a ‘bridge’
between Russia and Ukraine was popularized for a significant period of time throughout
1990s. Such hybrid intermediary status was supposed to assure the preservation of settler
colonial institutions and give the Russian government an instrument of influence over
Ukraine’s foreign policy.
The biggest difference between Meshkov’s pro-Russian organizations and Bahrov’s
Crimean communist nomenclature was the structure of their support. Both groups, as was
common at the time, had close ties to various organized crime groups in Crimea.289 In
addition to that Meshkov received political support from the Black Sea Fleet and large
business, represented by the company IMPEX-55. Volodymyr Prytula, who worked as a
journalist in Crimea at the time, says there was unconfirmed information that Meshkov’s
Republican Movement of Crimea (‘RDK’) also ‘inherited’ money from the dissolved
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communist party and received some finances from Russia directly.290 In other words,
Bahrov represented a ‘more local’ movement in Crimea (presuming settler colonial
authority can possibly be local), while Meshkov clearly relied on more distant Russian
interest and Russian politicians. Meshkov’s cabinet consisted of numerous Russian
citizens, ‘imported’ from Moscow and appointed in direct violation of the Ukrainian
legislation. Probably due to this flexibility and ability to adapt to political circumstances,
Bahrov received support as better of the two bad candidates from the Crimean Tatar
movement prior to the Crimea’s presidential elections.291
Since Bahrov relied on administrative resources and control over the media, it was
surprising that he lost the elections. The head of the Crimean parliament relied on the
leftovers of the communist power structures on the peninsula. But his administrative
monopoly started to fade. Mykola Savchenko recalls in his book that the command of the
Black Sea Fleet sent a signal down the fleet structures to support Yurii Meshkov, as
opposed to Bahrov.292 RDK conducted a very active political and informational campaign
in Crimea for two years prior to the presidential elections. Combined with harsh
economic problems in Ukraine (and Crimea in particular), institutional support from
Russia and uncertainty of Ukraine’s policy towards Crimea, the victory of Meshkov does
not seem that surprising. Finally, considering the nature of propaganda, transmitted by
the Crimean press, especially in the spheres of national and cultural policies, it would be
safe to say that Crimean communists themselves paved a way to the younger and more
energetic populists who shared very similar views.
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Russian nationalistic movement that existed in Crimea at the time appeared to be
significantly more conservative and radical in comparison to the forces that came to
power in Russia itself. Close circles of President Yeltsin included people with various
ideological positions, including nationalists. Russian parliament (both Supreme Soviet
and later the State Duma) had even larger representation of conservative forces (including
communists, who appeared to be very nationalistic). Crimean nationalistic movement of
Russians consisted for the most part of retired and active servicemen of the Soviet army,
fleet, security services. Therefore, when some of them made political careers in Russia,
they often became members of nationalistic political organizations. One of the postSoviet commanders of the Black Sea Fleet, for example, admiral Baltin ran for the
membership in the Russian State Duma in 1995 as part of the electoral block ‘Za Rodinu’
(‘For Fatherland’). Surprisingly, admiral Baltin started his campaign, while he was a
commander of the fleet; he organized meetings of the fleet personnel with the electoral
block in a cultural center for navy officers in Sevastopol (‘Dom ofitserov’). Block ‘Za
Rodinu’ promised to end the ‘colonial dependence’ of Russia on the West in “political,
economic and spiritual spheres.”293
That populism and the speed at which Meshkov began to move towards closer integration
with Russia provoked Kyiv’s political intervention and abolishment of Crimean
constitution (as well as the institution of Crimea’s presidency) in March, 1995.
Ultimately it appeared that Bahrov’s approach of slow movement towards autonomy and
preservation of Crimea’s hybrid colonial status in-between two countries reflected the
acceptable balance between Russia and Ukraine. The fact the Meshkov in his policies
oriented at the anti-Yeltsin opposition forces (mostly nationalists and nationalistic
communists) did not add to his support from the Russian government as well. Using
Crimea as an outpost to influence Ukraine’s foreign and internal affairs was more
valuable for the Russian government than annexing the peninsula. During his presidency
Yurii Meshkov acted much like other presidents of the post-Soviet space, demanding the
increase of presidential authority and getting into political rivalry with the Crimean
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parliament (where his allies during the presidential race held the majority). Unlike
Yeltsin, Meshkov lost the fight with his former political ally and the head of the Crimean
parliament Sergey Tsekov. The interference of the Ukrainian parliament restored the
balance that was lost with

Meshkov’s presidency and eventually returned Crimean

communists to power within the republic.
Gwendolyn Sasse looks at the struggle for the Crimean autonomy as a center-periphery
negotiation that ultimately led to the conflict prevention. She argues, in particular, that
the process of negotiating the vague autonomy that Crimea had within the centralized
Ukraine prevented an open ethnic collision.294 While to an extent this might be true, this
approach largely avoids the fact that from the very beginning the fear of ‘Ukrainization’
of Crimea was a media construct of the Crimean settler colonial institutions and Russian
nationalistic politicians (See Chapter 4). The ethnic conflict in Crimea in 1990s did in
fact happen, although it did not take a systematic violent form and was limited to isolated
examples of ethnic tensions. Rather than solve the conflict, the creation of Crimean
autonomy conserved and preserved it – preserving settler colonial institutions at a cost of
rights of the indigenous peoples of Crimea and Ukrainian nationals. Finally, settler
colonialism is at base a type of foreign invasion. Therefore, it presumes the existence of a
conflict – violence can happen internally, without active physical collisions. Cultural and
linguistic oppression of the indigenous people, Crimean Tatars, as well as the Ukrainian
population of Crimea also constituted violence, as it prevented those nations from equal
development and exercise of their rights.
The political struggle for Crimean autonomy throughout the 1990s ultimately happened
with an aim of the local communist elites to preserve their own power – mainly by
essentially preserving the status quo from Soviet times reframed in the new “democratic”
language of referendums. In addition to attempting to keep Ukraine integrated into the
Russia-centered political union, in order to keep Crimea closely connected to Russia
(which preserved their power and privilege) Crimean communists fought for their

294

Gwendolyn Sasse “Conflict Prevention in a Transition State. The Crimean Issue in Post-Soviet
Ukraine”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 8, # 2 (2002): 2.

129

personal political future and economic opportunities that emerged with post-Soviet
privatization of Crimean property. In this struggle they navigated carefully between
Russia and Ukraine, promoting an idea of Crimea as a ‘bridge’ between two post-Soviet
states – a space with ties to both, which either might use as leverage against the other. In
other words, Crimean settler colonial institutions negotiated their own survival, entering
into temporary alliances with various political groups in Ukraine and Russia. The inbetween status of the settler colony was in fact a (temporary) aim of those elites. The
temporary victory of the pro-Russian populists in Crimea highlighted the fact that in the
1990s Yeltsin’s government had no interest in annexing Crimea. An intermediate colonial
status for the peninsula - with overwhelming Russian informational and political
influence allowed the Russian government to maintain political control over the whole of
Ukraine by having a core of an organized and controlled separatist movement inside
Ukraine that could create domestic problems for the government in Kyiv, if Ukraine did
not cooperate.

3.3

Crimean Tatar Challenge: Conflict of Sovereignties

The power of post-Soviet Crimean authorities and their conservative system came from
the perception that there is only one possible and generally accepted vision of Crimea –
its past, present and future. This perception came from the fact that for several centuries a
very particular and carefully selected set of forces controlled the interpretation of
Crimean history, in service to the imperial center. The political, cultural and
informational sphere in Crimea did not allow for competing narratives. The public
narrative about Crimea looked like it had no alternative – it was pro-Soviet in a way that
was sometimes easy to mistake for pro-Russian-ness. Although they were not given any
public space or attention, alternative histories existed and they were not less real,
although not supported by the media machine. One of the most immediate political
challenges to the Crimean political status quo was the Crimean Tatar national movement:
the struggle for decolonization and to dismantle the settler colonial system. The
repatriation of Crimean Tatars was a process that Crimean settler colonizers feared and
tried to prevent for several decades. As was mentioned above, when the repatriation
became inevitable, the local Soviet institutions in Crimea tried to take the process under
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control in order to prevent or distort the decolonization. Those same institutions that
contributed to the creation of the image of ‘evil Crimean Tatar hordes’ were now
responsible for the repatriation. This, of course, meant that given the past history of
relationships between the representatives of the Crimean Tatar nationalist movement and
the state authorities, the colonized did not trust the colonizer, and expected them to
sabotage the repatriation. The struggle between Crimean Tatars and Crimean authorities
since late 1980s fits into the settler colonial dynamic of the struggle for (and against)
decolonization. In Crimea, these include conflicts over land, over the status of
sovereignty in Crimea, and over national equality of various national groups within the
peninsula based on the Crimean Tatar understanding of their national sovereignty, and
the colonizer’s denial of the indigenous sovereign rights.
Even though after 1989 the Soviet authorities officially approved the repatriation of
Crimean Tatars and denied the myth about the ‘traitor-nation’, the image of ‘Tatar Nazi
collaborators’ remained in the mass consciousness of the Crimean population. Ukrainian
communist party documents of the late 1980s recorded a number of letters and telegrams
sent by non- Crimean Tatar Crimeans to different state institutions, condemning the
repatriation.295 The fear and chauvinism of the colonizers did become physical, according
to the collective telegram, sent by Crimean Tatars to Kremlin:
“Instigators of the covert reaction and their condonation by the local authorities
resulted in a fact that chauvinistic passions heat the situation in Crimea to its
limits. At nighttime bandits, armed with knives, chains, bats break into the homes
of Crimean Tatars, beat innocent people until they lose consciousness, run over
elderly and women with their cars. We are afraid that this can cause response and
this is dangerous.”296
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Chauvinism did not appear without a reason, but was unofficially constructed by the
Crimean system of power. While the official state propaganda spoke about reconciliation
and a peaceful, multi-national Crimean society, unofficially Crimean Tatar repatriates
continued to be stigmatized. Volodymyr Prytula remembers that in late 1980s he was
among employees that were invited for collective meetings at his work place.297 Prytula
claims that these kinds of meetings were regular in Crimea at that time and were
organized by the communist party branches. Their goal was to ‘warn’ the employees
about the coming Crimean Tatar ‘threat’, to tell them to protect their children and
property.298 Several respondents also mentioned that Crimean Tatars were racialized in
day-to-day Crimean life. To the non-Crimean Tatar residents of Crimea, Crimean Tatars
were unknown Muslims, therefore, traditional stereotypes merged with the party
propaganda: Crimean Tatars were described as ‘violent’ (‘they will come and start
slaughtering people’) and ‘uncivilized’. Unofficially, during the quarrels and fights,
contrary to the Soviet policy of anti-racism, it was possible to hear people calling
Crimean Tatars ‘black’.299 The Crimean authorities at various levels promoted a fear of
Crimean Tatars in the society and in late 1980s that fear was very real among Crimea’s
population, although of course it was unjustified.300 When Ilmi Umerov (future deputy
prime-minister of Crimea, future deputy head of Crimean Tatar Mejlis and a political
prisoner of Russia after 2014) returned to Crimea in 1988, he was first accepted for a
doctor position in one of the clinics in the town of Bakhchysarai. However, when the
chief physician of the hospital found out that Umerov is a Crimean Tatar by nationality,
he rejected Umerov’s candidacy, even though a hospital was in need of doctors.301
Without a job a Crimean Tatar repatriate could not receive Crimean registration and,
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therefore, would not be allowed to live on the peninsula. This story of Umerov was very
typical for Crimean Tatar repatriates at that time. They often came to Crimea after selling
all their property just to be deported again and to lose homes they had bought in Crimea
with their life savings. Officially, the repatriation was a state policy. But repatriates had
to fight an uphill battle with the state bureaucratic machine, as well as systematic
xenophobia at every step of their repatriation. This political hypocrisy of the Soviet
settler colonial institutions towards the colonized peoples had been an effective method
of the imperial institutions that they used to respond to challenges.
This pattern in the unfair treatment of repatriating Crimean Tatars is an example of a
broader trend in Soviet-style settler colonialism. Being at the ‘highest stage of
imperialism’ (using Terry Martin’s terms again) from its inception Soviet state and
institutions had an extensive experience of hiding imperialism behind the democratic
curtain and anti-imperial rhetoric. The Soviet Union was a state which pointed fingers at
the American racism, pretending that the socialist society of the communist state had
ended racism as well as national, gender or any other prejudice. The Soviet state did
indeed distort some traditional patriarchal gender dynamics the same way as it ‘formally’
eliminated other forms of oppression. As demonstrated by the authors of Ideologies of
Race: Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union in the Global Context, Russian empire and
the Soviet Union maintained racial relations that were different from the Western
imperial context, but not absent.302 Although Soviet Union officially conducted antiracist policies, racial relations and oppression existed on the social (unofficial) level.303
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The history of the Soviet cultural stereotypes about Crimean Tatar and other Soviet
nationalities fits into the broader image of unofficial systematic racism, analyzed by the
authors of the abovementioned collection. Soviet Union never eliminated inequality in
spheres of race, gender or nationality, but often removed it from a public into a private
sphere, denying its existence in ways that made it impossible to fight. Soviet regime,
especially post-Stalinist versions of it, used democratic rhetoric and appeals to
international law in order to promote an imperialist agenda. The more the state was
opening itself to the West, the more it was important for the USSR to maintain a
democratic face.
After the decades during which generations of Crimean Tatar activists fought for their
repatriation to Crimea, at some point the Soviet regime could not ignore this effort any
longer. So in order to control repatriation, the Soviet state created institutions responsible
for the repatriation plan. Following the tendency of formal democratization, those
institutions had to involve the representatives of Crimean Tatars. The Crimean Tatar
presence was also important to grant legitimacy to the decisions made by the established
coordinating bodies. The logic of the preservation of the Crimean status quo, however,
demanded that Crimean Tatars’ presence had to be as invisible as possible. This often
meant that the state needed a particular kind of Crimean Tatar members, those willing to
cooperate with the colonizers. Soviet state institutions traditionally did not recognize the
coordinating bodies of the Crimean Tatar national movement as representatives of
Crimean Tatar people. In 1990, for example, the Central Committee (CC) of the
Communist party of the Soviet Union stated the following:
“However this work [on repatriation – M.S.] becomes more complicated due to
the absence of the competent body that would represent Crimean Tatar people.
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The existing national self-organized unions do not cover all of the Crimean Tatar
people and do not represent the whole spectrum of its interests. Some of their
leaders share extremist, nationalistic stand, they refuse of the constructive
cooperation with the Soviet and party organs.” 304
In other words, the state authorities were not pleased with the demands that were
announced by the representatives of the Crimean Tatar national movement during the
negotiations. Therefore, using their position of authority, instead of looking for a
compromise, the empire was willing to change the opposing side at the negotiating table.
Not only this would create a façade of the state agreeing with the Crimean Tatar people,
but also take away political legitimacy from the Crimean Tatar activists. The statement
about the lack of the constructive and competent body is directly linked to the accusation
against Crimean Tatar activists of extremism and nationalism. This kind of accusation
was commonly applied to any non-Russian that wanted to develop their own national
culture and language. Any criticism of the Soviet national policy (even coming from
loyal communists) traditionally fell under the category of extremism/ nationalism and,
therefore, dissent from the Soviet values.
Repatriation efforts by the government had to involve coordination with the Crimean
Tatar national movement (Crimean Tatar activists and civic organizations). However, the
state was reluctant to coordinate with the popular leaders of the movement, as this would
give them additional legitimacy. This reluctance to coordinate often involved a whole
range of measures, including the creation of loyal national organizations that would serve
as national representatives, but in fact be the government’s proxies. Real activists
remained under the constant pressure of secret police surveillance, including a number of
introduced activists who cooperated with KGB. KGB, in fact, was known to have
departments that were responsible for working with ‘national problems,’ or even
provoking some of them to aid in imperial power centralization. The only way activists
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could maintain legitimacy in this context was through a constant mobilization of popular
support. In order to limit that legitimacy, authorities tried to limit their interaction with
activists that would suggest their recognition. For example, in October, 1990 Yalta
municipal council forbade its presidium and executive commissions to conduct
negotiations or sign any agreements with “persons whose authority is not recognized by
The Committee on the Deported Peoples”.305 Such state-recognized representative bodies
that were meant to solve the Crimean Tatar problem appeared from time to time. The
process of their creation often resembled the state’s desire to hold decolonization under
control. The quoted document suggested a creation of the “United Council of Crimean
Tatar people” that was supposed to represent Crimean Tatars and “together with Soviet
and party organs would put into practice the solution of Crimean Tatar problem”.306 In
other words, it was up to the empire/state to decide who had a right to represent Crimean
Tatars and how the problem of their national rights should be solved. Ideally, for the
Soviet institutions, would be to negotiate with their own proxies, who happened to be
Crimean Tatars.
On January 29, 1990 under the instruction of the Soviet central government, the
government of the Ukrainian SSR created a State Commission On the Problems of
Crimean Tatar people, tasked with coordinating the repatriation. Only 5 out of 25
members of the commission were Crimean Tatars.307 Already in May 1990 Crimean
Tatar members of the commission were accused of “heating the situation, unconstructive
behavior, disorganizing the commission’s work, posing unreasonable demands”.308 Both
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sides saw the repatriation process and its outcome differently. For the Crimean Tatar
national movement and the people who supported it, repatriation was a first step towards
the restoration of Crimean Tatar national rights in Crimea. The state, and especially
Crimean institutions, saw Crimean Tatar activists as ‘disruptors of peace’ and discussed
all kinds of problems associated with the repatriation. The reports of this commission
often looked like an attempt to cover passiveness (or even sabotage) with empty
statements and statistics that were meant to represent successful performance of the job.
The commission pointed to the lack of action plan within the republic and absence of
action from higher authorities. One of the reports from August 14, 1990, for example
stated that the state plan was to provide accommodation for 8,400 families who would
repatriate to Crimea before June, 1991. The report also emphasized that the local
authorities provided at least some kind of housing to another 20,000 people. This statistic,
however, does not look as promising, considering that already in 1990, according to the
official statistics, the number of repatriates had reached 90,000 people.309 This number
increased by several times in just few years to come.310
Everybody in Crimea spoke about the necessity to prevent the ethnic tension and armed
conflicts that arose elsewhere within the Soviet Union. Crimean regional committee and
executive branches of government put all the responsibility for the potential conflict on
Crimean Tatars.311 In 1990 a secretary of the Crimean regional committee of the
Communist party, Leonid Grach, wrote: “The aim to return as soon as possible on any
conditions creates substantial problems for incomers as well as for local population of
separate cities and districts. The level of social wellbeing of people is getting worse.”312

309

“V gosudarstvennoi komissii po problemam krymskotatarskogo naroda,” Sovetskii Krym, August 14,
1990. 3
310

As repatriation proceeded there were some popular rumors that demonstrated a yet another fear of the
Crimean colonizers – a potential threat that Turkish Crimean Tatar diaspora of approximately 5 million
people would repatriate to Crimea as well. A repatriation of that many Crimean Tatars would allow them to
outnumber the colonizers and make them an absolute majority on the Crimean Peninsula, whose total
population was slightly larger than 2 million people.
311

“Krepit´ Druzhbu Vsekh Natsii i Narodnostey Kryma”, Sovetskii Krym, January 9, 1990.

312

L. Grach “Krymskie Tatary: Reshenie Dolzhno Ustraivat´ Vsekh”, Sovetskii Krym, May 29, 1990.

137

This had been one of the main arguments of local Crimean communists against
repatriation: population increase would disrupt the economy of ‘locals’. The “as soon as
possible part” is also bitterly ironic, as Crimean Tatars fought for repatriation for 40
years. Crimean Tatars were not considered local and therefore their rights on their
indigenous land were secondary. The debate over who is local to Crimea went on
throughout 1990s and had some important political influence. As Greta Uehling notes in
the introduction to her monograph, “…in a sense, past events are not really past.” She
continues by quoting one of the respondents she met during her fieldwork in Crimea:
“For the Soviet people, the thirties, the forties, the fifties – are history. For Crimean
Tatars, they are now…. They live history.”313 Uehling also makes an important note that
later in this research will be confirmed with the use of different sources: that the battle
over history and memory in Crimea in 1990s (and 2000s) was in fact a battle over who
gets the right to be in the space, to control it, profit from it, claim it, and have sovereignty
over it.314 Constructing an image of Crimean Tatar as non-local became an important
twist in the settler colonial informational politics that will be discussed below.
The conflict over land was a direct result of all the above mentioned problems and
conflicts between Crimean Tatar repatriates and the Soviet colonizers. The lack of trust
between the opposing sides and bureaucratic barriers for the repatriation led to a situation
in which Crimean Tatars just started repatriating on their own terms. This is when
samozakhvat-s became a part of Crimean politics. The term was created by the authorities
as a way to condemn what they saw as illegal occupation of land by Crimean Tatar
people. Samozakhvat literally means ‘self-acquisition’ and translates as an understanding
that the action described is a direct violation of the law, that the land is forcefully
captured by its occupants. The term itself turn the colonized into colonizers and
aggressors into victims, which is a yet another common narrative distortion used by
settler colonial authorities to delegitimize indigenous people as societies attempt to
decolonize. One of the Crimean Tatar respondents, Aider Muzhdaba, says he does not see
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any particularly negative meaning in the term samozakhvat. Although, he does use an
alternative term – samovozvrat – self-return, as opposed to self-acquisition.315 The reason
why Muzhdaba personally does not consider the term abusive probably comes from the
understanding that the accusation at its basis is overtly and obviously wrong. It is one of
the instances when the colonized ‘bursts into laughter’ (metaphorically, not literally in
this case) in response to yet another colonizer’s myth.316
Prior to the expected repatriation of Crimean Tatars, Crimean authorities began to
distribute free land to the Slavic (roughly Russian and Ukrainian) residents of Crimea.
Volodymyr Prytula remembers that dachas – Soviet equivalent of seasonal homes, small
pieces of land usually outside of the urban areas – were distributed specifically prior to
the repatriation of Crimean Tatars: “They even gave me land. We were young specialists
who had just come and worked only for half a year. They gave us a share of land for
dacha. That was on Sapun-hora [Mount Sapun]. With no problems. But for the Crimean
Tatars there was no land.”317 This of course speaks to the fear of revolt described by
Fanon, experienced by the colonizer that was discussed in the first chapter. The hint of
surprise in Prytula’s words is real – the land in Crimea was a precious asset, which
everybody wanted to receive; and therefore people had to earn it with years of labor. But
the repatriation of Crimean Tatars made this asset available very quickly to people on the
basis of their non-Crimean Tatar nationality. This access to land translated into a socioeconomic factor, as restriction of Crimean Tatar access to land generally reduced their
economic status and political influence on the peninsula, especially in the age of post-
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Soviet privatization.318 In Crimea’s context, settler colonial institutions were preparing
ahead of time to severely limit the potential of the future decolonization process and
worked to preserve the status quo in all spheres, including land ownership.
The representatives of the local institutions of power consistently framed Crimean Tatars
as migrants, rather than repatriates. Therefore, they described the allocation of land for
Crimean Tatar families as a favor, rather than their responsibility. In January, 1991 the
head of the Perovksi village council and a director of the poultry farm ‘Yuzhnaia’ V.
Verchenko protested against the Crimean Tatar self-return of land. He complained in
particular that “they” (the village or the farm) decided to cooperate with Crimean Tatars
and even allocated land for 34 families. And instead of gratefulness that Verchenko
expected from them, Crimean Tatars protested against the ‘rightful’ allocation of land for
farm workers and seized additional land for themselves.319 On the one hand Verchenko
argued that Crimean Tatars received as much as was possible to give to them. On the
other hand, providing land for workers’ summerhouses was ‘legal’. In this distorted
narrative the head of the village council presumed that the settlers’ need for
summerhouses was no less important that the need of the indigenous repatriates for
homes. Therefore, he put the responsibility for the conflict on the Crimean Tatars,
describing their actions as “inhumane”. He further called on both “those who live here”
and “those who come here” to restrain from aggravating the already complicated
situation.
Both Crimean Tatar respondents, Ilmi Umerov and Aider Muzhdaba, when asked about
the Crimean Tatar seizure of land, tell a similar story. Crimean authorities distributed
land en masse, but not to Crimean Tatars. The response Crimean Tatars received every
time they asked for land to be given to repatriates to build homes was that the state did
not have any free land to distribute. Activists that took part in the seizure of land say they
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had studied maps carefully to determine the land that was not in use by anyone.320 Then
they organized and built protest tent camps, claiming that this land could be distributed to
them. Sometimes the authorities found out in advance where Crimean Tatars would build
their protest camp and distributed that land for private use overnight.321 Sinaver Kadyrov,
Crimean Tatar activist and one of the last political prisoners of the USSR, claims
Crimean authorities actively involved organized crime in fighting with Crimean Tatar
movement.322 Every time the protest tent camp appeared, the authorities claimed that
Crimean Tatar occupied the land illegally and in fact stole it from either private owners
or collective farms. From time to time the authorities used riot police to disperse the
protest camps. One of such attacks in 1992 against the camp near Alushta ended with
arrests of Crimean Tatar activists. In return, Crimean Tatar activists stormed the
parliament of the Crimean autonomy. A demand to release prisoners gradually turned
into a general political protest.323
One of the major arguments of the Crimean local authorities against Crimean Tatar
seizure of land was that it violated the law. Crimean Tatar seizure of land did technically
violate Soviet legislation. But in a settler colonial context, as shown by Olúfémi Táíwò
and many other scholars of postcolonialism, the legal system of the state protects the
settler colonial regime.324 The history of the Russian imperial and the Soviet presence in
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Crimea suggests that laws did not function equally in relation to different national groups.
The law and the language of equality, as one of the institutions of the settler colonial
power was used by the local authorities to prevent and sabotage the repatriation process.
The demand for land by Crimean Tatars often accompanied mass protests in front of the
government buildings. One of such protest in the town of Yalta in 1990 was declared
unsanctioned: when activists submitted a request to sanction a protest in front of the
municipal authorities buildings, they got rejected and offered a place in an open-air
cinema (a place where they would not be as visible for public) instead.325 Finally, in a
statement by Yalta municipal council that condemned Crimean Tatar protests, the council
ordered distribution of land ‘on equal terms’ to Crimean Tatar and ‘local’ residents of the
area. The municipal also limited the possibility of Crimean Tatar repatriation to the area
only to those who were personally deported from the area or who could prove that their
closest cirсle of relatives had been deported from the area.326 The first statement meant
that under the use of equal national rights rhetoric, the authorities were going to distribute
a limited land resource to non-Crimean Tatars, limiting the indigenous access to the land.
And in addition, they further limited Crimean Tatar access to settling in Southern region
of Crimea by requiring them to prove their lineage, making the positive result almost
impossible. In the meantime, the precious land of the Southern Crimea was to be legally
distributed among ‘local people’ – settlers – behind the façade of repatriation efforts.
Crimean Tatar attempts to acquire land fit into the theoretical framework of the third
space of sovereignty, defined by an American political scientist Kevin Bruyneel.327
According to Bruyneel, a third space of sovereignty, is an indigenous way to challenge
the imperial “spatial and temporal boundaries, demanding rights and resources from the
liberal democratic settler state while also challenging the imposition of colonial rule on
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their lives”.328 Such understanding comes from a premise that the indigenous people have
a sovereignty of their own, separate from the sovereignty of the imperial state. This also
means that the indigenous sovereignty is not a gift of the empire and therefore, the
colonizer is unable to take it away.329 Crimean Tatars were Soviet citizens. They
recognized the Soviet authority and even appealed to Lenin’s writing in their fight for
national rights. They received Soviet education and utilized the opportunities of the
Soviet welfare system. In that regard, Crimean Tatars existed within the legal space of the
Soviet state. On the other hand, Crimean Tatars had a strong indigenous identity and saw
Crimea as a basis on which that identity stood. That said, Crimean Tatar seizure of land
was an act of resistance based on the understanding that the indigenous right to the land
and indigenous sovereignty comes before the imperial laws. That way, the selfacquisition of land was more than just a fight for private property, but a people’s claim
for their right to live and self-govern in Crimea. When analyzing the methods of Crimean
Tatar resistance to the Soviet state, Greta Uehling pays specific attention to the
appropriation of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric by Crimean Tatars. She further says that
Crimean Tatars entered into a dialogue with the state and played a role of educators,
teaching the state officials about the history and rights of their people.330 One of the
methods of resistance, according to Uehling, was the appropriation of the MarxistLeninist rhetoric in order to teach the state that it violated its own legal and ideological
norms.331
The reason why the self-acquisition of land by Crimean Tatars was often met with
resistance, hostility and the language of blackmail from the local authorities had a longlasting significance in the sphere of power dynamic on the peninsula. By coming on their
own terms, claiming the land and creating their own political institutions Crimean Tatars
claimed agency in the colonized space and prepared to distort the settler colonial system.
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In June 1991 Crimean Tatar demands for national sovereignty entered the sphere of
organized politics. Activists of the Crimean Tatar national movement organized Kurultai
in the city of Simferopol – an all-nation congress, where delegates from Crimean Tatar
communities elected the Crimean Tatar representative body – Mejlis. From that time
forward, the national movement entered the sphere of politics, in addition to social
activism. What was more important during the Kurultai was that the assembly adopted a
resolution which proclaimed the national sovereignty of Crimean Tatar people on
Crimean land: “Crimea is a national territory of Crimean Tatar people, where only this
people has a right for self-determination the way this right is mentioned in international
legal acts, recognized by the international community”.332 Crimean Tatar repatriation
efforts, acquisition of land and political organization are obviously connected processes,
but all together this was an effort for decolonization of the peninsula in the post-Soviet
era.
Mejlis became ‘the competent representative body’ that was ‘lacking’ in Crimean Tatar
representation, according to the state authorities. However, the Soviet state was not ready
to recognize Mejlis as a counteragent at negotiations. On July 2, 1991 a head of the
ideology section of the CC of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Ivan Musienko, issued a
report to the CC, informing about and condemning Kurultai and its decisions: “...in fact
Kurultai turned into a party congress of the nationalistic extremist organization –
Organization of Crimean Tatar National Movement /OKND/, - that tried to use this
congress in order to give its anti-Soviet program a look of the people’s support”.333 The
decisions of the Crimean Tatar congress, according to Musienko, cause “negative
reaction of the population of the autonomous republic [of Crimea], objectively lead to the
aggravation of the inter-national tension in the region.”334 Therefore, Musienko advised
Crimean regional committee to start an ideological campaign against the decisions of
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Kurultai in the local press and in the areas of concentration of Crimean Tatars in order to
explain “socio-historical and juridical impossibility of the demands of the creation of the
national-territorial autonomy of Crimean Tatars in the region”.335
The memoirs of Mykola Bahrov record his attitude towards the Kurultai. Once again, a
negative attitude hid behind a democratic and appeasing rhetoric: “…we understood the
plan to hold Kurultai in Simferopol on June 26-30, 1991. However, our position from the
beginning was based on [a statement] that the question was about the representative body
acting within the [norms of] legislation and not claiming an alternative power.”336
Rhetorically Bahrov remains democratic – he is ready to recognize the representative
body of Crimean Tatars – but in reality the requirement to follow the ‘norm of
legislation’ is a vague enough formulation to be able to manipulate it, especially in a
settler colonial environment. Just few pages later Bahrov says that leaders of the
Organization of Crimean Tatar National Movement were not ready for dialogue with the
authorities, that their political demands scared the ‘Crimeans’.337 This was why the
authorities negotiated with a more moderate Crimean Tatar organization – National
Movement of Crimean Tatars.338 National Movement of Crimean Tatars (NDKT)
consisted of the older generation of activists (often sharing communist ideology
themselves) that were ready to negotiate and find compromises with the Soviet
government. Their opponents – Organization of Crimean Tatar National Movement –
were younger and more radical, and anti-Soviet by ideology.339
The Crimean Supreme Council did not recognize the legitimacy of Crimean Tatar
declaration of national sovereignty and criticized it for ‘nationalism’, while the “so
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called” Mejlis was accused of destabilizing the inter-ethnic peace in Crimea.340 As
Andriy Klymenko described it, those terms were very new for the Crimean politicians
and general public at the time. To many of them ‘national sovereignty’ of Crimean Tatars
sounded like a claim for unilateral control over the peninsula.341 Therefore, the Supreme
Council of Crimea adopted a decree on July 29, 1991 that condemned Crimean Tatar
Kurultai, proclaimed the Mejlis illegitimate and denounced Crimean Tatar declaration of
sovereignty and national symbols as signs of nationalism.342 Crimean Tatar sovereignty
over the Crimean Peninsula disrupted the settler colonial regime that existed for two
centuries. The very existence of the indigenous Crimean Tatars in Crimea undermined
the settler’s myth about ‘brotherhood of nations’ and Crimean ‘multinationality’. This is
why, Crimean authorities could not possibly recognize Mejlis as a legitimate power.
Crimean Tatar sovereignty delegitimized the very foundations of the Crimean settler
colonial status quo. This is why it was vitally important to denounce Crimean Tatar
claims as nationalistic.
The Ukrainian state authorities did not recognize Mejlis as well. In that regard the
government in Kyiv supported the status quo in Crimea and undermined its own power
within the peninsula. It was easier for Kyiv’s post-communist politicians to find
agreement with former communists in Simferopol, rather than look for political allies
among Crimean Tatars. Maybe part of the reason was that Mejlis consistently supported
Ukrainian national-democratic forces (Narodny Rukh, in particular) and not former
communists during elections. And in the meantime, throughout the 1990s and after,
Mejlis was Ukraine’s ally in Crimea, often without getting support in return. Due to the
mobilization of Crimean Tatar people and mass repatriation, Mejlis quickly became an
important factor in Crimean local politics. Leaders of Mejlis formulated political
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demands based on the premise that the fate of Crimea could not be decided without
Crimean Tatars. They demanded facilitation of repatriation and pointed to the multiple
problems that stood in front of repatriates in Crimea. The acquisition of land was just one
of them. In addition, Crimean Tatar repatriates faced problems with receiving Ukrainian
citizenship and all questions that directly depended on that – education for children, job
opportunities, political representation, among others.
As a head of the Crimean parliament, Mykola Bahrov advocated for Crimean territorial
sovereignty. The arguments in favor of it mostly repeated the Soviet rhetoric of
‘brotherhood of nations’, adjusted to the reality of post-Soviet time. Besides, the claims
for the territorial sovereignty based on the historical claim that the Crimean autonomy in
early 1920s had a territorial form. This way, the proponents of the territorial autonomy
(and opponents of Crimean Tatar national autonomy) could employ history for their
political arguments and preserve the settler colonial sovereignty over land. At times, it
looked like Crimean authorities as well as Crimean press were trying to forge a separate
multinational Crimean identity. ‘Multinationalism’ propaganda appealed directly to
Soviet traditions and historical narratives. Statements about a historically ‘multinational’
Crimea were a way to employ history into the everyday politics and argue that Crimean
Tatars had no more rights for the Crimean land that any other national group in Crimea.
In that regard the Crimean settler colonial system used the old methods of political
warfare instead of inventing new ones.
For Crimean Tatar respondents, the sense of their national sovereignty seemed intuitive,
even when they were not quite sure about the meaning of the term. It stems from the
understanding that the land of Crimea is part of their identity, part of their families’
history. Surprisingly, Ismail Ramazanov and Sinaver Kadyrov (representatives of
different generations of Crimean Tatars) both described Russian policies in Crimea in
settler colonial terms, even though both were unaware of settler colonial theories. For
Ismail Ramazanov, who was born in Uzbekistan and repatriated to Crimea as a child in
1993, the sense of belonging to “my people” and “my land” is extremely powerful: “My
fight for my nationality started in 1993. My peers [children of the same age] called me
Uzbek. How can I be Uzbek, if everything here is mine? All mountains, all rivers have
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Crimean Tatar names. My Khans [leaders of Crimean Khanate – Crimean Tatar state] are
buried here”.343 He then continued with a story about the house of his great-grandfather
and a cornel tree that his great-great-grandfather planted near the foot of the mountain.344
Their family went to find the house (that they lost as a result of the deportation) and the
tree upon returning to Crimea. When Ramazanov’s grandfather asked the present owners
of the house to be allowed to step into the yard for a family prayer, they were denied.
This sense of belonging to his nationality is interesting to observe in a person, who was
just starting elementary school in 1993. This awareness of the deportation probably
developed as a result of repatriation and becoming the ‘Other’ in Crimean space.
Ramazanov’s words about the native land represent what Uehling describes as Crimean
Tatar responsibility for the land that is a source of their sense of national identity.345 Of
course, in the case of a representative of a younger generation, the researcher deals with
socially constructed memory. The emotional attachment to this memory probably even
increased after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, creating a perception of a single sequence
of the Russian imperial policy – since 1783 to this day. It is worth mentioning, however,
that identity in general is a social construct. And Russian identity in Crimea, the image of
the ‘Russian’ Crimea is no more or less of a construct that any other identities that exist
in Crimea or elsewhere. The fact that Crimean Tatar identity or memory is socially
constructed does not delegitimize it. And the idea of being responsible for one’s native
land or belonging to the land is strikingly similar to the ideas that were common among
the indigenous peoples of North America in relation to their native land.346
Throughout the conversation Ramazanov emphasizes the original Crimean Tatar
geographical names for every place he mentions. Other Crimean Tatar respondents, like
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Aider Muzhdaba and Ilmi Umerov, do the same – often referring to the place by Crimean
Tatar name and only after that giving the current official name of the place. This
demonstrates the awareness of the indigenous people of the necessity to record this
indigeneity and to resist the active policy of the empire to erase it. It also demonstrates
how settler colonization takes place in the space of linguistics: language, names and
geography traditionally become targets of settler colonization. Ramazanov also sees
himself a direct victim of the Stalin’s policy that he describes as a genocide: “Because of
Stalin’s repressions I could not be born in my native land… I cannot tell myself that I am
hundred percent Crimean Tatar. [They] deprived me of the opportunity to be born in my
native land.”347 The Crimean Tatar understanding of home and repatriation demanded
that they be repatriated to the exact same village from where their ancestors had been
deported. However, certain areas, especially in Southern parts of Crimea, became
restricted for Crimean Tatars. They also tended to receive permission to live in rural,
rather than urban areas. Most Crimean Tatar repatriates ended up repatriating wherever it
was possible within Crimea and had no opportunity to choose.348
One of the things Crimean Tatars did get in terms of their political demands was the
national quotas during the elections to Crimean Supreme Council of 1994. Those quotas
gave Crimean Tatars a right to elect 7 delegates to the council. This measure was
temporary and lasted a single election cycle. Officially this was a recognition of the fact
that Crimean Tatar people were in the process of repatriation and often had problems
acquiring citizenship. Therefore, there was a need to assure Crimean Tatar representation
in the Supreme Council. Mykola Bahrov became one of the proponents of the national
quotas for the Crimean Tatars and to a large extent they were approved on his effort.
While this was an important development in recognition of Crimean Tatar national rights,
this hardly led to dismantling the settler colonial system in Crimea. It is possible to say
that Bahrov was eventually ‘educated’ by the persistence and argumentation of Crimean
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Tatar activists.349 On the other hand, of course, Bahrov did get an endorsement of
Crimean Tatar Mejlis during his presidential race against Yurii Meshkov.

3.4
Ukrainian Activists: Constructing a Narrative of
Ukrainian Crimea
The Ukrainians’ challenge to settler colonial institutions of power in Crimea was of a
different kind than that of Crimean Tatars. Unlike Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians were not
an indigenous group on the peninsula and, unlike Russians, they did not have an imperial
narrative of the past to argue for their rightful presence in the space. In terms of the
development of Ukrainian national culture and language in Crimea (and, therefore,
cultural claims to Crimea as a homeland), Ukrainians were not much better state than
Crimean Tatars, even though technically Crimea had been part of the Ukrainian SSR
since 1954. What Ukrainians did have was state sovereignty over Crimea and a certain
level of national awakening in early 1990s. Ukrainian activists in Crimea tried to
challenge Russian settler-colonial institutions of power and claimed to be fighting for the
decolonization of Crimea, as a part of a general Ukrainian decolonization (deSovetization, de-Rusification) process. Their main goal was to preserve Crimea as an
integral part of Ukraine and resist the pro-Russian nationalist movement within the
peninsula. Partially this meant changing the language hierarchy within the peninsula and
demanding local authorities to enable functionality of the Ukrainian language. Often,
however, these efforts amounted to attempts to re-colonize Crimea into a Ukrainian
place. The pro-Ukrainian movement relied on activists, nationally minded intelligentsia
and several small anti-communist opposition parties. It had little to no support from the
state, but did get support from Ukrainian activists in the rest of Ukraine. In addition, the
Ukrainian movement was able to coordinate with the Crimean Tatar movement. Both
movements had slightly different goals, but had a common opponent, represented by the
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pro-Russian nationalist forces. Although the network of Ukrainian activists in Crimea
developed across the whole peninsula, this section will focus on the two main centers of
its activity – Sevastopol and Simferopol.
Ukrainian activists in Crimea, in general, campaigned for the deeper involvement of the
Ukrainian state in support of the Ukrainian culture, language in Crimea, as well as in the
competition with institutions and agents of influence of the Russian state. Their statebuilding views, however, did not involve a support of the post-Soviet Ukrainian
government. As was mentioned earlier, during the times of Kravchuk at least, the
authorities in Kyiv often received information about the situation in Crimea from the
local communists. Ukrainian activists, meanwhile, often oriented at the nationallyminded anti-communist opposition. They criticized (and continue to do so today) the
Ukrainian authorities in Kyiv and their passive approach towards the Crimea problem.
Therefore, they often tried to compensate the passiveness of the Ukrainian state with their
own activism. Often this meant putting their own careers at risk for the opportunity to
exercise their national rights, to be Ukrainian in Crimea and to not be targeted for that.
Surprisingly, the importance of Sevastopol for the pro-Ukrainian movement had similar
reasons to why Sevastopol was important for Russia. As a navy base, Sevastopol had a
considerable number of officers and sailors who came to serve from elsewhere in
Ukraine. That was a potential social base for the pro-Ukrainian movement. In the
December 1, 1991 referendum, 57% of people in Sevastopol supported the independence
of Ukraine. This was even higher than in the rest of Crimea, which was surprising,
considering the image of Sevastopol as a pro-Russian stronghold. Ukrainian officers
report that an absolute majority of the Black Sea Fleet supported the Ukrainian
independence and were ready to serve under Ukrainian jurisdiction.350 Volodymyr
Prytula claims that his sources among fleet officers informed that there had been a
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centralized order from the fleet command to support the Ukrainian independence.351
Other respondents, who served in the Black Sea Fleet, such as 2nd rank captain Mykola
Huk and 1st rank captain Yevhen Lupakov, do not mention this order in their interviews.
Moreover, upon being approached with a request for clarification, Yevhen Lupakov
directly rejected that statement: “Who would give such an order? What would be the
consequences for that person?”352 Prytula’s description of Sevastopol, however, aligns
with the way 1st rank captain Lupakov speaks about Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet –
as a militarized city and a military base, which together with their residents and
servicemen were ready to “fulfill orders,” often independently from personal beliefs.353 It
was Sevastopol rather than Simferopol, according to Prytula, that happened to be more
organized and effective in terms of Ukrainian activism in the Crimean Peninsula.354
In 1989, after the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR adopted the law “On
languages”, activists in Sevastopol started Tovarystvo Ukrain’skoi Movy imeni Tarasa
Shevchenka (Association of Ukrainian language of Taras Shevchenko). This association
later became known as Tovarystvo “Prosvita” (Association “Enlightenment”), a known
circle of Ukrainian intelligentsia in the city. It was one of the main organizations to carry
out Ukrainian activism and promote Ukrainian statehood and culture on the territory of
Crimea. 2nd rank captain Mykola Huk, a military journalist for the Black Sea Fleet
newspapers “Vympel” and “Flag Rodiny” became the first head of this organization. His
efforts to support Ukrainian language and culture in Crimea predated Tovarystvo
Ukrain’skoi Movy. He had previously tried to organize a Ukrainian language school for
his daughter, and as a result Mykola Huk began to suffer under pressure from his
superiors at work. In 1988 he was accused of Ukrainian nationalism (charges that were
rejected later), which put him in danger of being kicked out of the communist party.355 In
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1989 he was removed from his position on the fleet newspaper “Flag Rodiny” for his
political views. Military newspapers were official institutions of propaganda, and Huk
had been trained in a military school to become a part of this institution of propaganda.
His removal from writing for the paper indicated that, to his superiors in the Black Sea
Fleet, any kind of political dissent was akin to treason.356 Tovarystvo Ukrain’skoi Movy
was created shortly after that and united several dozens of Ukrainian-minded people in
Sevastopol.
The content of Ukrainian activism in Sevastopol in early 1990s developed out of several
social components that coincided: the fall of the Soviet Union and the general
demotivation of pro-Soviet forces, a relatively large group of politically neutral people,
the novelty of political activity in general and a sense of national awakening among proUkrainian activists. Tovarystvo Ukrain’skoi Movy and later Prosvita manifested
themselves as cultural organization, promoting Ukrainian language and culture. They
organized a Ukrainian choir and theater, they also held traditional Ukrainian Christmas
celebrations – Vertep. In a colonial situation with strict national hierarchies and
boundaries, these were highly political activities. On the other hand, the official Soviet
rhetoric on national equality enabled them to promote Ukrainian language and culture
without being openly anti-Soviet (or anti-systemic). Mykola Huk, a communist himself at
the time, says he even invited representatives of the Communist party to the first
meetings in order to emphasize its apolitical nature.357 The “oxymoron space” of Soviet
and post-Soviet political and social life (when official rhetoric did not correspond to real
actions) was not only an imperial form of oppression, it also enabled such resistance
maneuvers from non-dominant groups. While Ukrainian activism in Crimea claimed
emphatically to be apolitical, the existence of organizations like these, and their goals,
were thoroughly political, because they disrupted the colonial monopoly over cultural and
political socialization.358
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The goal of Ukrainian activists in Crimea was to promote Ukrainian statehood on the
peninsula and resist the attempts to secede it from Ukraine. The promotion of the creation
of Ukrainian armed forces on the territory of Crimea was an important step towards those
goals. Taking control over the Black Sea Fleet and the creation of the Ukrainian navy
forces turned into a race between Russia and Ukraine (more on this in Chapter 5). At
times, this was literally a race, when Ukrainian and Russian officers were trying to get
into military bases ahead of their competitors in order to convince local commander,
officers and servicemen either to pledge allegiance to Ukraine or to remain under the
control of the fleet command.359 The result of that race defined the balance of power on
the peninsula. In this race, Ukrainian activists/officers were the main power and source of
expertise regarding the creation of the fleet. Their main problems were lack of timely
political support from the state, fierce resistance from the fleet command and other fleet
institutions (media, for example), as well as marginalization from other Crimean settler
colonial institutions. Accordingly, the Russian side in this race had control over the fleet
structures, as well as political support from the Russian state authorities, including
President Yeltsin himself.360

common in actions of any empire. Controlling every single step of the members of the society requires an
enormous amount of resources. Therefore, at times various actors within the imperial discourse make
mistakes, use bad judgement, or become open to corruption. A representative of the party who came to the
meeting of Prosvita probably understood what was going on. But he was specifically invited to the
meeting, because he would not have any formal reason (or motivation) to start a fight against the
organization. Moreover, his presence at the meeting legitimized the meeting itself. Inconsistencies like this
change the characteristic of the imperial relations from being strictly ‘carved in stone’ to being a constantly
changing dynamic. This reminds of one of Homi Bhabha’s characteristics of colonial ambivalence – a
discourse that exists “at the crossroads of what is known and permissible and that which though known
must be kept concealed; a discourse uttered between the lines and as such against the rules and within
them” (Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 128).
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Lupakov further remembers that in early days of the Ukrainian navy forces, Ukrainian officers did not
have other choice but to use the military communication system of the Black Sea Fleet, which was of
course controlled (and listened to) by the respective branches of the fleet. The same problem was in the
newly established Ministry of Defense in Kyiv. Lupakov says that in early 1992 the Ministry of Defense
only had two phone lines. Therefore, it was almost impossible in critical situations for the officers in
Crimea to reach the ministry by phone to let the authorities know there were people in Crimea, willing to
serve Ukraine.
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The fight for the creation of the Ukrainian navy started when a group of officers of the
Black Sea Fleet decided to establish a local branch of the Spilka Ofitseriv Ukrainy
(Association of officers of Ukraine) in Crimea. Unlike anywhere else in Ukraine, in
Crimea and within the units of the Black Sea Fleet, membership in the officers’
association had to be kept secret. Membership in the association meant immediate
dismissal from the fleet. 2nd rank captain Mykola Huk became one of the delegates to the
1st congress of officers in Kyiv on July 28, 1991, where the association was established.
Captain Huk says his participation in the congress became known in the Communist
party and in the fleet. The commander of the fleet, admiral Mikhail Khronopulo, sent a
report to the Soviet minister of defense asking for permission to dismiss Huk from duty
before the end of his commission, due to his “anti-party and anti-Constitutional
activity”.361 Huk was also told he was going to be arrested and imprisoned. The process
was stopped due to the coup d’état of GKChP, which led to many people being dismissed
from the fleet.362 In 1991, even after the proclamation of Ukrainian independence, Spilka
existed as an underground movement in the Black Sea Fleet. Every gathering of Spilka
members resulted in the official dismissal of the unit commanders that had hosted them,
even though these repercussions contradicted all norms about the creation of separate
post-Soviet armed forces. As a result, officers had to meet at a secondary school, calling
themselves the association of gardeners.363 Spilka played an important role in the
establishment of the Ukrainian navy; it’s officers were the first to pledge loyalty oaths to
Ukraine and to organize a wide campaign within the fleet to encourage other servicemen
to do the same. Of course this meant burning their cover and suffering dismissal from
Black Sea Fleet service. The organization of the Ukrainian navy forces (established in
April, 1992) was completely comprised of officers who had previously pledged
allegiance to Ukraine and were dismissed for doing so.364
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As an underground movement within a military institution filled with counter-intelligence
and security service agents, Spilka could not recruit members openly. Captain Huk, as a
military journalist, used to walk around ships carrying a Ukrainian newspaper Literaturna
Ukraina (Literary Ukraine) so that he could assess the reactions of other seamen to his
choice of reading material. In this way, he saw the attitude of his colleagues towards
Ukraine. He also met people in bookstores next to the shelves with Ukrainian-language
literature.365 Literaturna Ukraina happened to be important for Yevhen Lupakov as well:
he found a drafted sailor reading the newspaper in the washroom on a military base and
ordered him to show what he was reading. Lupakov claims that this was how he got
exposed to that newspaper. A soldier was receiving the newspaper from his parents (it
was not accessible in newspaper kiosks of Sevastopol) in mail and further on shared it
with Lupakov. Reading that newspaper for Lupakov became a defining time for his
identity that, as he claims, had previously been Soviet. He says that he had never thought
of Ukraine as something different from the Soviet Union: “For the most part of my life I
was a good janissary. I served occupants faithfully and loyally.”366 But Literaturna
Ukraina made him question the reality he lived in. As a higher ranking officer he still
could not locate Spilka members as they considered him too dangerous (too high in the
rank and, therefore, potentially loyal to the system) to approach. Therefore, Lupakov had
to find his way into Spilka on his own by persuading an uncovered member to trust
him.367
Explaining a motivation of the Black Sea Fleet officers to pledge allegiance to the
Ukrainian state is a question that is very hard to answer. It seems that late 1980s and early
1990s were a breaking time, when many people behaved contrary to the general
expectation. Joining an underground organization or dissenting from the standards of
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political behavior for a Soviet military officer, especially prior to August, 1991 meant
putting their career, freedom and even the future of their families at risk. The Soviet
system of military education, background checks, political indoctrination and oversight
by security services could hardly allow disloyal people to build military careers. Mykola
Huk, although originally he came from Western Ukraine, was a trained military
propagandist. Yevhen Lupakov came from Mykolaiv region (Southern Ukraine). He
reached a rank of 1st rank captain and served as a deputy commander of the 14th
submarine division, armed with nuclear weapons. Apparently, he could only reach this
kind of status, because he was considered loyal to the state. The first commander of the
Ukrainian fleet, vice-admiral Borys Kozhyn, served as a commander of the navy base of
the Black Sea Fleet. At the time when he became a commander of the fleet, he, an ethnic
Russian, could not speak a word of Ukrainian language. The officers around him created
an environment in which the Ukrainian navy headquarters conducted all correspondence
and communication in Ukrainian.368 The time period might be at least partially
responsible for such dramatic changes in their allegiance. Perestroika in the Soviet Union
and the sense of a coming political instability allowed access to knowledge that had not
been available before. It is hard to measure the extent to which the social movements in
the Ukrainian SSR for the democratization and Ukrainian state-building reached navy
officers in Crimea. On the one hand, they were all educated people and knew from the
very experience of their service that in the Soviet Union words often did not correspond
to actions. On the other hand, Soviet military and navy was an institutions that isolated
personnel from the rest of the society. As unlikely as this was, those officers became part
of the general social movement in Ukraine. Due to their military experience they were
able to convert military discipline into serious political results.369
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Historical records say that President Kravchuk issued an order to form Ukrainian navy on April 5, 1992.
But personal memories of the Ukrainian navy veterans record the context. Ukrainian officers in Sevastopol
knew in advance that Russian President Yeltsin was going to issue an order that take control over the Black
Sea Fleet. The fleet command would of course follow that order, which meant that Ukraine was going to
lose the fleet. Therefore, it was important to force the Ukrainian government to act first. An envoy from
Sevastopol reached Kyiv on Sunday, April 5, 1992, when all the state institutions were of course closed.
The order of President Kravchuk came out that same day. President Yeltsin issued his order on April 7,
1992. That led to the political collision between two states.
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Further activity of Spilka members focused around turning officers and military units of
the Black Sea Fleet to the Ukrainian side. According the legislation of the new Ukrainian
state, all military units located on the territory of Ukraine had to switch to be under
Ukrainian command. Multiple officers of the Ukrainian navy forces claim that in 1992
the vast majority of the Black Sea Fleet personnel was ready to accept Ukrainian
allegiance.370 This was not always due to the Ukrainian patriotism (although this often
was the case), but due to their lack of confidence in the future Russia’s presence in
Crimea and their desire to remain on the Crimean Peninsula. Two major barriers
prevented a mass transfer of the fleet to Ukrainian control: a lack of quick and decisive
support from the political leadership in Kyiv for the initiatives of Ukrainian navy officers
and systematic repressions from the fleet command against any dissent. This was a key
failure of Ukrainian political leadership because the Black Sea Fleet was one of the main
forces that enabled the reproduction and support of Russian settler colonial influence in
Crimea.
Meanwhile, street activism by the Ukrainian organizations became the main advocate of
the Ukrainian state in Crimea. Prosvita actively supported the referendum on Ukrainian
independence, organized Ukrainian-language schools and held Ukrainian cultural events,
privately and publicly. Two of the Ukrainian activists in Sevastopol at that time, Mykola
Vladzimirsky and Mykola Huk believe, for instance, that the pro-independence outcome
of the referendum on the Ukraine’s independence in Sevastopol was due to the vitality of
the Ukrainian community there.371 Prior to that referendum, Prosvita managed to
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delegate several of its members to the Sevastopol municipal council during the municipal
elections of 1990. Those municipal deputies formed a group called ‘Ukraine’ in the city
council. This, of course, disrupted the existing Russian national status-quo, and
threatened to change national dynamics. Sevastopol was “a city of Russian glory” and
therefore, no alternative narratives could be allowed to exist. For example, in 1990 a
group of Sevastopol municipal deputies initiated a creation of the first Ukrainianlanguage school in the city. One of the initiators and member of the Prosvita, 2nd rank
captain and a municipal deputy Vadym Makhno later stated that he received anonymous
death threats over the phone because of his support for the school.372 Municipal deputy
Leonid Amelkovych also received threats from unknown people, activist Bohdan Yenal
even appealed to KGB for protection and changed his phone number. Resistance to proUkrainian representatives on the municipal council came from the local authorities and
local pro-Russian civic organizations, and from within the Black Sea Fleet.373
By 1993 Prosvita developed into an extended structure which united several different
initiatives. Alongside close cooperation with the Union of Ukrainian Officers, its activists
created a Greek Catholic religious community in the city, as well as a Sojuz Ukrainok
(Union of Ukrainian women), both headed by Bohdana Protsak. Protsak also organized
Plast – a scouting organization for children that was actively developing across Ukraine
in the early 1990s. In a context in which the Ukrainian state provided little to no support
to the community, activists were actively creating social structures and cultural
institutions on their own. This, in turn, disrupted the existing empire’s system of body
politics – Foucault’s term for the state’s system of socialization that assures the
upbringing of the ‘right’ member of society. Prosvita was the basis for all Ukrainian
events in Sevastopol and provided support for Ukrainian activists from outside of Crimea
when they visited.
Ukrainian activism in Simferopol, according to Volodymyr Prytula, was less organized
and went through constant internal conflicts. It consisted of the local university student
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movement, based in the Simferopol State University (later – Tavriisky National
University of Vernadsky) as well as local branches of the all-Ukrainian parties and civic
organizations. The Black Sea Fleet did not have much influence in Simferopol, which
allowed for relatively more freedom in pro-Ukrainian activism. The factor of repatriating
Crimean Tatars and coordination between pro-Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar
organizations further reduced the influence of pro-Russian activists and contributed to the
development of pro-Ukrainian influence, compared to Sevastopol.374 For Andriy Ivanets
and Andriy Shchekun, who were students at the Simferopol State University at the time,
student organizations (Ukrainian student association, ‘Zarevo’, Student brotherhood) and
cooperation with Narodny Rukh party (including its younger branch – Molody Rukh)
became the first steps into political activism.375 The department of history as well as the
linguistic department of the University became a source of activists, both pro-Ukrainian
and pro-Russian.376 Students participated in demonstrations, and campaigned for flying
Ukrainian flags over state institutions. Their goal was to show that Crimea had more than
one dimension, and that its identities included both Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar.377
Archival documents show that Ukrainian political parties in Crimea were constantly in
lack of resources. For example, as of November, 1992 the local branch of Narodny Rukh
in Crimea had 51 members.378 This meant that Rukh could not establish municipal
branches in all Crimean towns and therefore political activity required a lot of financial
and human resources. To facilitate this work, Rukh members identified local municipal
deputies who could potentially support pro-Ukrainian activity.379 Informational resources
were a general problem as well, as fight for Crimea often took place in the sphere of
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propaganda. A letter from the Odesa regional organization of Rukh Volodymyr
Tsymbaliuk to the deputy chairman of Rukh council Oleksandr Lavrynovych emphasized
the lack of informational resources, and especially people who were capable to publicly
debate with pro-Russian opponents:
“Propagandist forces are weak. On 12.04.92 [April 12, 1992] there had to be a
‘Round table’ on television with a participation of URP [Ukrainian Republican
Party], Rukh, ‘Grazhdansky Forum Kryma’ [Citizens’ Forum of Crimea] on
the one side and various chauvinistic groups – on the other [side]. From the
Russian chauvinists such bison [meaning experienced, well-prepared person]
will be speaking as philosophy professor Sagatovsky and others. From our side
there are no people who would be even close to that level.”380
In another letter, from the Democratic party of Ukraine, addressed to the President
Kravchuk and Ukrainian parliament, the authors emphasize the informational isolation of
Crimea from the rest of Ukraine. The letter emphasized the violation of the Ukrainian
legislation by the Crimean local authorities and Russian politicians who visited Crimea
and demanded protection of the national rights of Ukrainians. The Democratic party also
called for the state support of the national rights of Crimean Tatars:
“The condition of the Ukrainian community in Crimea remains to be a
condition of despised, persecuted minority. Still there has not been opened a
single Ukrainian school, while the number of lessons of Ukrainian language is
reduced to one-two in a week. The official language of Crimea is announced to
be Russian, while [they named] Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar the state
languages, as if [this is a] mockery. The Crimea’s law on education contradicts
the law on languages in Ukraine and puts the Ukrainian language at the level of
foreign. […] Ukrainian language, literature, history of Ukraine have to be
studied in full in all schools and educational institutions of Crimea. Political
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actors and officials that come to Ukraine privately [meaning Russian officials
visiting Crimea] and start anti-Ukrainian and anti-state activity have to be
deported outside of Ukraine. It is necessary to open access for Ukrainian media
to Crimea, stop the incitement of ethnic hatred, support the return of Crimean
Tatar people to its historical homeland and restoration of its national rights.”381
The scope of the problems of the Ukrainian community in Crimea was very wide, while
the number of activists was relatively low. Therefore, the immediate focus of their
activity was cultural and informational. They campaigned for the creation of Ukrainianlanguage classes in schools, and promoted the creation of an independent Ukrainian
church. The creative Association ‘Ostrov Krym’ (‘Island Crimea’) established a proUkrainian radio program at the local state radio station. In the meantime, Tovarystvo
vchenykh “Krym z Ukrainoiu” (Association of scientists “Crimea with Ukraine”) found
by Petro Volvach organized a campaign where Crimean scientists used their authority to
conduct counter-propaganda in response to the pro-Russian narrative. They launched a
propaganda campaign, providing economic and social reasoning for why Crimean should
remain part of Ukraine.382 This was an effort aimed at the establishment of a new and
complicated narrative of Crimea. It challenged the monopoly of the local institutions over
the definition of what Crimea and Crimean should mean. Eventually, as those activists
argue, this helped prevent the annexation of the peninsula in the mid-1990s.
In Simferopol, and in the rest of Crimea besides Sevastopol, organizational power for
pro-Ukrainian activism was imported from other parts of Ukraine. In order to coordinate
among various pro-Ukrainian organizations and parties, a Ukrainian Member of
Parliament, Mykola Porovsky, came to Crimea to organize a coordinating body called
Committee “Krym z Ukrainoiu” (“Crimea with Ukraine”). This committee, established in
1992, organized congresses of Ukrainians of Crimea that were significant political events
for Ukrainian activists. Again, the significance of the congresses was that they
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demonstrated the presence of pro-Ukrainian forces on the peninsula, contrary to the
official propaganda. Part of the effort to challenge the dominant narrative of Crimea was
the establishment of the Ukrainian-language newspaper “Kryms´ka Svitlytsia” which
began to publish in 1992. Significant effort was put into the creation of schools and
classes in which Ukrainian was the language of education. Between 1999 and 2004
Crimea had more than 600 classes of this kind in addition to 7 schools. The Ukrainian
gymnasium in Simferopol was created as a result of effort by Ukrainian activists, it
provided a high level of education and had higher demand that it could possibly meet.
Andriy Ivanets says that even pro-Russian activists were trying to send their children to
this gymnasium, due to its good quality.383
The fact that activism was imported also means that it contained a component of
colonization effort. Activists themselves saw this effort as decolonization of Ukraine
which Crimea was a part of. Ukrainians from the mainland Ukraine going to Crimea
describe their efforts in terms of ‘bringing Ukrainian-ness’ to this Russified (or, to be
exact, Sovietized) region. In 1992 the head of the Kyiv branch of the Spilka Ofitseriv
Ukrainy colonel Kostiuk addressed the head of the Ukrainian Republican Party Levko
Lukianenko suggesting that university graduates from Western Ukraine should be sent to
work in Eastern and Southern parts of the country. According to the suggestion, the
young specialists from Western Ukraine were supposed to “bring a word of truth to the
Southern and Eastern regions of Ukraine, restore our national rituals, traditions and
inculcate love for the Ukrainian language.”384 Bohdan Sobutsky and Taras Melnyk, the
organizers of the Ukrainian music festival “Chervona Ruta”, said they established the
festival specifically to spread Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian music to the most
Russified regions of the country.385 The festival was a week long and served as a stage
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for young musicians from all over Ukraine. The only requirement was that they had to
sing in Ukrainian. In 1995 this festival came to Sevastopol and Simferopol. Bohdan
Sobutsky says the organizers were very cautious about coming to Crimea, because the
peninsula had a reputation as a pro-Russian space that was hostile to everything
Ukrainian.386 In other words, the perception of Crimea exactly corresponded to the image
that Crimean authorities transmitted on the outside. But the resistance to the festival came
only from a few dozen Russian activists, although there was a certain level of suspicion
from the authorities. The turnout of people was large, and the Nakhimov square in
Sevastopol was filled with people during the final concert.387 Eventually, Sobutsky says,
his pre-existing perception of Sevastopol and Crimea being anti-Ukrainian turned out to
be wrong.388
Resistance to Ukrainian activism was organized systematically and relied primarily on
existing institutions of power, and pro-Russian organizations. The political and cultural
ambivalence in which Ukrainian organizations operated introduced traditional Soviet
methods of dissent into a conservative Soviet society in Crimea. In Sevastopol, the fact
that Prosvita united educated intelligentsia and military officers – often people with high
esteem in the city – further enhanced its influence and increased its danger to the
institutions of power. In addition to the dismissal or repression of pro-Ukrainian officers,
these institutions also launched a coordinated informational campaign against any proUkrainian activity in Crimea, based on their understandable perception of these as a
threat to their own power.
It is, of course, hard to evaluate the extent to which Ukrainian activists were effective in
their actions. They were not numerous, but their actions were very energetic and attracted
attention. Multiple respondents say that the general public was tolerant of public proUkrainian manifestations. While the immediate counterparts – pro-Russian civic
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organizations – had support from authorities, fleet command and some Russian
politicians, they still could not boast of having wider public support. The majority of
people in Crimea were not active politically. Most of them, in fact, seemed to be more
pro-Soviet than pro-Russian, as their votes suggested during the elections of 1998.
However, the existing structures of power and their control over media was successful in
presenting a very particular, one-sided image of Crimea. If, according to Homi Bhabha,
stereotype is one of the main instruments of colonial power, then Crimean and Russian
authorities used this instrument well. At some point it is necessary to question the relation
between creating and transmitting stereotypes about a certain society and construction of
that society according to the stereotypes.

3.5

Conclusion

After the fall of the USSR Crimea remained a special region within Ukraine. It almost
lived in its own world, and was only connected to the rest of the country with a narrow
strip of land that is only seven kilometers wide in its narrowest spot. In early 2000s some
radically pro-Russian advocates even proposed to organize a mission and to dig across
the Isthmus of Perekop to make Crimea an island. Their dislike towards the Ukrainian
state and influences coming from Ukraine, as well as the persistent threat of ‘Crimean
Tatar invasion’ was turning into a desire to separate from Ukraine not just politically, but
physically, geographically. Making Crimea an island would not make it closer to Russia,
of course, but this desire reflected constant insecurities of the colonizer and the desire to
conserve everything the way ‘it has always been,’ a desire to prevent changes by all
possible means.
It seems at times that the idea of ‘islandisation’ of Crimea has been around for much
longer than the recent two decades. A famous fiction novel “Ostrov Krym” (“Island
Crimea”) by Vasilii Aksenov that came out in 1981 described an alternative version of
history that presumed an outcome of the civil war in the Russian Empire in which Crimea
was an island under control of the White army. In the narrative by Aksionov, Crimea
preserved itself as a ‘Russian state’ in opposition to the Soviet Union and turned into a
prosperous, developed country. The novel became very popular in 1990s and possibly
contributed (culturally) to further alienation of the peninsula.
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Both the novel and the desire to dig across the Isthmus of Perekop are a reflection of a
local settler’s identity, formed under the influence of geographical isolation. This identity
is not shared by all residents of Crimea, but it reflects the only narrative that can be freely
expressed and transmitted to the outside world. Even in a fiction novel by Aksionov,
there was no place for the Ukrainian or Crimean Tatar narrative on the peninsula. The
novel was a story by a settler about settlers and their ‘island’ identity. It is a bitter irony
that in 2014 Sergey Aksionov, a namesake of the author of “Ostrov Krym,” and a so
called “prime-minister of the Republic of Crimea” effectively turned Crimea into an
island. And even after the annexation by Russia Crimean population preserved a sense of
distinctiveness and isolation from citizens and society of the Russian Federation.
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Chapter 4

4

Media as an Instrument of Settler Colonialism

In 2016 the Oxford dictionary named the word ‘post-truth’ as the international Word of
the Year.389 In the form of an adjective the word ‘post-truth’ is defined by Oxford
dictionaries as “relating to circumstances in which people respond more to feelings and
beliefs than to facts.”390 Since the time when the word ‘post-truth’ entered international
political and media spheres, media scholars and journalists, as well as political scientists,
have been considering the reasons and the outcomes of this new informational
environment. The US presidential elections of 2016 served as a wake-up call, drawing the
public attention to the power of social media networks and the so-called ‘bot farms’ that
were able to challenge the conventional media’s monopoly on information. New
technologies and means of communication of the 21st century have created a problematic
trend in public discourse: emotions matter more than facts and, therefore, become more
popular and prevalent in media markets. Emotion- and opinion-driven information in the
post-truth era, a distorted reality produced en masse by political and state propaganda,
and the way they are deployed in information warfare, have created a crisis in journalistic
standards. Information has become a space of international warfare just as central and
important as trade, energy markets, and military conflicts.
The term ‘post-truth’ relates not only to the act of reception of the information – when
people trust informational statements based on their beliefs and worldviews, not evidence
- but also to the production of that information as well. In the post-truth media, facts do
not matter, because the now outdated journalistic standard of “equal representation” of all
sides of a conflict require the media to give equal attention to facts and to manipulations.
As a result, the audience is either confused by conflicting reports that are framed by the
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idea that “every side is right in its own way,” or dismisses information that challenges
their pre-existing beliefs and chooses to believe in whatever best fits their belief systems.
As a result, society exists in a space where there is ‘more than one truth;’ all of them look
legitimate and, given the high speed and saturation of the news cycle, there is no time to
study the nuances. In other words, it is a space where truth simply does not exist, because
anything could be questioned by simple manipulations and distortions of the narrative.
What is more, these modern post-truth media practices enable authoritarian states to mask
propaganda as news, by covering it with a façade of journalistic objectivity and offering
it as one of the “truths” available.
The terminology of ‘post-truth’ appeared after the American presidential elections of
2016, when it became apparent that social media enables mass manipulation of public
opinion. What became even more concerning was that such manipulation could be done
by a foreign state with an aim to interfere in US domestic politics. Internationally, ‘posttruth’ has a close relationship with another term – ‘hybrid war’, used to describe the
Russian military and informational aggression against Ukraine that started with the
annexation of Crimea in 2014. Hybrid war includes not only military violence, but also
informational manipulations, narrative distortions, and appeals to emotions, all aimed at
demotivating one’s opponents. The aim of a hybrid war is to destroy the opponent with
their own hands, to conduct unofficial warfare without formally recognizing one’s
military involvement. ‘Post-truth’ and distortion of information provides an enormous
opportunity for that: since Russia started its hybrid war in 2014 by invading Ukrainian
Crimea and later Donbas, the international community always knew that the war has been
waged by Russia. But the official Russian propagandist narrative about this war remains
to be an ‘alternative truth’ and Western media remain to be one of the means by which
this propaganda spreads.391 No matter such close connection with the ‘post-truth,’
‘hybrid war’ never became an Oxford dictionaries “Word of the Year”.
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Elements of ‘post-truth’ – the intentional manipulation of facts using the audience’s
emotions in order to reach political goals – in forms of state propaganda have been part of
politics, warfare, colonialism for decades, even for centuries.392 The concept of ‘posttruth’ would be interesting to compare to any history of imperial propaganda in colonized
territories. Propaganda, especially in the 20th century, often appealed to emotions in its
methodology. Control over the narrative, over cultural stereotypes, over history and,
therefore, the interpretation of the present, is closely tied to the history of the European
settler colonialism. The languages of orientalism, racial segregation, benevolent
colonialism, or framing the colonized as inferior and violent have been based on appeals
to emotions, rather than facts – the emotions of colonizers, who were inclined to believe,
support and reproduce colonial myths imposed on colonized bodies and minds. In that
regard, ‘post-truth’ as a phenomenon seems to be much older than the term itself. What is
new here, however, is that for the first time these imperial methods of informational
aggression were effectively used against one of the most powerful states of the ‘First
World’ (and one of the most powerful settler colonial states). In that regard, this is similar
to what Mark Mazower argues in his Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe. He
says, in particular, that the uniqueness of Hitler’s regime was not in its racism and
colonialism per se, but in the fact that for the first time Europe became a target of these
(originally European) policies that were typically aimed at other parts of the world.393
The history of modern ‘post-truth,’ Russian informational operations in Ukraine’s
Crimea, dates back to the early 1990s. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Crimea served
as one of the testing grounds for hybrid war, or military-informational operations. This
chapter focuses on the role of media as an instrument of the settler colonial system in
Crimea. It argues that after the fall of the Soviet Union, media and propaganda became
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the main instruments used by settler colonial institutions in Crimea to reproduce Russian
narratives there, which they deployed to reproduce their legitimacy and ensure their
survival. Until 1995 Russian TV broadcasts were dominant in the informational sphere of
Ukraine. This created a monopoly of pro-Russian media in Crimean informational
spaces, which enabled the Russian government to frame itself as always on the ‘right’
side during every political conflict with Ukraine. That, in turn, heavily influenced public
opinion in Crimea.
Local Crimean settler colonial institutions inherited formal and informal control over the
main informational instruments in Crimea since the Soviet times. The newspaper
Sovetskii Krym initially was a printing organ of the Crimean regional committee of the
Communist party, of the regional Council of deputies, Yalta municipal committee and
Yalta municipal council of deputies. In 1991 the newspaper changed its name to Kurortny
Krym and advertised itself as an independent media. But already next year – in 1992 – the
newspaper again reorganized under the new name – Krymskaia Gazeta. It also became an
official printed voice of the local Crimean government. Krymskaia Pravda was one of the
most highest circulation newspapers in Crimea. More importantly, Krymskaia Pravda
preserved the old means of delivery of the issues to readers. Until the fall of the USSR it
was an official printed voice of the Crimean regional committee of the Communist party.
After 1991 it advertised itself as an independent newspaper. Since 1992, however, the
content suggests a gradual increase in sympathy towards the pro-Russian parties of Yurii
Meshkov. Finally, Slava Sevastopolia once again was a former printed voice of
Sevastopol municipal committee. After 1991 it announced itself as an independent media
but preserved the traditional editorial policies and prevalence within the city.
Just like in other settler colonies, cultural stereotypes became the main weapon that
Crimean institutions transmitted in their fight against ‘Others’ – Ukrainians and Crimean
Tatars. Crimean media promoted the idea of multinational autonomy, a direct evolution
of the Soviet ‘brotherhood of nations’ that stood for resistance to changes that Ukrainian
activists and Crimean Tatar repatriates demanded. Simultaneously, Crimean newspapers
‘othered’ the pro-Ukrainian movement (as well as Ukrainian state and culture) and
Crimean Tatar national movement. Activists from both those groups were accused of
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nationalism and extremism. Newspapers and their commentators suggested that both
movements were not ‘local’ to Crimea and described forceful collisions as a fight of the
local Crimean population against the external threat. The rhetoric of colonialism turned
the colonizers into colonized and aggressors into victims. Those were Crimean Tatar and
Ukrainian activists who, each group in their own way, were described as disruptors of
peaceful life. Their cultures, underdeveloped and backward, their political demands could
only exist as long as they did not affect the life of the ‘local population.’ In other words,
decolonization was never supposed to happen.
In addition to othering everything Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar, Crimean newspapers
reproduced and formulated the ‘appropriate’ narrative of peninsula’s past, present and
used historical argument to support the image of a particular future. Here again those
images were supposed to reproduce the Soviet status of Crimea with little or no changes.
Crimea ‘required’ autonomy due to its difference from the rest of Ukraine and historical
‘multinationalism.’ Crimean propaganda argued that due to the fact that historically
Crimea was populated by dozens of ethnic groups, none of the existing ethnicities had a
right to claim the indigenous status. Therefore, according to this narrative, all
nationalities that lived in Crimea all together constituted the ‘Crimean people’ and had to
have “equal rights.” ‘Multinationalism’ became a way for the Russian and Crimean
authorities to employ democratic rhetoric about protecting national minorities in order to
promote legacies of colonialism. What this meant in reality was that Crimea required
autonomy due to its ‘Russianness.’ ‘Crimean people’ most often meant ‘Russianspeaking people’, and closely resembled a Soviet concept of ‘Soviet people’. Therefore,
‘multinationalism’ most closely resembled another Soviet concept of ‘brotherhood of
nations.’ As a result, the Crimean Peninsula was supposed to become a ‘bridge’, and ‘inbetween space’ between Ukraine and Russia. This would allow a peninsula to remain a
‘shared’ resort (shared among post-Soviet countries, mainly Russia), while Sevastopol
was meant to remain the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. In a certain sense for Russia
this was a way to control Crimea without reshaping state borders.
The instrumentalization of the Soviet cult of the Second World War played an important
role in solving political debates and defining Crimea’s future. In the local Crimean
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iteration, the history of the Second World War closely related to the Sevastopolian myth,
which was a part of the local identity. The after war period of restoration of Crimea also
related to the story, since residents of Crimea in 1990s either came to Crimea after the
war, or were born by settlers. The narrative of coming to restore the peninsula from ruins
resembles similar settler colonial narratives about developing the unclaimed land. This
narrative was an important component of the settler’s myth that allowed settler society to
claim indigeneity in Crimea.
If Crimea were to remain part of Ukraine, then Ukraine itself had to integrate closer with
‘Slavic brothers’ – Russia and Belarus. The idea of such integration, mixed with Soviet
nostalgia and rising ideology of Russian Christian Orthodoxy, became very popular in the
Crimean informational space in mid-1990s. This very conservative view at the future of
the peninsula presumed an extensive economic, political and military influence from
Russia. Crimea united cites of memory (in a broad definition by Pierre Nora) of both
Russian/Soviet imperial, as well as Russian national identities. The popular narrative of
Crimean history included hardly anything besides the Russian and Soviet imperial
presence. In sum, Crimean newspapers defined, who was the ‘friend’ and who was the
‘foe’. According to those definitions the influence of the Ukrainian state in Crimea was
supposed to be minimal or non-existent.
Having monopoly over the interpretation of the past and present, newspapers did not
necessarily need to reflect public opinion, but could formulate it. Michael Foucault
describes the ways in which newspapers serve as disciplinary (biopolitical) institutions.
According to Foucault, shortly after their inception newspapers showed societies the
standards of the ‘right’ and ‘delinquent’ behavior. Everyday publications about crimes
and its punishment accustomed society to the constant presence of juridical and police
supervision.394 In addition, Benedict Anderson emphasized the role of the press in
forging social identities. Press sets the standards of social behavior and often defines
social norms. In the Crimean context, newspapers made an attempt to forge a ‘Crimean’
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multinational identity in order to counter Crimean Tatar claims for indigeneity.
Newspapers set the standards for what was thinkable and printed the dominant narrative
of public discussion. This kind of power is not obvious, but very important in a settler
colonial environment, especially in a society where there is a dominance of a particular
group over the information. This power allowed Crimean (and Russian) authorities to
transmit and produce various myths through the press that benefitted Crimean settler
colonial institutions in the short-term, but also formulated a specific image about Crimea
- both for Crimeans and outsiders – as a Russian place.
The oxymoronic/hybrid space of post-Soviet politics further enabled a carefully
presented plurality of opinion – just enough to create a democratic façade for
propaganda. Examples of pro-Ukrainian views appeared rarely as examples of ‘news
from the opposite camp’. Those pieces served as evidence that the evil ‘Other’ exists, that
the ‘enemy does not sleep’ and only waits for the right moment. In general, the Crimean
informational sphere existed within the same (post-) colonial discourse. Heavily
dominated by the Russian information space, this discourse was fueled by the cultural,
ethical and moral code of the Soviet epoch. Various ideas and informational operations
that came from different agents often narrowed down to an idea of Crimean autonomy
(preservation of the status-quo) with a unilaterally pro-Russian political orientation. Thus,
Crimean autonomy was constructed as something that existed only because of its
essentially Russian identity. Crimean media was pluralist only regarding the extent to
which one could like Russia and dislike Ukraine but did not any reality in which Crimean
residents might like and contribute to the development of the state in which they lived.

4.1
Transmitting the Image of the Crimean Past,
Present and Future
The Soviet historical narrative of the Second World War defined the behavioral standard
for the appropriate ‘present’ political and social activity in Crimea. In the Crimean postSoviet context this meant that newspapers used a common historical narrative and Sovietconstructed social memory in order to transmit and reproduce a framework of values that
then applied to the interpretation of present events and future preferences. References to
the Second World War, and to the local Crimean chapter of that historical myth – the

173

second defense of Sevastopol – appeared frequently (both during and outside the
anniversary dates) and defined the basic simple ground for the Crimean identity as part of
the Russian/Soviet glorious past. Simply speaking this meant that Crimean newspapers
described Manichean world in which the evil closely associated with Nazis, while the
good was a continuation of Crimea’s ‘glorious past.’
The city of Sevastopol was one of the main centers that reproduced the myth of the
Second World War. One of the most popular and numerous newspaper within the city
Slava Sevastopolia published articles related to the history of Sevastopol and Nazi siege
of the city (the “Second glorious defense”) very frequently, forging the history of defense
part of the local identity of the city residents. The topic of the war did not limit to the
specific time of the year, although newspapers paid special attention to anniversaries like
‘Victory Day’ (May 9) and the anniversary of the German-Soviet war (June 22). At other
times, it was common to see articles like the one published by Slava Sevastopolia in
January 1990, titled “Sevastopol is Our Honor and Consciousness” (“Sevastopol´ chest´
nasha i sovest´”). This article told stories about ‘ordinary Sevastopolians’ who defended
Sevastopol and/or fought in other parts of the Soviet-German front.395 Articles under the
same title/rubric, providing facts about the history of the war, appeared several times per
month.396
With a powerful historical myth that existed in Sevastopol, even ‘ordinary’ events were
evaluated through the prism of the war. For example, in January 1990 Slava Sevastopolia
reported that the city accepted displaced people, victims of ethnic pogroms, from Baku
(Azerbaijan SSR):
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“A disaster that fell on families of Baku servicemen concerned the whole
country, including Sevastopol – a city of naval glory, a city [where people]
know the price of the true friendship, where it is common to lend a shoulder
[help] to those who appeared in trouble”.397
This reporting on the help that the city provided to displaced persons reinstated the
historical myth. It also set the standard according to which the glorious past required
glorious actions in present. In other words, city residents had to meet challenges and give
to those in need in a similar fashion as residents of Sevastopol did when the Nazi army
besieged the city.
Sevastopolian myth combined the history of the ‘glorious’ second defense of Sevastopol
with the initial imperial myth – the first defense that took place when the Russian
imperial army fought against the allied forces in the Crimean war.398 This meant that prerevolutionary imperial historical mythology of Sevastopol was rehabilitated back in the
Soviet times, after the Second World War. It built a direct connection between the glory
of the Soviet soldier in the Second world war with the glory of his ‘ancestor’, soldier of
the Russian imperial army. They both had to defend ‘Fatherland’ from the foreign
(Western) invasions. The myth was of course settler colonial as it presumed that the city
was found by the order to Catherine II specifically as a naval fortress. Just like in other
settler colonies, where the pre-colonial history becomes erased, Sevastopolian myth had
little to no attention to the small Crimean Tatar town of Aquar that existed there (not to
mention the town of Balaklava that had its own history for thousands of years before the
Russian imperial invasion).399
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The glory of the past did not just require the city to help others in need, it also demanded
city’s pro-Russian (or pro-Soviet) political affiliation, because it appealed to the historical
experience of the Soviet past. This was how the municipal deputy V. M. Parkhomeko
characterized Sevastopol during one of the meetings of the municipal council in 1993
(the newspaper reported his words as an indirect speech):
“The city in the present moment remains the only undefeated territory of the
Soviet Union within the space of our formerly great Fatherland. There is an
indirect confirmation for this – waving red flag on the highest point of
Sevastopol - Khrustal´ny cape, as well as flags with hammer and sickle on the
ships of the Black Sea Fleet.”400
The Russia-Ukraine negotiations over the Black Sea Fleet, electoral choices and national
identification went through the moral filter of Sevastopolian memory of the Second
World War, and Sevastopolian myth of glory that was connected and predated the Second
World War. Mentioning of the Black Sea Fleet in Parkhomenko’s statement was dictated
by the overall discourse. The popular image of the ‘Russian city’ united with the ‘Russian
fleet’ persuaded the city’s residents that Sevastopol would not survive without the
presence of the fleet; that fleet was part of Sevastopol’s identity.401 Neither was it
acceptable to separate the fleet or change its status to anything but Russian.
Slava Sevastopolia served as a temporal bridge that connected present-day
Sevastopolians (most of whom of course came to the city after the Second World war) to
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their ‘ancestors’ from the first and second ‘glorious’ defenses. Readers were invited to
contribute to the reproduction of the myth and tell stories about Sevastopol’s past that
they heard. This was a constant exchange of narratives between the newspaper and its
readers (there was a regular rubric titled “To Sevastopolians about Sevastopol”) in which
the cult of the city’s Second World War history stood in the foundation of the city’s life.
In the process of reproduction of social memory and historical mythology newspapers
were the actors that pretended to be mediators that gave platform for the collective
memorization. Second World War, as well as Sevastopolian myth became one of the
main arguments in the foundation of the Russian territorial claims for Crimea.402 It
consolidated Russian identity of the city against ‘Others’ – Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars,
and later (in 2000s) – the West and NATO.
Outside of Sevastopol the image of ‘Russian’ Crimea dominated the cultural and political
discourse. The instrumentalization of history was also relatively active but seemed less
emotional than in Sevastopol. The narrative of Crimean history consisted mainly of
stories about famous military events of the previous two centuries, as well as cultural
figure who either admired Crimea in their art or worked in Crimea. Publications
regarding ‘Days of Chekhov’ in Yalta, visual art of Aivazovsky, as well as glorious
history of the Russian (russkii – ethnic term) fleet and army forged a perception that
Russian history was Crimean history.403 Almost exclusively those stories represented a
narrative of a settler colonizer in a colonized land, a history that was roughly 200 years
old, with only rare mentioning of the time prior to the annexation the peninsula by the
Russian empire. The cultural image of Crimea in the present also remained exclusively
Russian in newspaper articles. The section of the newspaper that advertised cultural
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events consisted almost exclusively of the Russian cultural symbols. Very often these
included exhibitions by the famous artists of the past, or classical plays from the Russian
literature, staged in theatres named after Russian figures.
The Russian imperial period merited special attention, especially the time when Crimea
was annexed by the empire in the late 18th century and then the times of late Romanovs.
Due to the popular newspaper format, the historical narrative at times became even more
radical than the one found in historical books. It reaffirmed and radicalized the settler’s
myth in order to prove Russia’s historical rights for Crimea. For example, one such
article from 1993 was dedicated to the anniversary of the manifesto by Catherine II by
which the Russian empire annexed Crimea. According to the article, the annexation
happened peacefully, although it was a result of the Russo-Turkish war. The deportation
of the Christian population of Crimea by the Russian army in 1779 is described as a
choice of that population that was made “due to the nervous political situation.”404
Furthermore, the article argue that the ‘independence’ of the Crimean Khanate (which in
fact was a protectorate of the Russian empire) led to political instability and that forced
Russian empress to take the peninsula under control:
“Chaos – economic and political – became even stronger. Towns were
becoming empty and turning into ruins, fields were being choked with weeds,
orchards were growing wild… What else could be done in this circumstance,
besides what did the government of Catherine II that announced all lands of the
former [my emphasis] Khanate a Russian territory?”405
The article ended with an appeal to ‘Rukh newspapers’ arguing that the ‘diplomatic
victory’ (as opposed to military occupation) of the Russian empire was never challenged
by anyone and therefore, Russia had a historic right for Crimea.406 The settler’s myth in
this article resembled similar myths of other settler colonial empires: the annexation was

404

B. Chupikov, “Manifest imperatritsy. 19 aprelia ispolniaetsia 210 let so dnia prisoedineniia Kryma k
Rossii,” Krymskaia Pravda, April 17, 1993.
405

Ibid.

406

Ibid.

178

in fact an act of pacifically, of bringing peace and order. The colonizer simply ‘did not
have any other choice’: by the time Crimea was annexed, Crimean Khanate ‘did not exist
anymore’.407 The fact that the ‘chaos’ was a direct result of the Russian military presence
in Crimea remained unnoticed. More importantly, this narrative was supposed to respond
to the Ukraine’s claims for the peninsula and deny them.
The line between the post-Soviet ‘multinational Crimea’ and ‘Russian Crimea’ was very
fine and resembled a relationship between the categories of ‘Soviet’ and ‘Russian’
identity (or even Russian imperial and Russian national). Non-Russian histories of
Crimea appeared in a secondary role as small streams within the large Russian river of
history. In a typical oxymoronic post-Soviet way, statements about the ‘equality’ of all
Crimean nations somehow did not appear to contradict other statements against
Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar ‘nationalisms’ or the historically ‘Russian’ Crimea.
Crimea’s past consisted of a single Soviet-style narrative, adopted to new post-Soviet
circumstances. The way newspapers told stories of Crimea’s history focused on the
history of Crimea as part of the Russian empire and the Soviet Union. Any narrative in
which anything Crimean might have been opposed to anything Russian or Soviet was
either absent or used as an example of the enemy’s story.
The settler colonial monopoly over the narrative eventually became the only known truth
about Crimea. Thus were newspapers a powerful settler colonial institution that enforced
and reproduced the main element of settler colonization – the settler’s myth. It trapped
speakers within an unending circle: the monopoly over the definition of what Crimea
historically was (is) reproduced (-s) the image of the cultural belonging and eliminated (s) all the challenging narratives; the absence of challenging narratives confirmed (-s) the
validity of the initial settler colonial claim. According to the settler’s myth, Crimea ‘was
Russian’, because according to the settler’s narrative ‘it has always been Russian.’ Just
like in other settler colonies, Crimean history ‘always’ meant only roughly the past 200
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years, but that historically short period of time was substantial enough to claim the space
as Russian. The fact that Russian cultural figures of the past visited Crimea and wrote
about Crimea, that Crimean landscape (geographical and cultural) was written into the
Russian discourse obviously reinforced that image that the peninsula belonged within
Russian cultural space.
The idea of a historically ‘multinational’ Crimea promoted by Crimean authorities and
press served as a way of resistance to decolonization attempts from Ukrainian activists
and indigenous Crimean Tatars. When the repatriation of Crimean Tatars became a
matter of time, the settler colonial institutions needed a new justification of the systematic
oppression against the indigenous, necessary to preserve the myth of Russian Crimea and,
therefore, Russian power in the peninsula. The ‘Multinationality’ of Crimea meant that
there were no indigenous peoples with special or prior claims to Crimean identity, and
that all ethnicities present in Crimea were entitled to ‘equal’ rights. This borrowed
democratic and civil rights language to make “multiethnic” appear to be the modern and
fair model for (present and future) national relations in Crimea. “Crimea cannot be seen
as somebody’s national territory”, said Bahrov in 1993 yet again, newspapers had been
following this message.408 This democratizing rhetoric was a direct inheritance from the
Soviet concept of the ‘brotherhood of nations’, but limited to a particular peninsula. The
concept of ‘multi-nationality’ worked the same way – its proponents advocated ‘national
equality’ and opposition to all kinds of oppression. However, effectively this meant the
Soviet-style national equality that benefited Russian culture and history, as well as
opposition to decolonization of inter-ethnic relations. In 1996 Krymskaia Gazeta
dedicated a separate regular column, titled “Multinational Crimea,” where contributors
tried to persuade readers that ‘national sentiment’ was politically harmful and led to inter-
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ethnic collisions.409 Eventually, ‘multi-nationality’ became the main concept regarding
the inter-ethnic relations on the peninsula that survived all changes in personalities of
Crimean leadership and political clashes.
Crimea was ‘multinational’, but that was supposed to be a very particular image of multinationality in which all ethnic-nationalisms subsumed into one version of “Crimean” that
recognized Crimea as a specific corner of Russia, or, rather, the Soviet Union. For
example, the section of the newspaper Sovetskii Krym from December 27, 1990,
dedicated to the referendum on the status of Crimea, published a short note on the
language situation in Crimea. The note says that 82.6% of the Crimean population
considered Russian to be their native language. According to the note, only 3.1% of the
Crimean population did not consider their knowledge of Russian perfect, but were fluent
enough to communicate. Ukrainian was the self-described native tongue of 13.6% of the
Crimean population.410 The way this statistic is presented suggests the message the
authors were aiming to send. For instance, the memo shows the percentage of Russians
and non-Russians who consider the Russian language as their native language. It also
shows the percentage of people who can communicate in Russian. The logic of
comparison would require presenting the same kind of information for Ukrainian,
Crimean Tatar or other languages. But this memo simply does not mention the number of
people who can comprehend or communicate in Ukrainian, or Crimean Tatar. In sum,
this leads to the conclusion that in Crimea the Russian language is shared among various
nationalities and is therefore the simplest and the only shared language of
communication. Put in the broader context, this memo suggests that Crimea is an
overwhelmingly Russian-speaking territory, is therefore different from the rest of
Ukraine, and needs to be able to “protect” itself.411 This argument persisted throughout
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the 1990s and appeared every time there was a political clash between Simferopol and
Kyiv or Kyiv and Moscow.
The instrumentalization of history also played an important role in promoting political
autonomy of the Crimean Peninsula. During the referendums of 1991 historical
arguments dominated the debate over the status of Crimea.412 Proponents of autonomy
argued in favor of Crimea’s right for it, citing the historical precedent of Crimean
autonomy before 1944. Ironically, Crimean Tatars used that same historical precedent to
advocate for their own national autonomy in Crimea. This eventually turned into a long
debate over history: Crimean authorities tried to prove that the pre-war Crimean
autonomy was territorial, Crimean Tatars argues that it was national in character.
Therefore, when Crimean Tatar Kurultai (national assembly) adopted a declaration of
Crimean Tatar national sovereignty in Crimea with a right to self-identify, Crimean
newspapers launched an attack against Crimean Tatar ‘nationalists’.413 After the fight for
Crimean autonomy was over, historical arguments were further used to challenge the
legality of Crimea’s subordination to Ukraine. They also lingered on as ‘common
knowledge’, a shared narrative, and appeared in a public space again whenever conflict
arose. The debate over the nature of the Soviet Crimean autonomy persisted, and in
October 1996 it showed up in the newspaper again.414
Beginning from about 1993 there was a visible switch in the narrative about Crimea’s
preferable future. By that time the economic problems of first post-Soviet years had
caused an increase in nostalgic sentiment for the Soviet past. Pro-Russian/Soviet Crimean
newspapers cultivated and supported that sentiment. They did so via a new broad
narrative propagated a new union between ‘Slavic peoples.’ The mobilization of the pro-
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Russian movement that started from 1992 contributed to this change of the narrative.
Among all the Slavic peoples, the proponents of unity for some reason chose only three
peoples – Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. Krymskaia Gazeta regularly published
materials, dedicated to the ‘Slavic brotherhood’. The festival, dedicated to the ‘Slavic
literature and culture’ (single literature and single culture) became annual and received
acknowledgement by Krymskaia Gazeta on its front pages.415 In May 1993, the
newspaper informed about the creation of the Slavic Economic Union in an article titled
‘The power is in Unity’.416 In other words, the readers were supposed to be educated
about the ‘Slavic unity’ and accept it as the main orientation for Crimea’s future.
Eventually, ‘Slavic’ was again becoming very close in meaning to Russian, at the end of
the day nobody was trying to unite with Polish, or Czech cultures and literature. While
‘reunification’ of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus suggested Russia’s leadership in the new
union. In 1993, Krymskaia Pravda, for instance, published an article titled “What is there
for Slavs to divide?” (“Chto zhe delit´ slavianam?”). The title of course suggested that
Slavic peoples simply did not have reasons for arguments and quarrels. The text of the
article, however, argued that “not from historic, not from legal or economic point of view
Ukraine has no right for Crimea, Sevastopol, [Black Sea] Fleet.”417 The idea of Slavic
unity, as well as the logic of friendship, described in this quote, resembled Russian
nationalistic reunification projects, proposed by Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, mentioned
earlier in Chapter 2.
‘Slavic unity’ (in addition to Crimea’s Russian-dominated ‘multinational peace’) became
one of the officially proclaimed political goals of multiple local Crimean political parties.
To a large extent it resembled a movement for the restoration of the USSR. For example,
in 1995 Krymskaia Gazeta published an interview with Ivan Yermakov, chairman of the
“Union for Prosperity and Unity” (Sojuz Protsvetania i Yedinstva). The interview
presented an exchange of predictable questions, and both the journalist and the
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respondent seemed to know the answer ahead of time. When commenting on the issue of
internationality, the journalist referred to the example of the United States, saying that “In
the United States the number of nations is not smaller [than in the USSR], but they hold
on to each other…”. In response Yermakov explained that this was exactly the reason
why his organization declared a goal to “unite people of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus”,
that the USSR was artificially destroyed and that the future social protection lays in unity
of ‘Slavic nations.’418
Parallel to Slavophilic sentiment there is a gradual increase of influence of the Russian
Orthodox Church in the press beginning from about 1992. The local Crimean eparchy of
the Russian Orthodox Church merited a page within the Krymskaia Gazeta under the
column ‘Crimea Orthodox’ (‘Krym Pravoslavny’) that came out roughly once in two
weeks. The page included some common information about the nuances of the Christian
religion, along with articles dedicated to the presence of the Orthodox church in Crimea.
For several years this column regularly appeared in the newspaper, encouraging people to
come to the Orthodox Church. In addition to general information related to Christian
faith, ‘Crimea Orthodox’ seldomly touched on political questions. In 1994, for example,
there were few articles, dedicated to the relationships between Christianity and
patriotism. They described “patriotism” and “death for the Fatherland” as actions that are
celebrated by the church.419 Later, in 1996, ‘Orthodox Crimea’ promoted the ‘unity’ of
the Russian Orthodox church, protesting against the separation of Estonian Orthodox
church from the Russian and informing its readers that the Crimean bishop of the
Ukrainian Orthodox church of the Kyivan patriarchate represented an unrecognized sinful
organization that was trying to bring schism to Crimea.420
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In 1996 the Christian and Slavophil elements of the newspaper surprisingly merge into
one narrative. That year Krymskaia Gazeta includes a separate subsection, dedicated to
the ‘Slavic unity’. The subsection is called “Slavic Dialogue, a newspaper in a
newspaper”, and has its own structure and issue numbers.421 The first and the following
issues of “Slavic Dialogue” opened with quotes by famous pan-Slavist of the 19th century
Nikolai Danilevski: “For every Slavic [person] after God and Church there can be no
more important idea than unification of Slavs”.422 The ‘newspaper inside a newspaper’
was dedicated to the idea of ‘Slavic unity’ and unification of the ‘Slavic culture’. It also
propagated the common Russian and Soviet historical narrative, according to which
Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians came out of the same ‘cradle’ of Kyivan Rus, and
therefore are destined to stay united in their ‘brotherhood’.423 The question of political
presence of the Russian Orthodox church on the territory of Crimea is yet to be
researched. A preliminary conclusion, based on newspaper material, suggest that the
church was a yet another proponent of Ukraine’s (and Crimea’s) integration with Russia.
A quote by Danilevski that opened every issue of ‘Slavic Dialogue’ imported Slavophilic
ideals of the 19th century into the post-Soviet era. It also referenced a conservative
intellectual movement within the 19th century Russian nation-building processes that
advocated for the ‘special path’ of the Russian empire that was supposed to be distinct
from accepting the European civilization.424 In other words, Slavophil ideas in early postSoviet years in Crimea represented one of the sides of the debate within the Russian
nationalistic thought that was going on in Russia at the time.
The idea of ‘Slavic brotherhood’ that openly associated with the idea of unity with Russia
was actively popularized by the press and civic movements in Crimea in mid-1990s.
Partially the reason for this was that the Russian state policy was to maintain its
ideological and political control over the peninsula within the body of the Ukrainian state.
Through the ideas of ‘brotherhood’ spread by means of Crimean newspapers and local
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political forces Russia could maintain control over the domestic political processes in
Ukraine and influence Ukraine’s foreign policy by creating ‘local instabilities’ whenever
this was necessary. ‘Slavic brotherhood’ to a large extent became a developed version of
the idea of Crimean multinationalism. The line between those ideas was very fine,
especially due to the fact that those ideas were advocated by the same social forces within
Crimea. Multinationalism, unity and brotherhood appeared to be positive (even
‘democratic’) messages that all represented the same goal – supporting the dominance of
Russian culture within the peninsula and local settler colonial institutions. It also meant
the increasing framing of Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars who rejected “Slavic Unity” as
separate. As with any ideology, Crimean multinationalism required an ‘Other’ to help
consolidate support into a single identity. In Crimea those ‘Others’ were Ukrainian and
Crimean Tatar ‘nationalists,’ against whom the consolidation of pro-Russian forces was
happening.

4.2
Besieged Fortress: Forging the Image of the
Ukrainian ‘Other’
The control over the informational sphere by the Russian-dominated institutions of the
Crimean settler colony enabled the system to adapt to change and resist decolonization.
The fall of the Soviet Union and the repatriation of Crimean Tatars to Crimea created a
space for possible decolonization, but settler colonizers fear of any threat to their
dominance encouraged them to enter into a new campaign of information manipulation.
The fear of “Ukrainian nationalism” and “Crimean Tatar extremism” to a large part was
politically and informationally constructed. The villainization of famous political figures
as ‘Ukrainian nationalists,’ as well as Crimean Tatar ‘extremists’ and ‘traitors,’ was
solely based on a media campaign to instill fear in Crimean voters so that they would
support politicians who offered them ‘protection’. This informationally constructed fear
combined a threat of mass violence coming from ‘nationalists’ as well as forceful cultural
assimilation in a form of ‘Ukrainization’ or ‘Tatarization.’ The media narrative treated
cultural assimilation of Russian-speaking people of Crimea in the same way as if this was
physical violence. Russification of Crimea that happened prior to this, in turn, was
considered a ‘natural’ process.
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The colonizer’s fear of a revolt by the colonized, of a violent decolonization, is an
important aspect of colonial dynamic, according to Franz Fanon.425 Fanon, rather
radically, argues that violence is in fact important for the decolonization to be successful,
since decolonization presumes a destruction of colonial system and creation of a new one.
In the case of Crimea, however, the colonizers’ fear became instrumentalized by the
settler colony (and the Russian metropole), despite the fact that Ukrainian and Crimean
Tatar organizations in Crimea emphasized their non-violent approach to political
competition. Through the rumors, manipulations and speculation with facts, Crimean
media warned its readers about the need to mobilize in face of the coming violence from
Crimean Tatars and assimilation attempts from Ukrainians. Crimean media were among
those who constructed the image of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar ‘Others’. And
because Crimea was ‘multinational’ by ideology, ‘othering’ officially targeted only
‘specific type’ of Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. Technically, those attacks were not
considered attacks against whole nations. As often happens in such instances, it was up to
the settler colonial institutions to set the standard of ‘good’ Ukrainian and Crimean
Tatars. Those who did not fit this standard, because they promoted national language and
culture, advocated for an independent Ukrainian state or demanded real national equality,
were denounced as nationalists and extremists.
The fear of a ‘Ukrainization’ in Crimea appeared during the Soviet times, after Crimea
was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954. The first secretary of the CC of the
Communist party of Ukraine, Mykola Pidhorny, stated in 1954 that all fears related to the
Ukrainization of Crimea had no grounds.426 According to Pidhorny, “…it is important to
keep in mind that there are a lot of oblasts in the Ukraine that are similar to
Crimean…where the school education is conducted in Russian language, the language of
the documents is also Russian. I assume that the same will be in Crimean oblast.”427 As a
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result, the Crimean educational system was poorly integrated into the educational system
of the Ukrainian SSR.428 The fear of ‘Ukrainization’ in the 1950s was a direct reference
to a complicated social memory of Russian nationals from the Soviet politics of
korenizatsia in 1920s. This fear and this collective trauma (that was already mentioned in
Chapter 2) was present in 1950s, just like in 1980s and throughout the post-Soviet years
up to the present. Since 1954, and until the mid-1990s, Crimea had no schools or classes
where Ukrainian was the language of education.429 All governmental structures and
cultural events (with few exceptions) used Russian as their primary language of
communication. This, in fact, meant that Ukrainian nationals in Crimea were
discriminated against and unable to exercise their national languages and culture. But
every time when there was a risk to the Crimean settler colonial institutions, the
population of Crimea was told that the Ukrainian state was about to force everyone to
speak Ukrainian. This instilled fear, but it did not represent a real possibility. The fear,
however, lingered on and that mattered to subsequent events.
Ukraine’s path towards sovereignty and independence, as was mentioned earlier,
stimulated a parallel movement for autonomy among Crimean local elites interested in
maintaining the settler colonial status quo. They used the threat of ‘Ukrainization’ to
stimulate public support for the ‘restoration’ of Crimean autonomy, ‘statehood’ or any
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other path that would allow distancing from Ukraine and integrating with Russia. The
newspaper articles regarding the dangerous ‘Ukrainization’ movement often came out as
op-eds, which created a perception that the topic had a wide public resonance. They
usually argued that Crimea was different from the rest of Ukraine, that it was too
ethnically diverse to become seamlessly part of Ukraine, and that therefore it required an
autonomous status that would protect it from assimilation by Ukraine. One such article,
published in July 1990, even before the referendum on the status of Crimea was
announced, argued that the multinational status quo in Crimea should be preserved. The
author claimed that
“Equally inappropriate are slants towards Ukrainization, which has been going
on in Crimea since 1954, when the Crimean oblast was transferred to Ukraine
from RSFSR. Impermissible is Tatarization on the basis of the status of
‘indigenous people’. Or Russification on the basis of the numeric majority of
the Russian population in Crimea.”430
The rhetoric/façade of equality, demonstrated in this quote was a common instrument of a
narrative distortion. Crimea was a settler colony, whose Sovietized settler population
spoke Russian almost exclusively. Throughout the Soviet period, the Ukrainian-ness of
the peninsula was reduced to some celebratory rituals – elements of the Ukrainian folk
culture that were inserted into the public space (Soviet representation of non-Russian
Soviet cultures that were mostly reduced to songs, dances and national cuisine). Crimean
Tatars were deported in 1944 and since then were repeatedly deported from Crimea every
time individual families made attempts to repatriate to their native land. But to the author
of this and many other articles, Ukrainization had been “going on since 1954” and
“Tatarization” was a real threat. Russification only appears on the list of threats in order
to create the democratic façade – by 1990 the Russification of Crimea was not a threat, it
was a fact.
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These supposed fears of ‘Ukrainization’ and ‘Tatarization’ were really the fears of the
colonizer that they might be (re)colonized. After 1991 Crimean settlers made up a
majority in Crimea, but they were a minority within the new independent Ukrainian state.
Therefore, they feared that the settler colonial institutions that served to protect the settler
colonial power dynamic might disappear. In that case playing a victim appeared to be an
effective political and informational tactic of preservation of the status quo. In terms of
power and cultural hierarchies, however, Russian speakers held the dominant position in
the informational sphere of Ukraine throughout the 1990s. From the point of view of
power dynamic pro-Russian Crimean settlers and Russian cultural discourse were
dominant not just in Crimea, but in much of Ukraine. This created an interesting
dynamic, in which a Russian-speaking minority had in fact stronger voice/had more
power (culturally and informationally) than the Ukrainian-speaking majority. Within
Crimea this minority did not recognize itself as such and claimed the rights of a majority.
Meanwhile, on the international stage Russian state forged an image of Crimean Russianspeaking minority that required protection.
The fear of being colonized could only appear as a result of the act of social ‘forgetting’ –
the erasure of the social memory of settler colonization of the Crimean land and the
development of the local quasi-indigenous identity of ‘Crimeans’. The act of settlement
was either erased, ignored, most often ignored, or justified with the narrative of
‘rebuilding Crimea after the Second World War’. According to that narrative, the new
Crimeans (settlers) had a right to the land because they had contributed to the rebuilding
of the Crimean economy, and no indigenous competitor had more right to it because they
had not. Furthermore, the idea that Crimea was ‘multinational,’ stripped of any historical
context, became a smokescreen allowed to forget about the existence of indigenous
Crimean Tatars (who, of course could not participate in rebuilding of Crimea after the
war because they had been deported). According to the settler institutions and media, ‘the
indigenous’ of Crimea could not be defined on such a “multinational” peninsula.431
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Claiming the indigeneity by any specific national group (Crimean Tatars, in particular),
other than the Sovietized Russian-speaking multi-ethnic population of Crimea was
considered an act of extremism by both Soviet and post-Soviet standards of inter-ethnic
relations.
To further discredit it, settler-colonial media framed the threat of ‘Ukrainization’ as
coming from outside of Crimea, and from a very particular kind of Ukrainian-ness – the
‘Western Ukraine’. This required the creation and reproduction of a particular image of
the Western Ukraine and its people. Throughout Soviet times Western Ukrainians were
considered nationalistic (and therefore, hostile to USSR), due to the history of the
Ukrainian nationalist movement and the Ukrainian Insurgent army (UPA) that operated
in the region during the Second World War. According to the Soviet historical narrative,
the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was an ally of Nazi Germany and fought on its side in the
Second World War. The history of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and its
military branch – UPA – was almost exclusively connected (in a popular narrative) to the
name of the leader of one of its branches – Stepan Bandera. It was common to refer to the
Ukrainian nationalists as ‘banderites’, followers of Bandera. The historical myth of the
Soviet Union, which placed the victory of the ‘Soviet people’ against Nazi Germany at
the center of state ideology, operated by villainizing all opposing ideologies as somehow
the same. The anti-Soviet nature of the Ukrainian nationalistic movement of the Western
Ukraine, therefore, became closely associated with Nazi collaboration. Similarly, Soviet
propaganda represented Crimean Tatars as a ‘traitor nation’ (rather than as a group of
people deported from their homeland in service to Russia’s settler colonial project in
Crimea). Being accused/suspected of Ukrainian nationalism meant being accused of
Nazism and of the desire to forcefully spread one’s identity. Therefore, the image of the
Western Ukraine, as a center of the ‘wrong’ Ukrainian-ness appeared in Crimean
newspapers whenever it was necessary to identify the Ukrainian threat.

For example: “My – krymchane,” Sovetskii Krym, October 11, 1990.
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The People’s Movement (Narodny Rukh) that became active in the Ukrainian SSR with
perestroika, and that campaigned for the democratization of the Soviet Union, was
immediately described as Western Ukrainian, which was a simplification, but not a
complete inaccuracy. Throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s, Soviet Ukrainian and
Crimean newspapers published articles that constructed an image of the nationalistic
Narodny Rukh as a threat to all peace-loving Soviet people. Crimean authorities used
specifically this image as a boogey-man to support the necessity of the Crimean
‘autonomy.’ During the all-Soviet referendum on the preservation of the USSR, for
instance, Rukh was presented (and painted in caricatures) as a radical separatist
organization that was willing to chop the branch called ‘Ukraine’ off the tree called
‘USSR,’ while sitting on that branch.432 During further years, Crimean newspapers
referred to ‘Rukh’, ‘democrats’ or ‘nationalists’ interchangeably, suggesting that there
was nothing democratic about the movement.
Beginning in November 1990, when the Crimean referendum was announced, Crimean
media started a propaganda campaign in support of what they called “Crimean
autonomy.” One of the main arguments used to denounce opponents of the referendum
could be represented in the following quote:
“There are calls from the repatriating Crimean Tatars, as well as a certain
category [my emphasis] of Ukrainians to boycott the referendum due to
various reasons. I will not tire you by naming them [my emphasis]. But the
main idea of a boycott should be bluntly clear to everyone – to ‘claim’ the
multinational Crimea for one’s own nation exclusively. Tatars demand that
Crimea becomes a Tatar republic, Ukrainian nationalists – [demand]
Ukrainization of the peninsula.”433
The claim that Crimea is a shared territory among various ethnic groups was never denied
by anyone. However, settler colonial institutions attributed it to Ukrainian and Crimean
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Tatar activists in order to distort their arguments, and mobilize support for themselves.
This claim allowed the settler colonial Crimean institutions to maintain the image of
inter-ethnic equality and fairness to all nationalities of Crimea, while supporting a
Russian dominated status quo.
One of the most widespread newspapers of Crimea Krymskaia Pravda advocated for the
‘restoration’ of the Crimean autonomy by promising its readers that this would allow to
solve “the national problem” of Crimea. While Crimean Tatars, boycotted the
referendum, the newspaper cited the position of the representatives of other non-Russian
nationalities that supported the autonomy. One such article was written by the deputy
chairman of the Greek cultural community K. Apostolidi. The authors argued that
“Our people is confident that the autonomy in particular will facilitate this path
[towards restoration of the national culture]. This is why it [the people] states
that only Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [built] on the
international [in a sense of multinational] basis as a subject of a renewed
federation and participant of the Union treaty will assure a full equality and
free development of all nations that inhabit our Crimean land”.434
Firstly, this article was meant to reject a common criticism of the opponents of the
referendum about the Russo-centrism of the future autonomy. Secondly, it demonstrated
a support for the autonomy from the representative of non-Russian nationality. More
interestingly, however, this article was published beside another text, dedicated to Stepan
Bandera, Ukrainian nationalism and the horrors of the Second World War. The text
began with an appeal to the social memory, and emotions about the Second World war
that had been cultivated by Soviet propaganda for decades:
“On the one hand, the name of Bandera, not just for the Ukrainian people, but
also for neighboring peoples, is a symbol of arsons, subversions, robberies and
murders, the embodiment of everything most criminal. It is an incarnation of a
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horrific violence, paranoiac sadism, blood curdling screams and howls of those
tortured during the ‘sparrow nights’ […] On the other hand, for part of the
population of the western region of Ukraine, especially Galicia, the name of
Bandera is a symbol of glory, heroism, and ‘martyrdom’ for ‘mother’ [nen´ku
– the author here uses the transliteration from Ukrainian] Ukraine.”435
Within several days in January 1991, several weeks prior to the referendum, Krymskaia
Pravda published articles in support of the Crimean autonomy alongside historical notes
about Ukrainian nationalists. Most those articles specifically emphasized the
aggressiveness of the Ukrainian nationalists and national equality that would come with
the autonomy.436 This of course created contrast between the risk and the opportunity and
manipulated readers, pushing them to mobilize around the idea of the Crimean autonomy.
At times Crimean newspapers gave space to the opponents of the mainstream media
narrative. Some key statements by the politicians from the ‘Ukrainian nationalist’
political camp did reach Crimean readers. On September 21, 1990, for example, the
newspaper Sovetskii Krym published a full text of the speech that Levko Luk’ianenko
gave to the Crimean local deputies.437 The article came out with an editor’s comment
saying that the speech was controversial and therefore many readers would want to be
able to know its content. Publications of this kind created a perception of ‘balanced
journalism’438 and therefore made propaganda more credible. On the other hand, within
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the context of the larger narrative, these infrequent publications representing the
opposition just provided “evidence” that “nationalists” should be feared by the public.
The appearance of the opposite view did not represent an attempt for a dialogue. Neither
did it represent the freedom of speech, as editors often claimed. It showed that the enemy
was real, that the image of Crimea as a ‘besieged fortress’ was in fact a reality.
In order to resist the potential increase of the pro-Ukrainian sentiment among readers,
Crimean press provided examples of what the ‘good’ Ukrainian should not be. The image
that settler media constructed of the Western Ukraine and Ukrainian-ness attributed a
certain level of civilizational backwardness to them. This perception was closely related
to the aforementioned image of nationalism, since Soviet propaganda described all
nationalists as narrow-minded, backward, aggressive people. As a nationalist (narrowminded) project, an independent Ukraine was perceived as an ultimately anti-Russian
(and presumably anti-Crimean), no matter what the Ukrainian government did. Presumed
anti-Russian-ness of Ukraine contradicted the plans of the Crimean settler colonial
institutions to keep close ties with Russia. It also associated anti-Russian-ness with
potential discrimination of the Russian-speakers. For example, in 1993 one of the regular
contributors to the Krymskaia Gazeta (and later its editor in 1999 to 2012) Petr Makukha
entered into a debate with M. Misiakov regarding the relationships between Russians and
Ukrainians. In one of his open letters Makukha addressed the traditional Soviet statement
that Russians were ‘the older brother’:
“[…]we should not forget that among equals everyone is older. Don’t you
think so? However, Nature and History ruled so that the people of Ukraine at
all times, while fighting off the pressure of pans [Polish noblemen] and beys
[Turkish and Crimean Tatar noblemen] gravitated with its soul towards the

the show is built around public humiliation of the position that those ‘professional Ukrainians’
(professional, because those are often same people and they are getting paid for participation) represent.

195

blood brother – the people of Northern Rus´ that appeared today (and that
happened before) to be richer than us, Ukrainians, in certain things.”439
In 1993, when Makukha wrote this, the Soviet historical narrative, presented in this quote
was still dominant. It is interesting, however, how rhetorical twists allow the author to
turn the presumable ‘difference in age’ into equality in order to fight off the accusations
of chauvinism. In a language of multinationalism, Russians and Ukrainians were
perceived to be equal. But inequality appeared in a rhetoric of age, and was only possible
as a result of the Russian cultural and political dominance. The rhetoric of ‘older brother’
was of course a part of the Russian nationalist discourse, that was acceptable in a Soviet
and post-Soviet seemingly anti-nationalist environment. Appeals to ‘nature and history’
follow the Soviet historical narrative of course, but also reminds one of Klyuchevski’s
descriptive strategy of the 19th century that used the ‘commands of history’ as an
explanation of the Russian imperial expansion to what is now Southern Ukraine and
Crimea.
Another sarcastic twist later in the text allowed Makukha ridicule what he saw as the
Ukrainian nationalism by ascribing it a goal to become “above everyone”. Makukha
comes up with a sarcastic etymology of the word ‘khokhol’ – a derogatory way that
Russians use to address Ukrainians – and suggests to tie the word to the following
meaning:
“Why would we not go further and, link the word ‘Khokhol’ to, say, GermanoEnglish [language], where ‘hoch’ – tall, taller, and ‘all’ – all, everyone. Then
there would be [that would mean] nothing but Germano-Arian ‘ubermensch’,
‘above all’ that said – overhuman!.. It seems that you would like that more than
amorphic Mongol-Tatar [name]”.440
The debate over the etymology of the word ‘Khokhol’ in this exchange seems pseudohistoric in the first place, and in no way Makukha suggests his etymology seriously. But
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the last sentence in the quoted piece contains an accusation of fascism, directed at the
opponent. Makukha draws clear parallels between the views of his opponent and German
Nazis, invoking a whole complex of cultural and historical associations with the NaziSoviet war.
In order to discredit ‘Ukrainian nationalists’ (and by extension the Ukrainian state) and
frame them as a threat, parallels between Ukrainian-ness and Nazism appeared relatively
often in Crimean news. Newspapers linked the new Ukrainian state symbols to the
history of German occupation in the Second World war in order to delegitimize them. In
October 1991, the newspaper Slava Sevastopolia published an article by A. Mareta about
the song “Shche ne vmerla Ukraina” (“Ukraine has not died yet”) that was being
suggested to be (and later became) the Ukrainian national anthem. The author of the
article said he remembered how Hitlerites promoted the song in the occupied Ukraine in
1941 and how they banned it after the project of a Ukrainian protectorate of Germany
was off the table. He argued that although the song represented a unique piece of art, and
was adored by some and targeted by others for nationalism, it should not become a state
anthem, because “the use of art in political, nationalistic or other conjuncture
[conjuncture here is synonymous to ‘trend’, ‘circumstance’] goals will not lead to
anything good.”441 The author of the article does not call the song nationalistic, but his
story starts with Hitlerites, and only after that does the reader finds out that the text
predated 1941. In addition, he basically validates the accusations of nationalism by
arguing against its use for political purposes. Another article came out in the opinion
section of Krymskaia Gazeta in 1993, after the Ukrainian parliament adopted the
Ukrainian state coat of arms and a flag. Here is how the author, Il´ia Neiachenko,
responded to this:
“Unfortunately, the Supreme Council of Ukraine under the pressure of
national-radicals [another reference to nationalists/Western Ukraine] in a hurry,
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outside of its competence, adopted the symbols – a trident and blue and yellow
flag, by which caused tension and conflict within the society…”442
According to Neiachenko, the trident was “an esoteric…sign of ancient Aryans, that is
where the swastika comes from […] Trident – is a symbol of intimidation and violence
that has a specific demonic meaning.”443 Neiachenko believed that those symbols were
unacceptable, due to their popularity among “nationalists during the civil and the Great
Patriotic” wars. “In the meantime, the hammer and sickle that are now being renounced
have been clear and acceptable – they have been a sign of labor”.444 As seen in this last
quote by Neiachenko, there was no need for the ‘Ukrainian-ness’ to have even a
slight/alleged connection to the history of German Nazism. The authors came up with a
bizarre and completely false connection between Ukrainian symbols, the Ukrainian state,
and views of the Ukrainian politicians, to Nazism.
The method of making the connection between Ukrainian-ness and Nazism implicit by
placing an article propagating a certain policy alongside the historical note on Ukrainian
nationalists in the Second World war also appeared in Krymskaia Gazeta. For instance,
on December 2, 1992 the newspaper published two seemingly unrelated texts on the same
page. One article, titled “Regarding Stamps in the Passport” (“Vokrug shtampa v
passporte”) suggested an interview with a government official regarding the new
legislative norm that required new Ukrainian citizens to confirm their citizenship by
stamping the Ukrainian trident into their old Soviet passports. The interview itself
represents a simple exchange of questions and answers, aimed to provide information to
the newspaper readers. It begins, however, with a journalist’s introduction that cites
multiple unidentified publications on the topic and opinions of multiple unidentified
Crimeans who protest against “’sealing’ [klejmit´ – the word here specifically refers to
putting a seal on cattle] the passports with a trident”.445 The journalist here did not claim
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the authorship over the application of this specific word to this context and therefore,
relieved himself of responsibility for it. But the word still appears in the article and does
build negative analogies around the Ukrainian coat of arms and citizenship. The second
article on the page talks about the new far-right Ukrainian organization – National
Socialist Party of Ukraine – that had been created in Western Ukraine. The article titled
“Sieg Heil in Galicia?” (“Zig Hajl v Galichinie?”) uses a mix of disturbing facts and
author’s assumptions in order to concoct an image of ‘Nazi Western Ukrainians’.446
Those two articles put in a context of one another again associate Ukrainian-ness with
Nazism, hostility, and threatened changes to the Crimean way of life.
The topic of nationalism, and by extension anti-democratism, of Ukraine was one of the
main themes in Krymskaia Pravda throughout the early 1990s. Eventually, it seemed that
this newspaper became one of the main instruments that mobilized people around the
pro-Russian RDK – Republican Movement of Crimea. One of the typical articles, titled
“New ‘discoveries’ of historians of Ukraine”, that came out in 1992 connected Ukrainian
nationalism to anti-democratism: “Calls for democracy today are nothing else than antiUkrainian activity…” It further argued that ideas of Ukrainian nationalism premised on
‘forged history’ of Ukraine.447 Articles of this kind, dedicated to unmasking the
Ukrainian nationalism and the fake Ukrainian history were a regular material in this
newspaper. This narrative had its own connection to the threat of ‘Ukrainization.’ The
newspaper regularly published articles and letters, when authors protested against
‘rewriting of history’ during the lessons in schools. On the one hand they suggested that
Ukraine as a state had no historical reasons for existence. On the other hand, they
suggested that Ukrainian nationalism was a deathly threat; that Ukrainian nationalism
defined the politics in Kyiv and were now going to target the Russian-speaking people of
Crimea, more dangerously - children.448
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Forging and supporting an image of Western Ukraine and members of the Ukrainian
national movement as nationalistic mobilized Soviet ideological values into the postSoviet political struggle. The hybridity and oxymoron-ness of the Soviet and post-Soviet
social and political norms made it possible for Crimean settler colonial institutions and
Russian state to use control over information in order to promote chauvinistic and
imperialist statements as democratic and ‘civil’. The Soviet system of values separated
Ukrainians into two types; the ‘correct’ – Soviet – and ‘wrong’ – nationalistic.449 Attacks
against ‘Ukrainian-ness’ were not presented as attacks on all Ukrainians, only against the
‘smaller portion’ of narrow-minded nationalists that happened to influence the
government, supposedly contrary to the desire of the majority of the population.450
Not only the Western Ukrainians were ‘nationalistic,’ their Ukrainian language (which
their tried to ‘enforce’ on the rest of Ukraine) was also ‘fake’. The local Western
Ukrainian dialects that had more in common with Polish and were less Russified than
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Eastern Ukrainian were announced unauthentic and Polonized.451 In opposition to those
‘wrong’ Western Ukrainians the media promoted an example of what the ‘right’
Ukrainian was. Some newspaper articles and ‘letters from the readers’ summarized all the
elements of the dichotomy between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ Ukrainians. For example, Z.
Ul´iantseva from the town of Kerch wrote a letter to the newspaper Krymskaia Gazeta in
1993 titled “I am Ukrainian as well” (“Ya tozhe ukrainka”):
“I am Ukrainian. I studied at school in Ukrainian and graduated from the
pedagogical college in Ukrainian. I like my language a lot, but only the literary
[language], the correct one, not the one that most people in Western oblasts of
Ukraine speak….”
One sentence later:
“I am horrified to think that my grand-children will have to forcefully learn the
Ukrainian language, that they will read in the [books of the] history of Ukraine
about the ‘courage and bravery’ of UPA [Ukrainian Insurgent Army] […]
Regarding the neglect of the Ukrainian language, it never happened […]
[Whenever we meet for celebrations with friends] I sing Ukrainian songs with
pleasure.”452
The language of this letter is of course Russian, although this could be determined by the
language of the newspaper which is Russian as well. But it is important to note the clear
cultural and political messages that the author reproduces in the text. The very title of the
text suggests victimization: the author believed that she was being excluded from her
nationality. Further claim suggested that there was nothing wrong with the correct
Ukrainian language. The text also suggested that learning Ukrainian was only possible
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under pressure, not by a conscious choice. Meanwhile, the definition of correctness of the
language remains unclear and seems to be reduced to the geographical origin of the
speaker.453 Ul´iantseva also repeats a stereotypical view of the Ukrainian language and
culture as something reduced to (folk) singing and uses singing as an evidence that the
language is not neglected. But the fact that she only applied language to sing songs was a
sign of neglect and cultural appropriation. It represented the limited space in which the
non-Russian Soviet cultures were reduced to – songs, dances and elements of cuisine. In
other words, those cultures were reduced to the past, deprived of ability to develop in
present and for sure having no future.454 Limiting a culture to that space was used to
reduce its influence and meaning and to argue that the culture received state support, in
the meantime. To an extent this repeats Olúfémi Táíwó’s definition of sociocryonics – a
colonizers policy to invent and support ‘the indigenous’ traditions in order to keep the
colonized society less developed, to ‘freeze’ the indigenous culture and society in time.
In a settler colonial environment sociocryonics becomes a basis of a colonized
‘backwardness’ that colonizers use to justify colonization.455 Similar arguments exist in
the studies of Soviet national policies. The Soviet state defined the appropriate
boundaries and historical narratives for non-Soviet cultures – elements that were allowed
to exist in the Soviet political space, and it also indicated those that were forbidden. In
that regard, the letter by Ul´iantseva, despite how self-contradicting it is from the
contemporary point of view, fits into the cultural and political standards of the Soviet
society456. It follows the oxymoronic pattern of Soviet cultural policies.
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A very similar text, describing a ‘good Ukrainian’ came out in Krymskaia Pravda in 1993. The article
“A thing or two about the Ukrainian humor” included a statement by a Ukrainian comedian Vasilii
Kochmala, who denied any discrimination against himself and the Ukrainian language during the Soviet
times. Just like Uliantseva, he further spoke about the Western Ukrainian dialect that was being ‘inflicted’
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Another popular propagandistic argument against ‘Ukrainization’ (that also relates to
sociocryonics) used the general perception of Ukrainian culture as ‘rural’ and ‘backward’
(discussed in Chapter 2). In 1994 the newspaper Slava Sevastopolia published a letter by
B. Maksimov titled “In Whose Hands Is the Power?” (“V chiich rukakh vlast´?”). The
author argues that the rise of Russian nationalist sentiment in Sevastopol happened due to
“the 2 years of attempts of crawling Ukrainization.”457 He further argues that it was
impossible to open Ukrainian schools in Sevastopol because they would not be popular
among the residents of the city who “are all Russian”.458 This statement was, of course,
false, because by 1994 the fight for the creation of a single Ukrainian school in
Sevastopol had been going on for several years. B. Maksimov further argued that
Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages were simply not ‘civilized’ enough to be
necessary for people in future:
“With all the respect to the Ukrainian and Tatar [Crimean Tatar] languages and
cultures, I have to say that it is not the study of national languages and the
‘history’ of Ukraine that had been invented in Lviv [Western Ukraine], but a
core educational reform and the study of languages of world communication
(Russian, English, German, French, Spanish etc.) will contribute to the
flourishing of the city [Sevastopol] and the increase of its intellectual
potential.”459
There is an obvious distinction in this quote between languages and cultures that can and
cannot contribute to the intellectual development of the society; cultures that have
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futures, and that are ‘frozen’ in the past.460 Ironically, among the languages that are
useful to learn the author lists exclusively languages of large European colonial empires.
And ‘smaller languages’ are simply ‘not necessary’, due to their ‘inability’ to develop
society intellectually. Note that the historical narrative of the post-Soviet Ukraine does
not deserve to be mentioned without quotations marks as well, since Ukraine simply
cannot have its own history that is separate from the Russian. This quote speaks to the
perception of national prestige and civilization in the post-Soviet environment as much as
to the ability of the imperial speaker to normalize chauvinism through the use of prudent
‘tone of voice’ and word choice.
It is not the content of the opinions, but the ability to achieve an aura of ‘civility’ through
the control over media that defines the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ sides in the political debate.
The quoted letters are representative of the common settler colonial rhetoric, put in a
cultural and political context of the Soviet Union and post-Soviet societies. The
newspapers that published those letters validated the opinions of the authors and create a
perception of them as the ‘norm’. And it is not this ‘norm’, but the views that challenge it
are targeted as examples of extremism and nationalism. The settler-controlled Crimean
press transmitted a very particular image of ‘normal’ society, ‘correct’ ethnic relations
and what ‘equality’ should looked like. In the meantime, it was very effective at
constructing an image of a ‘foreign threat’ coming from the rest of Ukraine. The
constructed image responded to the ‘demand for democracy’ of the time and therefore
painted ‘Us’ – settler colonial institutions – as paragons of change and democracy, and
defenders of human rights. Meanwhile, the other side – ‘Them’ – were represented as
‘Ukrainian nationalists’ (a definition that was applied to people with very different
political views) who were willing to violate human rights. This rhetoric and distinction
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between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ was extremely persistent and did not change significantly with
time.
Stories about ‘Ukrainian nationalism’ are strikingly repetitive and appeal to the same
emotional triggers throughout the whole period under research. The description of the
Congress of Ukrainians in Kyiv that came out In Krymskaia Pravda on January 28, 1992
appealed to gender stereotypes that were used in order to characterize the event as
‘Russophobic hysteria.’ Yurii Makeev, the author of the article titled “In which direction
does the hetman’s warder point?” (“Kuda ukazyvaet bulava get´mana?”, began the
description by pointing out the emotional atmosphere:
“As you know, women are much more emotional than men. They are very
sensitive to the psychological state of the environment, they easily get infected
with it. By looking at women’s speeches during the congress, it is easy to
understand a whole atmosphere. Warmed to the boiling stage the national idea
almost ripped the cover off of the caldron, and representatives of the
organizational committee, who were sitting in the presidium, had a hard time
keeping the meeting within proper limits.”461
The author argued that in such atmosphere the participants of the meeting were not
capable of any conscious thinking. The author described ‘Ukrainian nationalists’ as
people driven by emotions and ideology. The readers were supposed to recognize the
level of danger, coming from such description. And for those who did not read between
the lines, Krymskaia Pravda published another text just few days later. The author of the
letter to the editor said: “Nationalism, no matter whose, is scary. At this point the most
dangerous is Ukrainian. It threatens not only Crimeans and residents of Eastern Ukraine,
but also people beyond Ukraine. The evidence of that – the nationalistic sabbath during
the Congress of Ukrainians in Kyiv. If this continues like this, today’s nationalism will
become fascism.”462
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Sometimes the right-wing political groups in Ukraine (willingly or not) legitimized the
statement of the Crimean propaganda about the Ukrainian threat. In March, 1992 a group
of Ukrainian activists and politicians (representing the right political spectrum), led by
the Ukrainian MP Stepan Khmara came to Sevastopol in what was called a ‘train of
friendship’. This visit became a true gift to the Crimean propaganda, from the Ukrainian
far-right, as it provided evidence to all threats and fears that had been cultivated in
Crimea previously. The coverage of the visit by Khmara and UNSO (Ukrainian
Nationalistic Self-Defense) started several days before the visit itself with the first article
published on February 29, 1992 and titled “The Third Storm of Sevastopol?” – a yet
another reference to the history of ‘heroic’ defenses of Sevastopol.463 This visit was
described as an invasion that had to be repelled by Crimeans.464 Ukrainian officers who
served in Ukrainian navy forces at the time, Anatoliy Danilov and Mykola Savchenko,
mention this visit in their recollections on the history of the Ukrainian fleet. They
describe Khmara’s visit as a turning point that gave rise to the active pro-Russian
movement in Crimea.465 This pattern repeated itself strikingly in 2014, when, during the
annexation of Crimea, Russian propaganda outlets spoke about ‘trains of friendship’
filled with aggressive nationalists, who were coming to Crimea from the Western
Ukraine to kill local residents. The alleged defense from those nationalists once again
was proclaimed the ‘Third Defense of Sevastopol’. Therefore, according to propaganda,
Russian aggression in 2014 was actually the defense of Crimea from Ukrainian
nationalists.466 There is persistence and repetition of the same propagandist narratives
over time in Crimea, which may in part be due to its geographical isolation as a
peninsula, low social mobility, absence of professional journalism, strong persistence of
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propaganda and ‘post-truth’ hybrid warfare. This particular kind of isolation may make
Crimea especially vulnerable to informational manipulation. The same statements, same
images and same informational constructs are recycled and effectively used again and
again.
‘Ukrainian nationalism’ and, by extension, everything Ukrainian, was perceived as
external to Crimea – a threat, coming from the outside. Every time there was a proUkrainian cultural or political (which in this case is the same) event happening in Crimea,
it was described in terms of ‘them’ coming to ‘us’. This image performed two important
functions: it naturalized the idea that Crimea was not Ukrainian – Ukrainians came from
outside Crimea; and therefore it promoted the isolation of Crimean society from the rest
of the state (and prevented integration with Ukraine). Second, by making Crimea a
potential victim of this outside threat, it pushed Crimean residents towards their only
savior – Crimea’s settler colonial institutions that promised to keep them safe from
Ukrainian nationalists. When later in the year Ukrainian activists organized an AllCrimean Congress of Ukrainians that took place in Simferopol in 1992, Crimean
newspapers paid specific attention to the origin of the delegates. It was understood to be
of particular importance throughout the coverage to find out how many people were from
Crimea and how many came from the rest of Ukraine.467 When it became known that the
majority of the congress attenders were from Crimea, the emphasis shifted to the role of
the visitors: they were the minority, but they ‘dictated the agenda.’ This was how N.
Kharitonov, a board member of the Society of the Russian culture in Crimea (Obshestvo
Russkoi Kultury v Krymu) described the congress upon attending it. The article talks
about “visitors”, famous members of Ukrainian national movement (Viacheslav
Chornovil, Ivan Drach and others), who led the and ‘almost exclusively’ spoke at the
meeting.468 The author emphasized the “nationalistic” agenda of the meeting – members
of the congress demanded more presence of the Ukrainian state on the peninsula, they
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also expressed support for the “extremist” Crimean Tatar National movement.469 In
another instance, an article by the ‘Crimean writer’ Stanislav Slavich says that “Lack of
trust towards Russia – is a characteristic element of the Ukrainian national actors” and
they “inflict” it into people’s minds during the congresses, contrary to the desire of the
majority.470 The argument makes a full circle: Western Ukraine is a region of Ukrainian
nationalists, they try to inflict (with force, like Nazis did) their views and culture onto
Crimea, therefore, Crimea has to protect its way of life against this invasion; as a result,
everything Ukrainian is nationalistic and not Crimean, and Crimean cannot be Ukrainian.
On the top of all that – Ukraine was presented as an ‘anti-Russian project’. Ukraine’s
attitude towards Russia was one of its most important characteristics. Therefore, the goals
and ideology of Ukrainian activists in Crimea went contrary to the propaganda’s
perception of Crimea’s past, present and preferable future.
This attitude towards Ukrainian-ness as something external to Crimea extended to the
attitude towards the Ukrainian state. The way the Crimean press referred to Ukraine
creates a perception that Ukraine was a foreign country. News ‘from Ukraine’ and from
Russia (another external country due to the existence of the border, the ‘lost’ Fatherland)
appeared on newspaper pages simultaneously, as events that were equally removed from
Crimea. In the meantime, the primary attention of the press focused on the ‘Republic of
Crimea’ and decisions made by its governing bodies. This, of course, enhanced and
forged Crimean regional identity, but also through the rhetoric of self-governance
provided a power monopoly to the local Crimean politicians. Any involvement of Kyiv
into Crimean political processes was characterized as undemocratic interference, or even
outright invasion. The creation of the institution of the president of Crimea in 1994 and
the election of Yurii Meshkov did not change this perception of Ukraine, but enhanced it.
Crimean media followed the populist policies of Meshkov and validated his attempts to
conduct independent foreign politics and enter into international agreements.
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Such attitude towards Ukraine in the newspapers defined the way in which media
characterized the events surrounding the Black Sea Fleet. Here again, Ukraine and
‘Ukrainian nationalists’ played a role of aggressors, who tried to seize the fleet, which
meanwhile was located on Ukrainian territory. Newspapers published dozens of letters
and article, dedicated to the courage, dignity and loyalty of the fleet sailors and
officers.471 Krymskaia Pravda celebrated officers who resisted orders of the Ukrainian
Ministry of Defense (see more on Chapter 5) and described them as heroes.472 On the
other hand, there existed a ‘humane’ narrative, according to which fleet servicemen were
residents of Crimea and therefore – Crimeans. The question of ‘economic support of
servicemen and their families’ turned into a serious political question. The presumption,
of course, was that Ukraine’s actions would lead to worsening of that economic
prosperity, because Ukraine would not have resources to finance the fleet. That last
thought was actively supported by the fleet command, newspapers and various Ukrainian
and Russian politicians.
The change in elites did not deconstruct the settler colonial institutions, rather new
leaders took up the old myths to consolidate their hold on power. Media continued to be
an instrument of propaganda, controlled by local Crimean politicians. It projected images
that were necessary for the preservation of the political and social status quo. With the
failure of Meshkov and the pro-Russian movement in Crimea in 1995, the level of
emotional tension in relation to Ukraine in Crimean newspapers became somewhat lower.
However, the myth of the ‘Ukrainian nationalism’ continued to exist and was revoked
according to the political needs. By 1995 the Ukrainian government increased its control
over Crimea. It also became apparent that Russian political elites were not ready to start a
war with Ukraine over Crimea, but rather decided to use Crimea in order to manipulate
Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy from the inside. The Crimean press became an
important instrument that helped reach this goal. In a situation when Kyiv tightened its
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political control over Crimea in 1995, media remained an important settler colonial
institution that allowed local political elites and foreign Russian agents to maintain
control over the information and manipulate the political views and identities of Crimean
people by constructing “truths” contrary to history and reality.

4.3
De-Indigenizing the Indigenous: The Fluidity of the
Anti-Crimean Tatar Xenophobia
The repatriation of Crimean Tatars created an obvious tension in the everyday life of the
colonizer and the colonized in Crimea, as well as between the colonized and the settler
colonial institutions. Although at first they were invisible, eventually the political debates
and clashes between the repatriates and the local Crimean authorities got covered by the
press. Through the newspapers the Crimean residents were supposed to find out the
‘truth’ about the political events and the struggle that Crimean Tatars waged for
repatriation and restoration of their rights. Once they were on the peninsula, speaking for
themselves (inconveniently), the pro-Russian Crimean press changed its attitude toward
the Crimean Tatar issue very quickly, as shown above. Therefore, the narrative regarding
the acceptance of Crimean Tatars seems to have been crafted on-the-go. And while the
policy of the late USSR and post-Soviet times was to allow Crimean Tatars to repatriate,
this was done begrudgingly, with an effort to allow them to change as little as possible in
Crimea. Newspapers were the institution that justified this fight against decolonization.
They painted Crimean Tatar activists as aggressive nationalists, who were provoking the
peaceful multinational Crimean population into an inter-ethnic conflict over nothing.
The attitude towards the Crimean Tatar activists that appeared in Communist Party
documents in the late 1980s (Chapter 3) became the narrative for the local Crimean
newspapers, controlled by the party. The narrative described the deportation of Crimean
Tatars as a mistake, but the demands of the Crimean Tatar movement, according to that
narrative, were ‘nationalistic’ and unreasonable. In Crimean newspapers, reporters often
posed loaded questions and pushed their respondents towards a particular answer. For
instance, the interview with the chairman of the Yalta municipal council V.V. Brailovsky
(already mentioned in Chapter 3) demonstrated the ‘constructive’ approach of the
bureaucrats, who promised to “allocate land” versus the ‘provocative’ behavior of
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protestors.473 The interview and its publication became a platform that allowed
Brailovsky to say that protestors were given a designated place (away from a public eye)
to express their opinion, but they decided to protest under the municipal council. This
step, according to Brailovsky, constituted a “psychological pressure” and “aggravates the
problem.”474 This point of view seems to be shared by the interviewer, Petr Makukha,
who supports the conversation with the following statement: “Indeed, there is a lot to talk
about, a lot to do, so that the return of Crimean Tatars does not resemble their
expulsion.”475
This interview was one of those publications that created a perception that the authorities
were truly trying to help, but nothing was enough for the activists. Here again the
colonized (Crimean Tatars) are painted with accusations of ‘uncivility’ and ‘aggression’
by the colonizer. Here again, the colonized appears to be ‘unreasonable’ because of their
demand for decolonization. The quoted phrase by Makukha is important and could be
interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, further debates demonstrated an argument that
repatriation of Crimean Tatars should not violate the rights of the Crimean residents. If
that was Makukha’s idea, then he possibly was trying to say that a ‘mistake’ that the state
committed towards Crimean Tatars should not be repeated through limiting the rights of
‘local’ people as a result of Crimean Tatar repatriation. On the other hand, some argued
that repatriation was a process, provoked by the ‘nationalistic minority’ and went against
the true interests of Crimean Tatars themselves. In that case, the repatriation of Crimean
Tatars to Crimea in its effect was compared to their ‘deportation’ from their places of
residence, due to the poverty and lack of opportunities that awaited repatriates in Crimea.
Therefore, according to that argument, the repatriation process had to go slower and
according to the plan. Both those arguments existed in a public sphere and were used by
opponents of repatriation. A suggestion that there is a risk that repatriation might mirror
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the deportation was not just a friendly pass by the interviewer for the government official.
It also constituted a distortion of the narrative about the deportation and repatriation. It
was based on the generally accepted assumption (accepted as a result of decades of
consistent struggle) that deportation was a negative event in history. But this time the
journalist, and the settler colonial institution that he represented, made an attempt to hold
the deportation against the deportees – it was their fault that deportation was a negative
event in history.476 And even if this phrase was a thoughtless mistake, there are enough
similar phrases by other speakers that show the pattern of this particular distortion.
The image of Crimean Tatar ‘extremists’ was similar to the image of Ukrainian
nationalists. The main argument here again was that Crimean Tatar ‘extremists’ would
try to bring the inter-ethnic conflict to Crimea by trying to claim unfair or unequal
privileges for Crimean Tatar people. In order to fight Crimean Tatar demands, Crimean
authorities and media manipulated the arguments of their opponents, of course, by trying
to ascribe them extremist goals that they often did not share. This later enabled them to
describe Crimean Tatar activists and Mejlis in particular, as initiators of the conflict. The
newspaper Krymskaia Gazeta published letters that were sent to the Crimean Supreme
Council and Council of Ministers, addressing Crimean Tatar threat: “Actions of ‘Mejlis’
– is a tragic path towards polarization of Crimea along ethnic lines, its consequences are
unpredictable”, “Of course, the deported people should return to Crimea, but this return
should come along with the respect to law, stable sociopolitical situation of Crimea, and
without discrimination of rights of the multinational people, who live here”.477
Yet again those quotes are examples of the distortion of reality. Crimean authorities
fought against repatriation by using the legacy of institutional oppression of Crimean
Tatars. Later they distributed land among Crimean residents so that it did not fall into
Crimean Tatar hands (see Chapter 3). Crimean Tatars were not allowed to return to
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certain areas, where they were unwelcome – southern shores of Crimea, city of
Sevastopol etc. Previously, for 40 years Crimean Tatars were not allowed to live in
Crimea because of their nationality, they could not purchase houses or get official job. At
the time when the above quoted newspaper articles were published, most Crimean Tatars
did not have citizenship and could not send their children to schools, because they were
Crimean Tatars. But of course, now it was the Mejlis that ‘polarized Crimea along the
ethnic lines’. Of course, Crimean Tatars had to respect the law that reinforced their
subjugated cultural, economic political and social position. It was only the socio
economic life and comfort of the Crimean residents (most of whom came to Crimea to
replace Crimean Tatars and other deported nations) that mattered. Repatriation was
supposed to happen without any inconveniences to the settler colonizers, without any
distortion of the power dynamic. In other words, according to the prevailing settler
colonial view, repatriation was not supposed to bring decolonization.
As with Ukrainians – who were constructed as outsider nationalists from Western
Ukraine – Crimean Tatars were also painted as threatening outsiders. The deep irony, of
course, is that they were the indigenous inhabitants of Crimea. But that is just all the
more reason, in a settler colonial context, why Russian settler colonial interests needed to
reframe them as outsiders and others. This was accomplished in Crimea via the story of
land ‘self-return’. The narrative of a struggle over land between the repatriates
(‘outsiders’) and Crimean residents (‘locals’) appeared in multiple places. It could not
openly call Crimean Tatars foreign to Crimea, as the repatriation technically was their
recognized right. Therefore, just like in the quotes above, this narrative often spoke about
the necessity to respect the rights of Crimean residents/ local population, which already
suggested that their opponents were not ‘local’ to Crimea. It began from the Soviet times,
of course. Back in 1990 after one of the collisions between the riot police and Crimean
Tatar camp, the newspaper Sovetskii Krym published an article that seemed to condemn
the collision. The journalist, Galina Kostina, titled her story “We Will All Be Ashamed
for Today.” She wrote about the attack of police and ‘local people’ on the Crimean Tatar
protestors under the Yalta municipal council and on the land that Crimean Tatars had
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‘self-returned’ to (that same council whose chairman gave an interview quoted above). 478
While trying to find a balance in the presentation of the story, a journalist turns the text
into a covert justification of the attack: one side was demanding “law and order”, while
“Tatars” (here we see a deprivation of the indigenous of their name) did not agree to wait
longer (were impatient) for the repatriation process to finish.479 The rhetoric of the article
is crafted in the tradition of the settler colonial culture: Kostina repeatedly talks about the
collision between “the local population” and “Tatars.” In this narrative the colonizer and
the colonized seem to switch places, making the former a potential victim of a
colonization of the latter. The riot police, according to this report, took the side of the
attackers, removing building materials that Crimean Tatars brought for themselves.
According to Kostina, “a crowd that came to the Crimean Tatar tent camp rushed to take
down tents, and police could not prevent that from happening.”480 It is hard to believe
that an institution that proved to be very capable in suppressing protests in the Soviet
Union suddenly lost control over the crowd that attacked a Crimean Tatar camp.
As with Ukrainian question, the problems with Crimean Tatar repatriation always came
from ‘nationalists.’ In September 1991, a group of Crimean Tatars ‘self-returned’ land in
the town of Yevpatoria. The article that covers this story refers to Crimean Tatars
exclusively as ‘Tatars’, ‘repatriates’, and ‘deportees’.481 The reason for the
‘samozakhavat’ (‘self-acquisition’ – the term used by the authorities and media) of land,
according to the journalist, V. Shcherbinin, laid in the sphere of politics:
“The spring of the current self-acquisition was tightening not in Yevpatoria,
but in the great spaces of Central Asia, where the process of migration is
artificially accelerated by the national political forces”.482
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This quote not only refers to the repatriates as just ‘migrants,’ but makes a reference to
the image of nationalistic Crimean Tatar politicians, who ‘artificially accelerate the
repatriation’. Further in the text Shcherbinin explains in detail why such a fast
repatriation of Crimean Tatars prevented the town of Yevpatoria from developing. The
author emphasized that the small town could not absorb that many people, suggesting
probably that the repatriating Crimean Tatars were to blame for the Yevpatoria’s
potential problems of development. While Crimean Tatars claimed that people in
Uzbekistan, where they had been deported to, forced them to repatriate to Crimea (and
violence like that did happen at the time), Shcherbinin wrote that this was false and that
many ‘migrants’ did not even cancel their registration in places where they lived, and
came to Crimea “for reconnaissance, with an aim to reserve land plots.”483 By this
Shcherbinin seemed to diminish the reasoning behind repatriation hinting that people
were driven by possible economic gains, rather than the idea to return home. Finally,
Shcherbinin refers to the image of an ‘aggressive Tatar’ that brought disruption to
Crimean land: “Hostility, conscious disregard of law is becoming a norm of conduct for
the most aggressive portion of migrants”.484
In this and other stories about the Crimean Tatar repatriation the basic principle for the
journalists and Crimean politicians was to preserve the ‘rights’ of the ‘local Crimean
population’ – settlers – first. Local almost becomes a replacement for indigenous, and is
used to erase the prior claim of Crimean Tatars, or at least to compete with its meaning.
The fact that Crimean Tatars had been deported from their homeland and lost all their
property in Crimea (in favor of settlers, who often moved into empty Crimean Tatar
homes) technically was acknowledged, but did not bring liability to the current “Crimean
locals”. Simply speaking, the settler colonial institutions adopted a position according to
which the deportation was bad, and therefore no elements of it could be applied to
‘Crimean residents’ during the repatriation. This was the colonized that had to adjust to
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the colonizer, not vice versa. Any attempts to change that met with the references to law
and accusations of aggression.
This narrative about the ‘nationalistic minority’, represented by the Mejlis, that provoked
all Crimean Tatars to repatriate, even when it was supposedly “contrary to their own
interests” survived into the post-Soviet era. The narrative itself was very paternalistic, of
course, because it presumed that the speaker knew Crimean Tatar interests better than
Crimean Tatars themselves. It makes resistance to decolonization inevitable, and its
possible failure becomes a an evidence that decolonization had been doomed in the first
place – a lesson against possible future attempts to decolonize. This narrative appeared in
statements by politicians, but also in questions by journalists, which suggests an attempt
to influence public opinion, and to ‘dominate the truth’. In 1994 Elena Gornaya
interviewed an ethnic Crimean Tatar, Enver Abliakimov, who was a vice-president of the
Chuvashia republic within the Russian Federation at the time.485 The delegation from the
Chuvashia visited Crimea, therefore, Gornaya conducted a somewhat typical interview,
with the exception of the fact that her respondent had a certain relationship to Crimea.
One of the questions that Gornaya asked included her own evaluation of the repatriation
of Crimean Tatars:
“[…] was it not a mistaken decision to return Crimean Tatars to Crimea
simultaneously and in an organized way? That said, immediately rip dozens of
thousands of people off of their conventional life, from permanent places and
to lead their way to the place where nobody could welcome them properly, I
mean economically.”486
In other words, Gornaya herself believed that the repatriation was a mistake and
normalized that message. Her message reproduced an idea that the failure of
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decolonization would be the fault of the colonized Crimean Tatars and their leaders.487
Again, the way this question is formulated presumes that repatriates did not have power
over their decision but followed somebody’s lead.
The interview by Gornaya is one of example of the way that Russian settler colonial
interests, using Crimean newspapers, conducted information warfare against the Crimean
Tatar struggle for their national rights. The conversation focused on the inter-ethnic
relations in the Russian Federation. The main underlying argument that readers could get
from the text was that the Russian state solved the inter-ethnic tension by federalizing and
giving rights to national minorities. Therefore, this approach could serve as a guideline
for Ukraine, Crimea, or Ukraine in Crimea. One of the later questions by Gornaya
included a statement that directly related to Crimean politics: “It seems like you
[Chuvashia republic/Russian Federation] do not have that prejudice that is popular in
some places, like ‘indigenous – non-indigenous’?”.488 Such a reference to the fight of
Crimean Tatars for their national rights in Crimea was of course intentional. And
according to this reference, the demand of the colonized to restore their sovereignty and
national rights was a prejudice – a sin against settlers, not a justified right. The colonizer
could not and did not recognize Crimean Tatars as the indigenous people. Indigeneity
went directly against the ideology of multinational Crimea, where ‘nobody was
indigenous,’ suggesting that any group was amounted to “prejudice,” and this is why the
power should remain within the “unprejudiced, fair” settler colonial institutions.
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The interview with Abliakhimov demonstrates an image of a Crimean Tatar that is
surprisingly similar to the image of the ‘good’ Ukrainian, mentioned above. Abliakhimov
himself said that his family was deported from Crimea in 1930, during the
collectivization. Therefore, the deportation of 1944 was not a traumatic experience for his
family, and it did not influence his identity the way that deportation shaped other
Crimean Tatars. Abliakhimov identified himself as Russian during the interview,
although he admitted that his family “respects the Crimean Tatar traditions – national
cuisine, language”.489 Abliakhimov said he did not know the Crimean Tatar language
very well, but his Crimean Tatar was “relatively purified…without the mixture of Central
Asian linguistic layers, which are characteristic of the language of Crimean Tatars, who
lived in Uzbekistan for a long time”.490 Just like in other cases of non-Russian postSoviet nationalities, the respect towards national culture here reduces to eating national
food and speaking the language in limited ways. Just like with the image of Western
Ukrainians and their language, this interview makes a slight suggestion that the language
of Crimean Tatars is not ‘pure’ enough, because it mixed with the local languages in
Uzbekistan. The Crimean Tatar presence in Uzbekistan was not a collective choice of the
nation, but here the respondent comes close to questioning the authenticity of repatriates.
The more overt challenge of the Crimean Tatar authenticity happened before. In April,
1992 Krymskaia Gazeta published an article “National crafts – factor of increase of
employment” (“Natsyonal´nye promysly – faktor povysheniia zaniatosti”). On the one
hand, the article argued that Crimean Tatar traditional craftsmanship could be a
potentially good way to make money in times of crisis. On the other hand, the author B.
Finogeev made a remark about the Crimean Tatar authenticity:
“Meanwhile it is necessary to acknowledge that the loss of the national
distinctiveness and originality [samobytnosti i original´nosti] by Crimean
Tatars under the influence of their long-term residence in places of deportation
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will, I think, complicate a revival of the national culture in its full primordiality
[pervozdannost´].”491
The challenge to originality (‘primordiality’) is another way of the settler colonial
discourse to call the indigeneity into question. Other settler colonies demonstrate similar
examples, when bastardized language or culture become a premise which settler colonies
use in order to question the ‘purity’ of the native blood.492 The demand for
‘primordiality’ further denies the right of the Crimean Tatar culture to change, it denies
the right of Crimean Tatars to be modern and to remain Crimean Tatars simultaneously, a
right that was never in question for the Russian culture. The celebration of Crimean Tatar
cultural ‘originality’ eventually became part of the discourse that Crimean Tatars
themselves seemed to support. At the end of the day, preservation of the national culture
in places of deportation was the challenge that Crimean Tatars recognized collectively.
Therefore, when Crimean Tatar national culture was celebrated for folklore,
traditionalism and originality, partially this was due to the experience of Crimean Tatars
themselves, but partially this was due to the imperial discourse.
The description of the Crimean Tatar national cultural events at times included elements
of Orientalization, a tradition of othering that also typically includes framing exotic
cultures as trapped in the past. To an extent the image of the Orientalized Crimean Tatar
culture contributed to the statement that Crimean Tatars were not quite ‘local’. In
addition, this image helped create a myth of inter-ethnic peace and national equality in
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Crimea. Just like presentation of opposing views by the Crimean newspapers created an
image of ‘balanced journalism’. Orientalization of the Crimean Tatar culture often
happened in articles devoted to the cultural events in Crimea. One such article, called
“Khaitarma Sings and Dances” (“Poet i tantsuet ‘Khaitarma’”493) described the
performance of the Crimean Tatar folk ensemble in the following way:
“The performance of ‘Khaitarma’ is a unique [svoeobraznyi – might also be
translated as ‘exotic’, ‘original’, and ‘peculiar’] decoration for one of the most
popular Eastern holidays that are going on now – Ramadan”.494
Ramadan is, of course, a religious holiday, celebrated by Muslims all over the world.
Ramadan existed in Crimea long before the peninsula became part of the Russian empire,
or the Soviet Union, long before Slavic peoples became the majority in Crimea. In those
terms, Ramadan is more ‘local’ to Crimea (and not ‘Eastern’) than the editorial board of
the Kurortnyi Krym newspaper, which published this article without naming its author.
While the article seemed to celebrate Crimean Tatar national culture, it described it in
exotic terms, and admired it much like Western colonists admired the exotic cultures of
East Asia.495
In October 1991, the same newspaper Kurortnyi Krym published two short notes,
dedicated to the festival “Shelkovy put´-91”. Both notes came under a shared title
“Dialog kul´tur – velenie vremeni”. One of them described a performance of the Crimean
Tatar ensemble. This description Orientalized and exoticized Crimean Tatars yet again:
“Gifts of the generous Crimean nature that are a delight for eyes, tantalizing
smells, summer-like warm sun, multilingual speech… and in imagination
arises a tempting picture of the Eastern bazaar, where goods come from all
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sides of the world, where everything is soaked with mysterious charm of lovely
tales of Scheherazade”.496
This quote resembles the 19th century tradition of the Russian poets and writers to
describe Crimea in oriental terms (quotes by Aleksander Pushkin, mentioned in Chapter
1), it represents a pride of the 19th century Russian imperial subject to obtain their own,
‘Russian East’ in one of the most western geographical areas of the Russian empire –
Crimean Peninsula. In this text, the author again admired Crimean multiculturalism while
othering it in ways that deny indigenous status to Crimean Tatars and incorporates all
kinds of stereotypical cultural references from the Arab world. In this cultural construct
Crimean Tatars were supposed to represent ‘the Orient’, ‘the bazaar’ and ‘Eastern
exotics’:
“Of course, Sudak fair is far from the real Eastern bazaar, but a unique [again –
svoeobraznyi] coloring was created by the performance of an ensemble of
Crimean Tatars ‘Krym’ [‘Crimea’]. Antique headdresses and white-toothed
smiles twinkled in the sunlight, necklaces tingled and multicolored outfits
fluttered. And oh what ladies those were!”497
The last exclamation finalized what the author was stumbling around throughout this
short text. The picture was now complete – the indigenous folk ensemble played a very
particular role at the event. The ensemble created an atmosphere of the ‘Orient’ for the
settler colonizer and enabled colonial phantasies about exoticism and sensual the
‘Eastern’ bodies. A (recently) post-Soviet Slavic attendant of the festival joined the
imaginary ‘civilized world’ and drew a clear color line between himself and the exotic
indigenous ensemble. The ensemble was there to ‘create a coloring’, to entertain the
colonizer with their ‘white-toothed smiles’ and colorful outfits. The colonizer was there
to enjoy the atmosphere, to fantasize about female bodies, to see the difference (including
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the difference in power) between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. He was there to exercise the power,
given to his nationality: to consume the spectacle, and to write the narrative.
Four years later, descriptions of the Crimean Tatar festival in 1995 did not contain
Orientalist language. The number of articles, describing Crimean Tatar cultural events
generally decreased. One article, dedicated to the Days of Crimean Tatar culture,
emphasized Crimean multiculturalism and celebrated the fact the Crimean Tatars had
managed to preserve their culture and ‘originality’ in places of deportation.498 The
cultural sites, however, remained to be colonized. Therefore, Crimean Tatar ensembles
and theaters performed on the stages of ‘Russian academic’ theaters, named after Russian
writers. The examples of Orientalization still appeared from time to time. In 1995, for
instance, Slava Sevastopolia reported about a play themed on the poem “Bakhchysaraiski
fontan’ by Aleksander Pushkin in a news section. A short description of a play mentioned
that the director followed a “genre of poetic legend, giving it [a play] some Eastern
coloring [vostochny kolorit]”.499 While this was not an example of exoticizing of Crimean
Tatar culture per se, it built on the 19th century tradition of exoticizing and Orientalization
of Crimea.
The admiration of the Crimean Tatar culture did contribute to the image of peaceful
multiculturalism, carefully maintained by generations of Crimean politicians. Partially
this could be explained by the fact that by 1995 the settler colonial framework of Crimea
had adapted to the new circumstances and secured its existence. But also this was a time
of a new ‘balance’, reached after the fall of Yurii Meshkov. In that balance Crimean
Tatars were still discriminates, but at least got some representation in governmental
institutions, namely Ilmi Umerov, who served as a deputy Prime Minister of Crimea. The
image of multiethnic Crimea with the real Soviet national hierarchy and prestige was
preserved, and all political and social forces more or less recognized it. It was no longer
necessary to exoticize Crimean Tatars, at least temporarily. In addition, since roughly
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1994 Crimean newspapers dedicate significantly less publications to Crimean Tatar
culture, and mostly mention Mejlis to describe political events.
The image of the Crimean Tatar ‘Other’ in the newspapers combined accusations of
extremism and nationalism, Orientalized Crimean Tatars and framed them as invading
outsiders in order to present Crimea as a multicultural paradise: combined these things
and undermined Crimean Tatar claims to their rights as indigenous people. The element
of Crimean Tatar ‘nationalism’ were shared with the image of the Ukrainian ‘Other’,
although not as developed as in the case of Ukraine. The Orientalization is quite an
interesting example of a revival of 19th century Russian imperial mythology and its
application to early post-Soviet Crimea. Orientalization reinforced settler colonial
mythology and emphasized the cultural/racial line between Crimean settlers and
repatriates. It also partially supported a claim that Crimean Tatars were not actually local
to Crimea (whether because of the deportation, or because of the historical narratives)
and therefore, could only have a right to ‘mix into’ the Crimean mosaic, rather than
maintain a separate indigenous identity.

4.4

Conclusion: Post-truth? Has There Been Truth?

In their introduction to the collection on Indigenous theory Audra Simpson and Andrea
Smith mention a common indigenous criticism for the term postcolonial theory:
“Postcolonial? Have they left yet?”500 The criticism refers to the fact that most settler
colonies today remain colonized spaces, while the prefix ‘post-‘ in the ‘postcolonial’
suggests a turn into something new, and era after colonialism. While there also exist
explanations of the term in response to this criticism that justify the ‘post-‘, it is hardly
possible to escape the chronological meaning that embedded in it.
Having a similar approach in mind, there might be a need to criticize and reconsider
‘post’ in the term ‘post-truth’. The term exists as a characteristic of what is considered to
be a modern phenomenon of a digital era. It presumes that at some point – probably in
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2016 – there was an important turn that moved the humanity from the era of ‘truth’ into
something different. While for some people that might be the case, this approach seems
to be rather Western-centric. The history of imperialism and colonialism, especially in the
era of information has little to do with ‘truth’ and much more – with appeals to emotions,
informational manipulations, cultural stereotypes, empire’s control over the narrative. In
other words, Crimea has existed in ‘post-truth’ for over two centuries now, the digital era
only discovered a more modern methods to support it.
The lack of control over the informational sphere was one of the main reasons why
Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar political movements in Crimea were not able to effectively
start the decolonization process. Crimean settler colonial institutions inherited control
over media and instruments of propaganda since the Soviet times. They also inherited the
cultural and political discourse which had constructed national stereotypes about Crimean
Tatars and Ukrainians. The use of those stereotypes, their political instrumentalization
was one of the factors that enabled Crimean politicians to preserve the settler colonial
status quo in Crimea’s national relations.
The image of Crimea’s past, present and future, presented by the main Crimean
newspapers, existed within the Russian or at least Russo-centric cultural and political
discourse. It hardly depended on the personality of those who were in power at the
Crimea’s council of ministers or who held the majority in the Crimea’s supreme council,
as long as those politicians did not resist and even supported this discourse. Readers of
Krymskaia Pravda and Krymskaia Gazeta received regular signals that Crimea could not
survive (culturally, politically, economically, identically) without close integration or
incorporation into the Russian Federation. The instrumentalization of history by invoking
the settler’s myth suggested there had been no successful preliminary experience of
Crimea’s existence outside of ‘Russia.’ The economic hardships of the young post-Soviet
Ukrainian state, along with the increased crime rates on the peninsula, suggested that the
present experience outside of Russia was not successful as well. Therefore, Crimean
press (and various civic movements, including movements that were closely integrated
with the processes of post-Soviet Russian nation-building) played with the emotion of
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nostalgia and suggested Crimean residents to mobilize around the idea of the new Soviet
(Slavic) Union.
A threat of violent ‘nationalism’ – Ukrainian or Crimean Tatar reflected the desire of
colonizers to turn themselves into victims and mobilize public support in opposition to
the common enemy. By ascribing the term ‘nationalism’ to every instance of Ukrainians’
and Crimean Tatars’ fight for their national rights, local settler colonial institutions
employed the rhetoric of democracy and human rights to promote the settler colonial
agenda. Crimean ‘multinationalism’, in turn, was a combination of this democratic
rhetoric modeled after the Soviet idea of the ‘brotherhood of nations,’ where all nations
were ‘equal’ and led by the Russian culture, language and history.
Crimean newspapers performed a role of a yet another settler colonial institution in
Crimea, which ‘othered’ Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in similar ways. In both
instances the narrative suggested that neither Ukrainians, nor Crimean Tatars really
‘belonged’ in Crimea. Ukrainian activists were described as envoys of the Western
Ukrainian nationalists, who came to Crimean to assimilate the Russian-speaking
population. While Crimean Tatars were not recognized as indigenous and therefore were
treated as a group with unreasonable demands for preferential treatment in a space where
‘nobody could claim indigeneity’. In the case of Crimean Tatars their religion and culture
left some space for the colonizer to exoticize and Orientalize them. Eventually
newspapers described Crimean Tatar cultural events as historical records from the past,
and not a modern culture of the present day.
In sum, the control over the informational discourse allowed the settler colonial
institutions to normalize settler colonialism and prevent decolonization. It also allowed
Russian state and government to retain informal (but very open) control over the local
Crimean political and informational sphere. While Russian state effectively supported
and promoted this imperial discourse, the position of the Ukrainian government was
effectively static. Ukrainian governmental institutions were either bearers of the Russian
imperial discourse about Crimean Tatars or did not have enough resource (not just
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financial, but also analytical and intellectual) to meaningfully intervene and compete with
the ‘Othering’.
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Chapter 5

5

Where Is the Boundary Between Internal and
International?

“Using force to impose brotherly relations is the only method that has historically proven
its efficiency on the Ukrainian direction. I do not think that any other method will be
invented.”
Vladislav Surkov, former advisor to the president of Russia Vladimir Putin on Ukraine
(2013-2020).501
The struggle of settler colonial institutions in Crimea for preservation of their power and
fight against decolonization was as much a matter of international relations, as it was a
matter of internal Ukrainian affairs. This chapter will look at the role of Crimea in
Russian domestic politics, the international activities of the local Crimean authorities, as
well as political and cultural role of the Black Sea Fleet and its command structure.
Drawing on Homi Bhabha’s concepts of ambivalence and hybridity, it will argue that the
conflict over Crimea has always had a pronounced international dimension that was
enhanced by the hybridity of social and political processes in early post-Soviet years. In
the case of Crimea, local settler colonial institutions, as well as the Black Sea Fleet
existed in an ‘in-between space’ between Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, the
ambivalence of these imperial relations was instrumentalized and used by the (former)
imperial metropole in order to reinforce the imperial hierarchy. The early post-Soviet
years in Crimea were what Bhabha has called a ‘hybrid moment of political change’, a
period during the process of transformation when the object of change is not what it used
to be anymore, but not yet what it is going to become.502 In a post-Soviet Crimean
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context this was a period when informal contacts between various social and political
agents was often more important than their formal responsibilities.
Hybridity in the post-Soviet Crimean space is useful to describe the ‘moment of political
change’. It helps to illuminate the vacuum of legislation, statehood, loyalty, sovereignty
and identity that appeared in Crimea after the fall of the Soviet Union. Hybrid institutions
in the territory of Crimea often existed outside of the legal norms, or even contrary to the
legal norms of the state in which they existed. Moreover, the legal norms that were
supposed to regulate the presence of those institutions in Crimea often did not exist
themselves. Changes and decisions often relied on the late Soviet political traditions and
social understandings of ‘normality’ and authority, combined with a general perception of
chaos and an absence of legal norms. This often made those hybrid institutions an
extension of the Russian foreign policy within the body of a Ukrainian state. Finally, in
the context of Crimea, hybridity is a way to step away from binary understanding of this
space. The binary notion that politics is either domestic or international does not apply
here. Crimean politics – however local – are also always already international. Because
Crimean people and institutions are also deeply shaped by Ukraine/Russia/Crimean Tatar
concerns. And international interest in Crimea is not just about Crimea, it is also about
reinforcing and justifying myths of self (of Russian self or Ukrainian self or Crimean
Tatar self) that rely on particular ways of framing and relating to Crimea as a place and
political entity.
Scholars who addressed the issue of ‘Crimean separatism’ of 1990s have taken various
approaches in analyzing the topic. Some look at it as a center-periphery struggle between
Kyiv and Simferopol. Others look at Crimea as a borderland, a crossroad of Russian and
Ukrainian political cultures and systems.503 After the annexation of 2014 many analysts
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claimed they had predicted a future aggression, others took the conflict as completely
unexpected. The presence of Russia in these analysis is always known and assumed, but
hardly analyzed. What unites the existing scholarship on Crimea in 1990s is an
assumption that between 1991 and 2014 there had been a period of peace – absence of
conflict. That assumption presumes that Crimea was a center of potential instability, an
‘insurgent region’ that demanded higher status of autonomy due to its historical
connections to Russia and Russian-speaking population.
A mutual ‘desire’ of the Russian state and the Crimean autonomy to ‘reconciliate’,
therefore, is assumed to be something natural. This, in turn, triggers two more lines of
thought. One assumes that post-Soviet Ukraine generally is a state with “artificial”
borders (a statement popularized by Russian propaganda and some scholars). A second
line frames ‘Crimean separatism’ as an internal movement, fueled by the ‘oppressed’
Russian minorities, but only supported by some Russian politicians. This supposed
movement for Crimean separatism is often recognized as one of the main internal
challenges to the post-Soviet Ukrainian state. Contrary to those lines of thought, this
chapter will argue that ‘the internal conflict between Kyiv and Simferopol’ is another
political and diplomatic construct, created in order for Russia to wage a hybrid
intervention into Ukraine’s domestic politics.
This research demonstrates that the Russian settler colonial project is a conflict that never
stopped or paused, that there was no time of absence of conflict. The previous chapters
have already shown that the ‘conflict that did not happen’ approach does not quite fit into
the wider context of Crimean history. This chapter will further argue that while the
Crimean conflict had elements of domestic problem within the body of the post-Soviet
Ukrainian state, it was in fact a multifaceted international conflict that played out on
local, regional, military, national, and international stages. Firstly, settler colonization is
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international by definition because once it is made visible, it requires that one recognize
the existence of distinct sovereign entities (nations, in modern era), one of which is
invaded and “settled” by another. The fact that Crimea was annexed by the Russian
empire and later became part of the Soviet Union does not erase the existence of a
Crimean Tatar space/place/nation there, nor that it continues to exist under colonization.
Neither does a settler colony stops being a settler colony, unless the decolonization is
achieved. In a narrower sense, in the more immediate context of the 1990s, the Russian
state and Russian non-state agents influenced Crimea’s internal politics and identity
processes. Crimean ‘regionalism,’ or settler colonialism, was able to survive for two
major reasons. As discussed above, the local political elites and settler colonial
institutions fought for the preservation of the status quo. But in addition, the Crimean
settler colony received invaluable financial, ideological, informational, intellectual and
diplomatic help from what now (after the fall of the USSR) became a foreign entity – the
post-Soviet Russian state.
The post-Soviet Russian state served as an example for the local Crimean political
movement and settler colonial institutions. The boundary between the internal and
international struggle was thin and often transparent. Post-Soviet politics existed in the
sphere of unspoken rules or political traditions, inherited from the Soviet times, rather
than in the sphere of the formal law. In fact, at the time of the transformation many
actions were taken in a situation when the old political/legal norms or practices became
outdated and new ones had not yet been created. While Crimea appeared to exist within
the state sovereignty of the newly independent Ukraine, a lot of the institutional power
rested with the Russian political and military agents. Local Crimean branches of
government as well as institutions like the Black Sea Fleet coordinated their effort or
directly responded to the Russian state authorities contrary to the policies of the
Ukrainian government. Russian influence on the territory of Crimea could not be taken
for granted: it was institutionalized and maintained by both the settler colonial institutions
inside Crimea, external Russian political forces, and the Black Sea Fleet. However, until
1997 the Black Sea Fleet does not quite fit into the description of either Russian or local
Crimean forces. This chapter will look at the influence of the Black Sea Fleet, and will
argue that it operated as one of several “hybrid” institutions, that is, it combined both
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local Crimean settler elites and external Russian interests in its work to maintain Russian
settler colonialism in Crimea.

5.1
Not Fully Within, Not Fully Outside: Crimea and
Ukraine in Russian Political Debates and Diplomacy
The fall of the Soviet Union made the relations among the former Soviet state foreign in
form, but not in content. Different non-Russian post-Soviet republics took their
independence differently. Some countries oriented at the West immediately, some sought
a new integration with the Russian Federation, while others started a long history of
maneuvering between the West and Russia. In Ukraine the attitude towards Russia as a
foreign country to a large extent depended on political affiliation. While the anti-Soviet
(‘nationally-minded’) forces wanted to make Russia-Ukraine relationships truly foreign,
many groups within Ukraine (and many members of the post-Soviet government)
appeared within a political range between building an independent country separate from
Russia and having close friendly relationships with the former Soviet center. In Russia,
however, the relationships with Ukraine never appeared to be completely foreign. The
Russian parliament, first Supreme Council and then State Duma, had a separate
committee responsible for the legislation in the sphere of the Commonwealth of
Independent States that effected the Russian-speaking population outside of Russia.
Russian policy towards Ukraine and Crimea, made with “Russian speakers” in mind, was
an extension of Russian domestic politics and efforts to preserve its empire and recreate
Russian national identity after the USSR. Maintaining a strong influence in Crimea and
Ukraine was a general consensus among the Russian politicians, but the level of control
Russia ought to exert was a matter of debate.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian political elites were homogenous at that time. The debates
that are at the center of this analysis were often waged by politicians who were not
always responsible for making decisions. In addition, domestic political tensions in
Russia often influenced the tenor of their political statements. During his two presidential
terms, President Boris Yeltsin had a conflict with the legislative branch. Therefore, some
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of the Russian Parliament’s decisions about Ukraine and Crimea were directed at the
domestic Russian nationalist audience and were really part of its political struggle with
Yeltsin. However, the debates on Ukrainian and Crimean matters represented the political
climate and reflected the opinions of a certain number of citizens of the Russian
Federation. Even when some openly aggressive decisions by the Russian Parliament were
not fulfilled by the executive branch, they often pushed Yeltsin’s cabinet towards
accommodating nationalistic policies.
The possibility of a territorial conflict between Russia and Ukraine over the Crimean
Peninsula appeared right after Ukraine proclaimed its independence. A journalist Vitalii
Portnikov remembers his interview with the Ukrainian deputy prime-minister Kostyantyn
Masyk, who claimed that Boris Yeltsin consulted his military advisors regarding the
possibility of a nuclear strike against Ukraine in 1991.504 In October 1991, after the
proclamation of the independence of Ukraine, but before the referendum of December 1,
Vitalii Portnikov published an article describing the latest political developments between
Ukraine and Russia. In particular, he described tension between the vice-president of the
Russian SFSR Rutskoi and Ukraine’s prime-minister Fokin. Ukraine’s desire to maintain
international border and customs control with Russia (as opposed to border-free regime)
elicited responsive sanctions from the Russian government. For example, Russia
restricted a supply of paper to Ukraine. This eventually led to a shortage of paper for
Ukrainian newspapers right before the referendum on Ukraine’s independence, a problem
that potentially reduced the propaganda resources of the state prior to referendum.505 In
subsequent years Russian politicians often used resource blockades as a leverage during
the conflicts over cultural, political and ideological matters. Resource diplomacy (most
commonly referred to as ‘gas diplomacy’) has been an influential instrument for keeping
Ukraine within the Russian sphere of influence.
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The desire to maintain control over Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet was common among
different political groups within the Russian parliament, it united the government and
opposition. On January 9, 1992, for example, several MPs from the opposition deputy
group ‘Russia’ Sergey Baburin, Nikolai Pavlov and Valeriy Khairuzov addressed
President Yeltsin with an open letter.506 The letter demanded the preservation of the unity
of the Soviet armed forces on the territory of post-Soviet republics. The authors also
demanded denunciation of any bilateral agreements between Russia and Ukraine
regarding borders in return for Ukraine’s movement away from “Russia-Ukraine unity”.
In particular, this meant cancelling all acts and agreements of 1954 by which Crimea
became part of the Ukrainian SSR. The letter also suggested to allow any Ukrainian
regions to join Russia on region-by-region basis.507 The deputy group ‘Russia’ in the
Russian Supreme Council508 was a group of nationalists, who were in opposition to
President Yeltsin. The proposal that they made in the letter was almost identical to the
views expressed by Alexander Solzhenitsyn on the future Russian state-building (see
Chapter 2). On January 11, 1992 President Yeltsin himself said that “Nobody, including
[president of Ukraine] Kravchuk, will take the Black Sea Fleet away from Russia”.509 He
also stated that the fleet in Sevastopol was under his personal protection and ordered navy
officers to not pledge allegiance to Ukraine.
Early 1992 was still a time when the Russian authorities hoped to restore some form of
the Soviet Union under a different name. Therefore, a preservation of control over the
former Soviet military became a matter of fulfillment of this goal. Throughout January
1992 the newspaper of the Russian government Rossiiskaia Gazeta published materials
about the Black Sea Fleet almost every day. They often came along with the repetition of
the Russian historical myth of Crimea: Crimea had to belong to Russia, because Russian
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(Russkiye – ethno-national term) soldiers spilled their blood on that land.510 Due to the
existing myth (described in Chapter 4) the claims for Crimea and for the fleet were
interchangeable. Controlling the fleet meant controlling Crimea and vice versa. With an
aim to preserve a united armed forces (and within a political fashion of plebiscites) the
commander of the armed forces of the CIS general Shaposhnikov organized ‘All-Army
Congress’ that was broadcasted live on Channel 1 (and therefore watched by people all
over the post-Soviet area).511 The congress was meant to demonstrate that the army itself
(a structure that is created to fulfil orders without negotiation) wanted to remain unified.
In other words, Russian elites were trying to reduce the damage and restore control that
they lost after the fall of the USSR by using the institutions of power of the deceased
state.
As a result of this increased emotional tension around the issue of Crimea, on January 24,
1992 the Russian Supreme Council authorized its committees to analyze the legality of
the decrees of 1954 that transferred the peninsula to the Ukrainian SSR.512 Technically
this meant that the parliament of one of the former Soviet republics decided to amend
decisions made on the all-Soviet level. This eventually led to the decree of the Russian
Supreme Council, adopted on May 21, 1992 that proclaimed the necessity to “regulate
the question of Crimea through the interstate negotiations between Russia and
Ukraine”.513 The decree cancelled the decision of the presidium of the Soviet Supreme
Council that transferred Crimea from Russian to the Ukrainian Soviet republic in 1954.
The response of the Ukrainian parliament denied the juridical right of the Russian
authorities to cancel the decisions of the non-existing Soviet state institutions. Ukrainian
deputies also refused of any international negotiations regarding the state borders of the
country and accused the Russian parliament of interfering into Ukrainian internal politics
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(here one can see how the framing of Crimea as international or internal has been
historically politicized).514 On July 9, 1993 the Supreme Council of Russia adopted a
decree that recognized the Russian status of the city of Sevastopol. The decree did not
have any serious results, since even the Russian government opposed it: conflict between
the Russian legislative and executive state powers was underway. On July 19, 1993 the
Russian representative to the UN addressed the Secretary of the UN Security Council
with a letter issued by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.515 The letter expressed
disapproval of the decree, adopted by the Russian parliament. The Russian government
expressed that its goal was to adhere to the international law and Ukraine’s sovereignty
over Crimea. However, the same letter included a sentence that characterized as
‘negative’ the “consequences of the administrative decisions by the leadership of the
former USSR regarding the territorial question.”516 This demonstrates that although the
Russian leadership refused to use force to solve the problem of Crimea, they still saw
Crimea as a territory that Russia had a right for, if not legally, then morally.
An idea of what kind of information Russian politicians received from policy experts of
the Russian Academy of Science comes from a secret policy document, published by the
Kyiv newspaper Vechirniy Kyiv in June 1992.517 The editorial board claimed they
obtained the original copy of the secret document that was accessible to only a narrow
circle of Russia’s highest ranking politicians.518 The document presented Russia and
Ukraine as countries that went opposite directions in their development: while Russia was
opening itself to the market economy and building democracy, Ukrainian political elites
were creating a “mild national-fundamentalist” regime.519 Therefore, experts predicted no
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good relationships between the two states in the near future. The desire of the Ukrainian
elites to build a separate economy, maintain customs control on the borders, create
separate armed forces etc. constituted ‘unfriendly actions’ in the eyes of the Russian
experts and Russian politicians.520 Meanwhile, the anti-Russian statements made in the
Ukrainian informational sphere supported these experts’ arguments. The report
acknowledged that anti-Russian rhetoric in Ukraine was often responsive, as it appeared
as a reaction to “the firm statements of Russian officials”. This, however, did not reject
the statement about ‘anti-Russian-ness’ of the Ukrainian state, since experts were sure
that “the [anti-Russian informational] campaign would still go own, even if there were no
such statements” from the Russian representatives.521
Much like in other historical examples of relationships between the imperial center and
its peripheries, this report demonstrates the lack of knowledge of empire about its
subjects. The postcolonial theory often describes how empires operate with stereotypical
knowledge about their subjects. This knowledge is originally created to control, however,
once it becomes dominant, it starts to provide the colonizer with a distorted knowledge
about the colonized. This report is an example of what Homi Bhabha calls ‘cultural
translation’.522 It is an interpretation of the local Ukrainian politics and practices through
the Russian cultural symbols. This report resembles the attitude of the Russian political
elites towards Ukraine and Ukrainian nationalists, mentioned by Vitalii Portnikov above.
It repeats the stereotypical knowledge about Ukraine that originated in the Soviet times.
The experts that created it had an obvious tendency to exaggerate Ukraine’s antiRussianness and diminish Russian anti-Ukrainian-ness. Based on the policies that the
report defines as anti-Russian, there was hardly anything that an independent Ukraine
could do to not be characterized as an unfriendly state. Russian politicians, who made
anti-Ukrainian statements, according to this report, were not influential on the general
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political stage. On the other hand, Ukraine’s far-right organizations were presented as
forces that formulated the agenda in Ukrainian politics. 523
With the available sources there is no way to check whether the policy recommendations
of this report turned into an actual Russian policy towards Ukraine. However, the history
of those relations suggests an indirect evidence that the Russian political authorities and
diplomats either listened to the experts or held very similar policy ideas on their minds.
While they understood direct military conflict with Ukraine as the least favorable option,
a combination of diplomatic appeasement and pressure was the approach that Russian
diplomats were advised to take.524 The report described this approach as “active friendly
ignoration” (aktivnoe druzhestvennoe ignorirovanie) of the Ukrainian counter-agents.
Russian political discourse was to get rid of the anti-Ukrainian statements completely and
publicly demonstrate its openness and democratization to the rest of the world. On the
other hand, the diplomatic approach behind the closed doors was supposed to be firm and
even harsh. The report advised Russian diplomats to use the available diplomatic means
in order to limit the Ukraine’s economic growth and independence from Russia. The
international community had to become an arbiter of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Therefore, Russian diplomats were supposed to emphasize the autocratic nature of the
Ukrainian state and draw foreign attention to the most radical anti-Russian statements of
Ukrainian political agents. This would eventually tie Ukraine to Russia politically. In
addition, Russian economy would receive a larger portion of the Western investment and
help that was directed into the post-Soviet region. Finally, the report emphasized the
importance of public diplomacy, unofficial contacts and non-governmental organizations,
which would alter Ukraine’s political positions from inside. In other words, the ‘active
friendly ignoration’ was a recommendation to build a façade of friendliness towards
Ukraine and to press on it diplomatically behind the closed doors. Eventually, a
Ukrainian public response to pressure had to be used against Ukraine and contrasted with
a façade of friendliness.
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In May 1992, the newspaper Literaturna Ukraina published another report, created by
Russian experts from the Russian Science Foundation (Rossiiskii Nauchny Fond). The
report appeared as a result of a research trip to Crimea and interviews with the deputies of
the Crimean Supreme Council, as well as journalists and civic activists.525 The text again
included a description of the state of affairs in Crimea and recommendation part that
suggested policies for the Russian government. According to the authors, the economic
hardships in Ukraine, policies of ‘Ukrainization’ and repatriation of Crimean Tatars to
Crimea provoked a rise of a popular anti-Ukrainian movement within Crimea. The
repatriation, by the way, was characterized as a policy of the Ukrainian authorities that
was supposed to “change the ethno-political situation in Crimea.” In other words, the
Ukrainian government was indirectly accused of implementing colonial policies in
Crimea. Which means that narrative turned decolonization into colonialism. The report
also acknowledged that the decolonization movements in Crimea threatened the existing
status quo on the peninsula. The report called for a “balanced solution” of the Crimean
Tatar problem, not specifying what it meant, but based on the debate one would assume
that ‘balanced’ meant a situation where Russian retained influence on the peninsula. As
was shown in Chapters 2 and 3 the internal Crimean debate often had similar voices
calling for ‘reasonable’ approaches towards repatriation. This further suggests the
existence of a shared political and informational space between the Russian political
circles and Crimean political elites. In this case Russian experts mirror the settler colonial
discourse of Crimea itself, and apparently support the preservation of that discourse by
appealing to the Russian politicians with recommendations. The report emphasized the
importance of Crimea and its ports in the Russian foreign trade. Russia could not afford
to lose its ports. Therefore, the recommendation was to integrate Ukraine into the
structures of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). And in case Ukrainian
government refused to integrate, the text proposed Crimea’s ‘self-determination’ as a
possible solution of the problem. 526 In any case, the Russian government had to maintain
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control over Crimea not just for the sake of the Russian national myth, but also for
economic reasons.
Presenting the conflict between the Ukrainian center and Crimea as an internal problem
of Ukraine, rather than a territorial conflict with Russia, was one of the key
recommendations of the experts. Further events revealed that not only was this approach
taken by the Russian government, it became the basis for the dominant interpretation of
the Crimea problem. This interpretation appears in historiography, political analysis and
public opinion to this day. Presenting the conflict as internal to Ukraine removed
potential accusations of Russia’s interference. It allowed Russian to continue its hybrid
intervention in Ukraine’s domestic politics. It was hybrid in the sense that by framing
Crimea as an “internal” Ukrainian problem, Russia could enter as the “champion” of the
downtrodden Crimeans who were being victimized by nationalistic Ukrainians, even as
Russians retold Crimean history as a Ukrainian colonial plot. Statement about the internal
character of the conflict in Ukraine was a politically and informationally constructed
narrative. Throughout the post-Soviet years Russian diplomats managed to create a
façade of Russia’s non-presence in the domestic politics of other countries, while in fact
such presence was often very influential. This approach provided multiple benefits:
Russia preserved an image of a democratizing state and preserved good diplomatic
relationships with the West, while it continued dominating in the post-Soviet region.
Russian state, diplomacy and experts claimed to have an exclusive knowledge about the
region, which allowed them to be invisibly present in Western diplomatic relations with
post-Soviet republics. The discourse of ‘oxymoron space’ (mentioned in previous
chapters) allowed Russia to implement the word ‘self-determination’ in order to send a
clear message as to what kind of subversive operations were to be used if the Ukrainian
government decided to radically break with the CIS.527
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After the constitutional crisis that happened in Moscow in late September of 1993, the
new constitution of Russia abolished the Supreme Council and established a twochamber parliament. The new State Duma (lower house) was elected in December of the
same year. The deputies played an active diplomatic and political role in supporting the
morale of the pro-Russian movement in Crimea. They demanded that Yeltsin’s
government act more decisively in solving the problem of the Black Sea Fleet and the
status of Crimea. One of the major demands was to connect the issue of the status of
Crimea within Ukraine to the Russia-Ukraine Treaty on Friendship that had been
prepared by diplomats of the two countries for several years and was signed in 1997.
While Russian executives often repeated that Crimea was an internal problem of Ukraine,
Russian MPs attempted to make it an internal problem of Russia. What all sides agreed
on was the necessity to preserve Russian military power on the territory of Sevastopol in
form of the Black Sea Fleet.
Crimean internal political process had a constant oversight from the Russian state
institutions. For example, on January 21st, 1994 the seating records indicate a short
interaction between the head of the CIS committee Konstantin Zatulin and deputy
minister for Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov.528 The question by Zatulin expressed
concerns over the future presidential elections in Crimea, a possibility of their
cancellation by the Ukrainian parliament and possible conflict that could rise around
this.529 The second round of presidential elections in Crimea took place on January 30th,
1994. According to Zatulin, that was a day when the Russian Parliament was on a break
and could not react, if the Ukrainian parliament decided to cancel the elections. This
suggests that Zatulin saw a possibility and necessity of such reaction in relation to the
political process inside a different state. The deputy requested the Russian Foreign
Ministry to make sure that the elections in Crimea take place. Therefore that internal
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‘center-periphery’ struggle between Kyiv and Simferopol was accompanied by a
diplomatic and political pressure from Russia. During the further meetings of the Duma
Konstantin Zatulin, as well as the faction of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia530
was one of the major initiators of any discussion of Crimea.
Russian MPs visited Crimea regularly, met with the Black Sea Fleet command, proRussian civic organizations and politicians of different kinds. Their moral and financial
support contributed to the organization of the pro-Russian movement in Crimea. Until the
elections of the Crimean President and Supreme Council in 1995, the command of the
Black Sea Fleet seemed to be the main outpost of the Russian influence on the peninsula.
Therefore, the election of Meshkov as the President of Crimea looked like a result of
coordination between the Russian MPs, local pro-Russian movements and the Black Sea
Fleet command. The fleet itself went into a state of high alert, preparing for a possible
intervention of Ukrainian nationalists into Crimea.531 Even at times when the Russian
president switched from liberal democracy towards neoconservatism, Crimean proRussian movement seemed to be more conservative than the Russian government. In
addition, a number of domestic problems with the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation itself, restrained Yeltsin’s ability to begin an open interference in Crimea.
Instead, the Russian government switched to the tactics of soft influence, which delayed
the final solution of the Crimea question until more favorable domestic and international
conditions come. In other words, Yeltsin’s government seemed to adopt the tactics of
‘active friendly ignoration’ as advised by the expert community.
The question of Crimea, Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet was a matter of internal
politics for Russian MPs and the government. Crimea remained a point of criticism
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against the executive power in Russia, especially in the context of Yeltsin’s constant fight
with the legislative branch for power. On March 17, 1995 Konstantin Zatulin protested
the intervention of the Ukrainian government into the political crisis in Crimea.
According to Zatulin, the reason why the Ukrainian center acted decisively and abolished
the position of the Crimean President was the fact that Russia got militarily engaged in
Chechnya. Zatulin demanded that the government of Yeltsin withdraw from all
negotiations with Ukraine and introduce economic restrictions against Ukraine as a
retaliation to an attack at the Crimean autonomy.532 For the Russian nationalist thought
Crimea remained an important factor of restoration of the ‘great’ Russian state, that had
allegedly been lost with the fall of the USSR. Russian nationalistic forces successfully
instrumentalized a question of Crimea as a point of Criticism against the Russian
president. They organized visits of famous Crimean activists to speak to the Russian
Duma. For example, April 14, 1995 the chairman of the Crimean Supreme Council
Sergey Tsekov spoke to the Russian Duma. He criticized the Russian executive
government for its passiveness regarding the support of Crimea. He also asked the
Russian MPs for help and claimed that “…a disrespect expressed towards Crimea, in my
opinion, is first of all a disrespect towards Russia.” He further claimed that Crimea
should not be a matter of a foreign politics for Russia:
“It should not be that for Russia the situation with Crimea is solely an internal
problem of Ukraine, from the point of view of history, national composition
and international law”.533
The ‘disrespect towards Crimea, according to Tsekov, was an interference of the
Ukrainian central government into the political crisis between the Crimean president and
Supreme Council, a demand of the central authority to the autonomous republic to adhere
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to the state legislation. For Tsekov and those Russian MPs who invited him into the
Duma, however, this was not a matter of the Ukraine’s domestic politics, but an open
challenge to Russia. Furthermore, on November 6, 1995 a representative of a so-called
Rossiiskaya Obshina Sevastopolia (Russian Community of Sevastopol) Raisa
Teliatnikova addressed the Russian Duma, asking for help and support. Teliatnikova
complained about the restrictive measures that the Ukrainian authorities imposed against
the Russian community. According to Teliatnikova, “We deny accusations of appeals
towards violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. As of today, all juridical base
confirms the Russian status of Sevastopol.”534
Both appeals – of Tsekov and of Teliatnikova – were based on the Russian nationalistic
understanding of the state honor, glory, and pride. According to those views, Crimea was
an external part of Russia and therefore, Russian state had responsibility (not just the
right) to interfere into its matters. This Russian nationalistic thought aligned closely with
the world traditions of imperialism. The very notion of responsibility of the metropole
over its colonies resembles classic imperialist views according to which the metropole
plays the role of the parent, while colonies are the children. Teliatnikova’s denial of the
accusation of undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity fits within this discourse of
familial connection between the Russia and Crimea. In a common discourse of
international relations, advocating for secession of the city from one state to another
without consent constitutes undermining the territorial integrity. In an imperial discourse,
where colonies are children of the metropole, the secession of that city would constitute
reunification, or restoration of children into their family. The imperial discourse is of
course the one that formulates the alternative reality of social and political order. That
exact discourse came into force with the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.
The history of Russian settler colonialism in Crimea created a powerful cultural and
historical myth to justify itself. That myth influenced not just the population of Crimea, it
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also influenced Russia itself, making the Russian nationalistic discourse and the problem
of Russian national identity a hostage of the settler colonial myth about Crimea. This
made the problem of Crimea a powerful political instrument in Russian domestic political
struggles. As a result, no matter their political affiliation, all participants of the Russian
political chessboard were discursively required to fight for the preservation of the
Russian influence in Crimea or be branded as traitors to Russia. The debate, therefore,
was not whether to intervene in Crimea, but about the amount of resources that each party
was ready to dedicate to the intervention.

5.2

Hybridity of Crimean Settler Colonial Institutions

Crimea’s hybridity, as an in-between space between Ukraine and Russia, was not just an
instrument that helped manipulate public opinion, but also a space of maneuver for the
Crimean politicians. It was also a way for Russian diplomacy and politics to open ‘a
second diplomatic front’ within the Ukrainian delegations that participated in various
negotiations. There were two types of hybrid institutions in Crimea: those that were
formally Ukrainian local branches of government, located in Crimea; and those that were
nominally international, but de facto Russian, Black Sea Fleet that conducted
informational and military operations in the territory of Ukraine. The Russian
government had close relationships and influence over both types of institutions and went
to an extensive effort to help local Crimean authorities preserve their agency in
relationships with the central Ukrainian government. Due to the amount of discursive
(cultural), political and military influence that Russian state had over the Crimean
institutions of power and social processes, the Crimea question was a low-key
international conflict throughout the post-Soviet history of Russia-Ukraine relations. The
hybridity of Crimean state institutions were an important component of that conflict.
During the period of time (1991-1994), when Mykola Bahrov was the chairman of the
Crimean Supreme Council, his efforts were mostly aimed at the preservation of a settler
colonial status quo in Crimea, as discussed in Chapter 3. This included a support for the
domination of the Russian cultural, historical and informational discourse in Crimea, as
well as strengthening of the autonomous status of the peninsula within Ukraine. The
absence of any immediate and decisive actions aimed at the secession of Crimea from
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Ukraine to Russia allowed Bahrov to present himself as a fighter for Ukraine’s territorial
integrity in 1997. On the other hand, Mykola Bahrov did not oppose the development of
the pro-Russian nationalist movement in Crimea. Moreover, during and after the Crimean
Presidential elections in 1994 Mykola Bahrov advocated for closer economic and
political ties with Russia, and supported Meshkov’s appointment of Yevgeniy Saburov as
a Deputy Prime Minister of Crimea.535 Bahrov’s political style made his political
orientations and hybridity very subtle and enabled him to maneuver between an
appearance of pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian orientation.
The stronghold of the pro-Russian movement until 1994 in Crimea was of course the
Black Sea Fleet and its command. Over the course of 1992-1993 Ukrainian and Russian
presidents met 5 times to discuss issued regarding the future of the Black Sea Fleet.
Those meetings were an attempts to mediate conflicts between the militaries of two states
that were happening in Sevastopol and all over Crimea. This was when Ukrainian officers
actively pulled the fleet to the Ukraine’s side and the fleet command resisted with harsh
pressure against them. During the first two meetings in Odesa and Dahomys on April 30
and June 23, 1992 both sides have agreed to refrain from one-sided actions regarding the
separation of the Black Sea Fleet property. The later agreement in Dahomys also allowed
servicemen to pledge allegiance to the state of their choice and not be pressured for that.
During the meeting in Yalta on August 3, 1992 Yeltsin and Kravchuk agreed to put the
fleet under joint command of two states (as opposed to the command of the CIS) and
introduced a ‘transitory period’ until 1995. This meant that both sides agreed to continue
negotiations for the next 3 years. Upon an intermediary meeting in Moscow on June 17,
1993, where both sides agreed to speed up the negotiations, Yeltsin and Kravchuk met
again in Masandra (Crimea) on September 3, 1993. The Masandra agreement put the
majority of the fleet under the Russian control. President Yeltsin proposed to buy the
Ukraine’s part of the fleet by writing off the Ukraine’s state debt. The final agreement
that separated the fleet, however, did not come until 1997.
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According to the agreements made by two presidents, the fleet was supposed to receive
conscripts from Ukraine and Russia in equal proportions. Moreover, both countries were
supposed to finance the fleet equally and appoint a commander of the fleet jointly.
Throughout the years of negotiations, from 1992 to 1997, the positions of the Russian
diplomacy in the question of the preservation of the fleet went from high risks of
completely losing the military presence in Sevastopol, to getting a majority (around 80%)
of the fleet’s property and an extremely low cost of rent of the military base. The factors
that contributed to such enormous success were: cooperation of the fleet command that
de facto was under full Russian control, cooperation of the local authorities in
Sevastopol, economic hardships of Ukraine, and the Russian diplomatic style that
delayed the final agreement for as long as it was necessary to get a preferable result, and
the ability of the Russian diplomats to influence the composition of the delegation across
the negotiating table.
Contrary to the agreements between two presidents, the fleet personnel did not have a
right to choose the country and the allegiance. The emergence of an active Ukrainian
movement to control the Black Sea Fleet caused resistance from the fleet command. The
question of allegiance of the fleet officers became a matter of competition and
propaganda. Both sides tried to persuade the majority of the personnel that their choice
would guarantee a more preferable future for the fleet and for the serviceman personally.
In this competition, the fleet command had an administrative power to remove officers
from their positions. Therefore, officers, who pledged allegiance to Ukraine were being
dismissed under various reasons. President Yeltsin personally participated in this
competition for the mind of the personnel. In January 1992, a group of ships left
Sevastopol for Novorossiysk (Russia) where President Yeltsin secretly visited the
antisubmarine cruiser ship ‘Moskva’. This visit was meant to support the morale of the
servicemen and assure then that the Russian state would fight for control over the fleet.536
What this story of negotiations and competition demonstrates is a diplomatic approach of
Russia towards the problem of the fleet and relations with Ukraine. Russian diplomats
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were able to twist the narrative and to buy the Russian side some time. The demand to
‘refrain from one-sided actions’ was almost exclusively applied to Ukraine and its
officers. While the final decision was not being made, Russian command was clearing the
fleet personnel off of the pro-Ukrainian officers, who pledged allegiance to Ukraine.
Eventually, this created a situation in which not having a final agreement on the fleet
meant that Ukraine would have no fleet, since it would not have active navy officers to
serve in it. The fleet technically was supposed to hold neutrality in a conflict between the
two states, Crimean state institutions were supposed to defend the Ukraine’s interest. But
the former and the latter took an active pro-Russian stance. The psychological,
informational, economic and political pressure organized by the fleet command and local
Crimean state institutions constituted one-sided actions that were forbidden by the
agreements of two presidents. But they have never been described as such in the press,
since the press performed a function of a settler colonial institution that defended the proRussian status quo. Quite the contrary, it was Ukraine and its officers who were
constantly being accused of aggression.
The hybridity of the Black Sea Fleet and its command allowed Admiral Kasatonov (later
– Admiral Baltin) to support the local pro-Russian movement in Sevastopol without
being identified as an ”outside” Russian influencer. Mykola Savchenko mentions how a
group of fleet servicemen ‘went for a walk’ in downtown Sevastopol during one of the
public demonstrations by the Respublikanskoe Dvizhenie Kryma (‘Republican Movement
of Crimea’, the main pro-Russian organization of Crimea at that time).537 This pretense of
an “innocent” walk in fact increased visually the number of people participating in the
protest. Such walk (as they are always consist of an officer in charge of a group of lowerrank servicemen, sailors or cadets) was meant to influence the servicemen as well. A
fight for the hearts and mind of the personnel was an important component of the fight
for the fleet. Therefore, it was important that fleet servicemen hear cheering of support
from the pro-Russian activists. According to Savchenko,
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“Under the command from the press-center [of the Black Sea Fleet] a group of
[pro-Russian] yelling women of retired age could organize a protest at any
moment in any necessary place…”.538

Those small rallies of active pro-Russian women of a retired age became a constant
instrument of political struggle throughout 1990s and well into 2000s. One of the proUkrainian activists in Sevastopol at the time, Mykola Vladzimirski remembers that those
small rallies of pro-Russian activists accompanied every pro-Ukrainian event in
Sevastopol. He further points out that the newspapers always made it sound like those
rallies were numerous. In particular, Vladzimirski emphasizes that newspapers never
published general pictures of the crowd, but only specific people with specific slogans.539
The general analysis of Crimean newspapers between 1990 and 1997 confirms this
statement by Vladzimirski; newspapers indeed often covered pro-Russian protests in
Sevastopol, but they rarely mentioned the number of participants or showed pictures of
the crowd. Vladzimirski further points out that using local activists to force the Ukrainian
government to make a necessary decision in Russian and fleet’s favor was a constant
routine, practiced in Sevastopol and Crimea.540
Memories of Ukrainian navy personnel allow to draw conclusions about the existing
coordination between the pro-Russian civic movement in Sevastopol and the command of
the Black Sea Fleet. Anatoliy Danilov quotes recollections of Admiral Kozhyn, who
described his first day as a commander of the Ukrainian Fleet. According to Kozhyn, that
day in April 1992 he came to the office of Admiral Kasatonov, but was unable to speak to
him. Admiral Kasatonov was having a meeting with all commanders of the fleet
formations as well as with several heads of pro-Russian civic organizations in the city.
The meeting, according to admiral Kozhyn, was dedicated to coordination of actions
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aimed at resistance to ‘Ukrainization of the fleet’.541 The level of organizational support
that the fleet gave to Russian nationalist organizations often kept those organizations
alive. In addition to that, as claimed by Savchenko, Admiral Kasatonov had direct
relationships with Russian MPs. One of those MPs a leading member of Russian
nationalist forces in the Duma Sergey Baburin.542 The emergence of the active proRussian movement in Sevastopol coincided in time with the emergence of the initiative
of Ukrainian officers to create Ukrainian navy. In addition, those events coincided in time
with active initiatives by the Russian MPs that aimed to cancel the document of 1954 that
transferred Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR.
The position of the fleet commander gave Kasatonov enormous political influence within
Sevastopol and even outside of it. Kasatonov often made political statement and took a
clear public stance on political conflicts between Russia and Ukraine.543 The commander
used force against Ukrainian officers whenever he felt necessary. For example, on April
7, 1992 Admiral Kasatonov deployed 4 armored vehicles and 2 armed platoons from the
361st Yevpatoria regiment of the 126th division of the coastal guard to the settlement
Novoozerne, where a Crimean Navy Base had planned to pledge allegiance to Ukraine.544
In August 1992 when the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense took control over the military
school in Sevastopol, Admiral Kasatonov deployed marines to seize the school and place
it under the fleet’s control.545 The military school was not an institution within the Black
Sea Fleet and therefore it was outside of Kasatonov’s jurisdiction. However, the
commander overstepped his responsibilities, knowing that he commanded the largest
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military force on the territory of Crimea. Admiral Kasatonov denied his responsibility to
follow orders from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, and openly acted against the
newly created Ukrainian navy forces. Furthermore, Mykola Savchenko claims that the
control over the construction departments of the fleet allowed Kasatonov to control the
distribution of housing among the fleet personnel. Savchenko says that the construction
departments were financed by Ukraine and therefore built housing with the Ukrainian
money. But it was Kasatonov who had the power to distribute housing, which was why
Ukrainian officers did not get it.546
The position of the local authorities in Sevastopol aligned with that of the Black Sea Fleet
command. Unlike Admiral Kasatonov, who was supposed to be neutral, Sevastopol
municipal authorities were supposed to act within the sovereignty of Ukrainian state.
However, they too appeared in a hybrid space, often acting as Russian agents of influence
within the diplomatic delegations of Ukraine. The chair of the Sevastopol municipal
council Viktor Semenov as well as other representatives of the municipal government
went to an extensive effort in order to ‘represent’ the interests of Sevastopol during the
Ukraine-Russia negotiations about the fate of the Black Sea Fleet. In June 1993 Viktor
Semenov even conducted his own trip to Moscow to conduct negotiations with President
Yeltsin regarding the possibility of Russian financial support of Sevastopol.547 As
representative of the municipal authorities, Semenov was in no position of conduction
negotiations with foreign governments. The meeting between a chair of municipal
council and a president could hardly fit diplomatic protocols, considering the difference
in status of two negotiators. However, Slava Sevastopolia described that visit as if the
city of Sevastopol was not a part of the Ukrainian state, but an independent entity.
The position of the Crimean settler colonial institutions, both local state authorities and
the fleet, between the two states is a reflection of Homi Bhabha’s description of colonial
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hybridity. Bhabha uses this term to describe a process of translation that happens between
cultures of the colonizer and the colonized during colonization. A result of this translation
is creation of an in-between space that influences identity and culture. Being in that
hybrid space means being in two places at once – not quite in the place of the colonizer,
but also not in a place of a colonized. In a completely new hybrid space, which is still a
product of colonialism, “the presence of colonialist authority is no longer immediately
visible.”548 Colonization stops being so obvious. In the case of Crimea hybridity of local
settler colonial institutions means that same subtle in-between space. Their hybridity is an
instrument of preserving the domination after the formal disintegration of the empire. It is
a way to rely on informal connections, hierarchies and institutional subordination of a
state that did not exist anymore. In addition, hybridity is a way for the Russian political
agents to interfere while pretending that there is no such interference, that the agency lies
purely with the local Crimean institutions. And at the same time it is a way for the
Russian agents to claim that their presence in Crimea is not an interference. Soviet Union
did not exist, but the rules it established and structures of governance, as well as logic of
governance persisted into the post-Soviet times. This allowed the fleet command to take
an active side in a political debate. This also allowed the municipal authorities to overstep
their power and conduct negotiations with a foreign state.
The hybridity of Semenov’s political position could be illustrated by a quote from a
press-conference that took place in July 1993. When asked about his attitude towards the
claims of the Russian parliament to take control over the city of Sevastopol the chairman
of the Sevastopol municipal council said: “This is an extremely complicated question.
But we live in Ukraine, according to the laws of Ukraine. From these positions we should
evaluate the decision of the Russian parliament as interference into [Ukraine’s] internal
affairs. However, there are some juridical problems here [emphasis is mine].”549 The last
sentence of this response turns a reaction of the Ukrainian municipal official into a
reaction of a representative of a hybrid institution. On the one hand, Semenov defends the
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official positions of the Ukrainian government. However, when he invokes the “juridical
problems,” he referenced the arguments of Russian politicians who argued that
Sevastopol was not part of the decree of 1954 that transferred Crimea to Ukraine, and
therefore, Sevastopol legally remained a part of Russian SFSR after 1954.
When Russia and Ukraine started negotiations regarding the Black Sea Fleet, pro-Russian
activists in Crimea as well as Crimean state institutions launched an informational
campaign with a demand to ‘listen to the voice of Crimeans’ during the negotiations. In
January, 1992 Mykola Bahrov personally addressed Kravchuk asking him to refrain from
any serious moves regarding the Black Sea Fleet.550 That was when Ukrainian officers
and activists in Sevastopol required and demanded support from the Ukrainian state. The
voice that Ukrainian and Russian authorities had to listen to was a pro-Russian voice that
demanded the preservation of the unity of the Black Sea Fleet. The fleet itself had to
remain under Russian control. ‘The public’ also demanded that representatives of
Sevastopol and Crimea had to be present during the negotiations about the fleet. This
created domestic pressure within Ukraine that obviously weakened its positions during
the negotiations with Russia. The fleet, civic organizations related to it and local
authorities acted as a subversive force within Ukraine that acted in the interests of the
opponent.
The municipal authorities of Sevastopol, by means of the local newspaper, presented
themselves as a ‘third party’ of negotiations regarding the fleet and argued that ‘the voice
of Sevastopol’ had to be taken into consideration while the final decision on the fleet was
made.551 The position of the municipal authorities of Sevastopol regarding the unity of
the Black Sea Fleet corresponded to the position of the Russian delegation. Yet Viktor
Semenov, although pro-Russian, was part of the Ukrainian, not Russian, delegation. In
another instance, in response to the criticism from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense,
representatives of the Black Sea Fleet proposed to consult the Sevastopol municipal
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council and the Supreme Council of Crimea as to the legitimacy of the fleet’s actions.552
The majority of the municipal council of Sevastopol openly supported the idea of keeping
the Black Sea Fleet within a single structure and not divide it between Russia and
Ukraine.553 During the seating of the municipal council of Sevastopol, deputies often
spoke in favor of Russian control over the whole fleet, and supported messages that were
distributed by the Russian command: the fleet was loyal to Russia, Ukraine had no
money to own fleet, division of the fleet would destroy it, residents of Sevastopol would
lose economic stability.554 Moreover, representatives of the fleet command even took part
in the council meetings and participated in discussions on the social situation in the
city.555 The ability of the Black Sea Fleet to appeal to opinion of the local Crimean
institutions demonstrated an ambivalence of the whole situation: the fleet technically was
an ‘outer’ force that did not have a right to interfere into the domestic politics of Ukraine.
But the existence of local Crimean state institutions made the diplomatic position of
Ukraine itself internally split. This is how the fleet command was able to appeal to the
opinion of local Crimean politicians in order to resist Ukraine’s government. And in that
political struggle between the fleet and the Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, Russia was not
even officially present in the conflict.
In order to weaken the Ukraine’s diplomatic position at the negotiation table, the
municipal council of Sevastopol decided to further reinforce an argument about the
public endorsement of the unity of the fleet. During the meeting of the council on July 28,
1993 the majority of the deputies adopted a decree which proclaimed a plan to conduct an
opinion poll among residents of Sevastopol on the status of the city and the fleet.556 The
poll was supposed to be organized on September 26, 1993, simultaneously with an allUkrainian referendum of no confidence to the Parliament and the President. The
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referendum, however, was cancelled by the Parliament’s decree.557 Therefore, the poll on
the status of Sevastopol happened on June 26, 1994, together with the municipal elections
in Sevastopol and presidential elections in Ukraine. Its results showed that 89% of the
turnout voted in favor of making Sevastopol a main base of the united Black Sea Fleet of
the Russian Federation.558 The framing of the question offered a single option for the
status of Sevastopol. This question, meanwhile, was formulated by members of the
municipal council, which operated under the Ukrainian jurisdiction. The results of the
poll were later used during various Russia-Ukraine negotiations as an argument for the
Russian presence in the city. They confirmed a popular belief that there was a link
between the interests of the Russian fleet and the interests of Sevastopol residents. The
official turnout for the poll was around 187,714 people, which at that time constituted
~52% of the population of the city.559 It is hard to argue about the real reasons for the
opinion poll to be organized. However, the results of the poll turned out to be very
helpful for the Russian diplomats.
The cooperation between the fleet command and the municipal council was not out of the
ordinary for Sevastopol. The Black Sea Fleet owned enormous amounts of land and
infrastructure within and outside of the city of Sevastopol. It is not the coordination and
relationships themselves, but the form which they took is of interest. And after the fall of
the Soviet Union and the emergence of the problem of the status of the fleet, those
relations became a breach between the state and juridical boundaries of Ukraine and
Russia. The more it became clear that the Ukrainian fleet forces would emerge in
Sevastopol, contrary to the desire of the Russian side, the more Russian fleet command
attempted to reduce the Ukrainian military presence in the city. In 1995, for example, the
newspapers of Crimea reported on a conflict that emerged around the deployment of the
Ukrainian fleet to the Balaklava bay. According to the agreements, the military bases in
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Balaklava bay had to be transferred from the Russian Black Sea Fleet to the Ukrainian
fleet. The Russian fleet command, however, decided to transfer the territory of the base to
the municipal authorities of Sevastopol. The article by 1st rank captain Vladimir Pasiakin,
published in Krymskaya Gazeta on January 20th 1995 warned the readers about a possible
“capture of Balaklava” (by Ukrainian fleet) and argued that a transfer of the base to the
authorities of Sevastopol meant transferring it to Ukraine.560
This example once again demonstrates a hybridity in which the Black Sea Fleet and the
municipal authorities in Sevastopol operated at that time. The parts of the Black Sea Fleet
that were located in Crimea based on Ukrainian land. Therefore, technically it was not a
jurisdiction of the fleet to decide how Ukraine was supposed to control this land. From
the official point of view a military institution of a foreign state transferred a piece of
property to the local authorities, under the Ukrainian sovereignty and jurisdiction. In fact,
the fleet transferred the base into a jurisdiction of civilian authorities who had
questionable loyalty to the Ukrainian state. By doing so they deprived the Ukrainian side
of authority over its own property and land. From a formal point of view, the presence of
a Ukrainian military base on that territory would become a matter of internal Ukrainian
negotiations between the ministry of defense of Ukraine and the Sevastopol municipal
council – a matter of domestic, rather than an international conflict. This would delay or
even remove a possibility of a Ukrainian military control over the Balaklava base, this
would also put Russia outside of the conflict.
Another military component of influence of the Black Sea Fleet was its intelligence.
Mykola Savchenko claims that the intelligence of the Black Sea Fleet never underwent
the reduction of its personnel since 1992.561 He further argues that the activity of the
Russian Main Directorate of Intelligence (GRU, military intelligence) happened in
Crimea openly; Russian state even established headquarters of the Russian state bank in
Sevastopol in order to be able to transfer finances to Crimea and prevent the Ukrainian
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government from tracing the transactions.562 Mykola Porovsky, a Ukrainian MP between
1990 and 1998 claims he personally had access to secret counter-intelligence information
about the operations of Russian security services and military intelligence in Crimea.563
In his publication from 1996 Mykola Porovsky claimed that Russian security services
were actively implanting spies inside the Ukrainian armed forces and navy.564 He further
claimed that Russian intelligence inherited the operative network from the Soviet times,
some of the secret bases of the Soviet period on the territory of Ukraine and Crimea that
only responded to the central Soviet authorities. Therefore, Ukrainian government and
local branches of KGB (which then turned into Ukrainian secret service) did not even
know about the existence of those secret bases.565
In 1994 the Russian nationalist movement in Crimea managed to take full control over
the Crimean Supreme Council and elect a pro-Russian populist as a President of Crimea.
Not only this did not solve the problems of the Crimean population, but contributed to the
hybridity of the Crimean institutions. The election of Yurii Meshkov as president of
Crimea on January 30, 1994 was the result of an informational campaign waged by the
Crimean press which led to the mobilization of the Russian nationalist movement on the
peninsula. Cooperation between the Meshkov’s Republican Movement, the Black Sea
Fleet, and Russian political agents was an important factor as well. As early as April 29,
1994 president Meshkov together with the chairman of Sevastopol municipal council and
the command of the Black Sea Fleet, issued a common statement which demanded
‘Crimea’s participation’ in the negotiations over the Black Sea Fleet.566 This way Russia
introduced a third party into negotiations, which it controlled and by doing so increased
its own control over the outcome.
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The populist initiatives of Meshkov and his allies were eventually what brought his
power down. After the inauguration the Crimean President actively started engaging in
foreign negotiations with other countries. The success of those negotiations was
questionable, as even Meshkov’s ‘business trip’ to Moscow did not lead to a meeting
with President Yeltsin.567 Crimean newspapers, however, described Meshkov as an
negotiator equal to the presidents of Ukraine and Russia, and spoke of Crimea as if it was
a separate state. The appointment of Yevgeniy Saburov, a citizen of Russia, as Crimea’s
Deputy Prime-Minister was a directl violation of the Ukrainian legislation at that time.
This, however, did not prevent Meshkov from proposing the candidacy of Saburov, nor
the Supreme Council of Crimea from approving it. The conflict between Yurii Meshkov
and the Chairman of the Crimean Supreme Council, Sergey Tsekov, was eventually the
formal reason for the intervention of the Ukrainian government. Tsekov and Meshkov
were political allies during the election cycle and came to power on a single wave of
Russian nationalism. Their conflict and eventual failure in 1995 decapitated the proRussian movement in Crimea and marginalized it.
Therefore, in 1995 Russian authorities decided not to start an open territorial aggression
against Ukraine in Crimea. They did, however, preserve Russian military presence in
Sevastopol as well as cultural and informational control over the Crimea’s political
discourse. Black Sea navy continued to perform its hybrid roles as a point of cultural and
political influence of Russia on the territory of a foreign country. For examples, in 1996
the fleet command began cooperation with the so called Cossack movement of Crimea, a
paramilitary organization, created in order to militarize Crimean youth. In cooperation
with Cossack, the Black Sea Fleet was engaging in the “military-patriotic upbringing” of
the Crimean youth and military personnel of the fleet. The fleet also provided
infrastructure, military camps and shooting ranges for the use of the Cossack movement.
568
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paramilitary organizations of a different country (Ukraine) in the sphere of ideological
upbringing of the youth of that country.
In February 2014, the military units of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, stationed in Crimea
under the international agreement between Ukraine and Russia, left their military bases
and took control over the administrative buildings of the local Crimean Parliament. In
addition to that, they surrounded the Ukrainian military bases and blocked Ukrainian
servicemen inside those bases, demanding surrender. This act of an international
aggression signified that Russian authorities finally decided to play the card that they had
long fought to preserve. Russian military action in Crimea has not always been the major
plan, but its presence on the peninsula has always made such plan possible.

5.3
Russian Prestige and Military Masculinity in
Crimea
In November 1994 the so called ‘Chechen opposition’ failed to overthrow the President
of the Chechen republic of Ichkeria, General Dzhokhar Dudayev, whose main policy
aimed at the independence of Chechnya from the Russian Federation. As a result of a
failed attack on the Chechen capital Grozny, Dudaev’s forces killed and captured many
Russian regular servicemen and officers (in addition to successfully burning multiple
Russian tanks), who were supposed to imitate an internal conflict within the Republic of
Ichkeria. When it became apparent that the failed coup was waged by Russian regular
armed forces, the failure became a personal military loss of the Russian state, Russian
president Boris Yeltsin and the Russian army. What was more important – this was a
challenge to the military ‘greatness’ of the Russian military that came out of the small
rebellious republic, whose whole population size was comparable to the number of troops
available to the Russian federal government. This failure was so humiliating that the
Russian minister of defense general Pavel Grachev had to deny the participation of the
Russian regular troops in the assault of the city of Grozny. With an ironic smile on his
face Grachev said:
“Firstly, if it was an action by the Russian army, I would never allow tanks to
enter the city. That is already an [example of] wild incompetence. Secondly, if
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it was a fight of the Russian army, one paratroop regiment could solve all the
issues within two hours”.569
Similar tactics were used 20 years later. Russian military involvement in the occupation
of Crimea in 2014 was not acknowledged by Vladimir Putin until it became apparent
that the operation was successful. Until that time, the world referred to the invaders as
‘little green men’ without military insignias, although they had Russian ammunition and
military training. The acknowledgement of the Russian military presence came from
Putin himself, when, already post factum Putin recognized that “they never concealed the
fact” that Russian armed forces participated in blocking Ukrainian military bases in
Crimea.570 This was not true. During his conversation with journalists in March 2014
(before the annexation of Crimea was complete), Putin called the invading men a ‘selfdefense forces’ (with a clear reference to the Euromaidan self-defense units, legitimized
by the international community) and denied their affiliation with the Russian army.571
When Russia continued its aggression against Ukraine into what is now a war in the
eastern Donbas region, yet again the Russian President did not acknowledge the
involvement of Russian regular troops in the conflict. Over the 6 years of war, however,
one of the arguments that was meant to confirm Russian innocence was the state of the
fighting itself. On multiple occasions, multiple speakers, including state propaganda and
members of the Russian parliament, repeated the same phrase: “If the Russian army was
in there [Donbas] the war would have been over long time ago”.572 Other iterations of
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that phrase included promises ‘to seize Kyiv’ or Lviv within two weeks, or two days,
depending on the speaker.
The difference between the Russian aggression in Donbas and Crimea (or Transnistria in
1992, or Chechnya in 1994) is that the former is not over yet and, therefore, not
victorious. It took two wars (one of which was lost), years of fighting and the lives of
thousands of Russian soldiers to return the Chechen republic to Russian federal control.
Donbas may yet be lost, a risk that apparently is too high for the support of Russian
understandings of ‘self,’ and for the Russian military masculinity and national identity.
Such a great power, as Russia is (and ‘has always been!’), cannot afford to fail in a
military operation against the tiny Chechnya, or against the ‘little brother’/’failed state’ of
Ukraine. The difference in power status requires that the war is not just victorious, but
the victory has to be total, the enemy has to be humiliated, the resources spent for the war
have to be minimal and, moreover, everything has to happen fast. The great power
mentality requires the Russian state authority and military to comply with the myth they
created for the sake of their own regime and their own political structure. Ironically, this
makes the Russian state and Russian society prisoners of their own myth, much like
patriarchal social structures limit men in addition to imprisoning women (albeit with
comparatively more power). In case of the Russian state and government, when the
standards of greatness are not met, the war often becomes erased from the discourse. In
fact, in that case it does not become part of the discourse in the first place; the loss
remains unclaimed.
Russian military presence in Crimea in 2014 was a direct result of a struggle that took
place on the peninsula during the separation of the Black Sea Fleet in the 1990s. The
military and political aspects of that struggle have been on the surface and are widely
analyzed by scholars. This section will argue, however, that the competition in the space
of prestige (military, national) and masculinity defined the overall discourse in which the
competition took place. In order to maintain control over the Black Sea Fleet and
preserve the Russian presence in Crimea, the fleet command used informational, political
and military instruments to fight the pro-Ukrainian dissent among the military personnel,
as well as oppose the presence of the Ukrainian navy in Sevastopol. While the political
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solution of the fleet problem was being constantly postponed, campaigns of
disinformation, censorship and psychological pressure became the main weapon in order
to maintain control over the fleet structure and keep most of it within the Russian control.
The rhetoric and the model of behavior chosen by the Black Sea Fleet commanders often
resembled rhetoric addressed to the enemy on the battlefield. However, the fleet
command has never actually acknowledged the existence of such battle. Much like in
other cases mentioned above. The problem of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea in 1990s had
much to do with the Russian perception of one’s own national and military prestige and
greatness. Russian state as well as military command often demonstrated a battle-like
behavior, maintaining the image of their own military greatness and competing with their
Ukrainian opponents on the battlegrounds of masculinity. In the context of Crimea, where
Russia competed with Ukraine for political and military influence, competitions in the
space of prestige also meant competitions for the hearts and mind of younger generations,
future conscripts or officers of the navy. The fleet needed personnel and a substantial
portion of it came from Sevastopol and Crimea.
The connection between the military masculinity, officer’s honor and prestige is not
obvious. This section, however, will argue that such connection exists, if not in the
military in general, then in the case of Sevastopol in particular. As a city that was mostly
populated by navy servicemen and their families in early 1990s, Sevastopol was a highly
militarized masculine space. The standard of masculinity, or in other words, the standards
of appropriate manliness required young people to join the armed forces, go study in the
navy military school, commit to the service in the navy. Partially this resembled a general
Soviet discourse according to which the military ‘made’ men out of boys. In the case of
Sevastopol this image was specialized – the standard required service in the navy to
which everyone was somehow related. Crimean newspapers published celebratory
articles dedicated to conscripts and officers, who served in the Black Sea Fleet,
suggesting them as an example for the rest of the society. Within the context of this
militarized masculinity, the image of the officer was of a special importance. In a public
discourse, in the sphere of information and propaganda, an officer was inseparably
connected to his honor. Honor was a component of officer’s masculinity, since failure to
comply with standards of honor (or with the perception of those standards) turned an
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officer into a ‘lesser man.’ This is not to say that all officers of the Black Sea Fleet were
exceptional honorable people. In early 1990s the problem of theft of the fleet’s property
was especially serious. But in a public discourse an officer had to maintain a certain
image. An attack on that image compromised the officer personally, but also it
undermined the authority of the institution he represented. Therefore, as this section
further argues, an attack on the military honor in the context of Sevastopol, was a claim
against the manliness of the person who was under attack; furthermore, it was a way for
the colonizing force (Black Sea Fleet) to preserve control over the definition of standards
of honor and therefore, to preserve its prestige and political influence.
During a short period of time after the dissolution of the USSR and the proclamation of
Ukrainian independence, the position (political, military) and future of the Black Sea
navy in Crimea was very uncertain. The fleet commander Admiral Kasatonov was a very
influential person in the fleet and, by extension, a very noticeable figure in the city of
Sevastopol and Crimea. Kasatonov is known as a person who became a vocal defender of
the Russian interests in Sevastopol. However, officers remember when commander
Kasatonov ordered his fleet to transfer under Ukrainian command. During the period of
uncertainty in 1991, Admiral Kasatonov appeared in front of a complicated choice, just
like politicians of that time. Upon taking some time to consider his options, Admiral
Kasatonov ordered his fleet to prepare to pledge allegiance to Ukraine. Being a deputy
commander of the submarine division, Yevhen Lupakov received a secret message via
military secure link on January 3, 1992. The message from the commander Kasatonov
ordered the fleet to disconnect a system of nuclear launchers “Viuga” (“Snowstorm”)
from Moscow’s control and to respond to Kyiv only. The message also ordered to
prepare for the official pledge of allegiance of the fleet personnel to Ukraine.573
Kasatonov cancelled these orders on January 9, after the Ukrainian president Leonid
Kravchuk publicly expressed discontent with Kasatonov’s speech given during the allUkrainian meeting between the army command and the President. Anatoliy Danilov
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confirms these facts in his book, noting that all this information became publicly known
only with time.574 Mykola Savchenko confirms this episode with Kasatonov’s orders, and
mentions that the creation of the ‘heroic Russian Admiral Kasatonov’ was solely a work
of the Russian newspapers, who ‘made’ Kasatonov Russian even before he knew that.575
In 1992 Admiral Kasatonov emerged as a commander of the Black Sea Fleet who
officially responded to the Ukrainian and Russian presidents. His task was to allow the
fleet personnel to choose their allegiance freely, as per the inter-state agreements between
the two presidents. However, that short period of ‘weakness’, when the admiral almost
submitted to Ukraine, as well as the necessity to correspond to the image of the Russian
hero, created by the media, defined the admiral’s further policies within the fleet. Here is
the characteristic that Mykola Savchenko, a press officers of the fleet, gave to Admiral
Kasatonov:
“As members of the press center we happened to meet with Admiral Kasatonov
fairly often, sometimes several times a day. Apart from all of his severity and
commander’s arrogance that penetrated his bones during the years of fleet
service, [apart from] his self-esteem and pride, and more often his disrespect to
lower ranks, confirmed by hundreds of examples, he liked journalists and
addressed them with respect and attention. Later this quality became one of the
decisive factors in the creation of his image”.576
Black Sea Fleet inherited (from USSR) a social and media infrastructure, built around the
reinforcement of the masculine prestige of its personnel. Newspapers in Crimea and
Sevastopol in particular formulated social discourse in which all young men were
supposed to serve in the army. Stories about the heroic past of Sevastopolian sailors
created a direct succession line between the past and the present. In that regard,
newspapers of Crimea were not unique. In her analysis of the reconstruction of Soviet
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masculinity after the Second world war Claire McCallum emphasized the importance of
media, visual art and museums in that process.577 Sevastopol, with its hundreds of
museums and military monuments is a city built around masculinity. As demonstrated by
Karl Qualls, in fact, the whole post Second World war reconstruction of Sevastopol
centered around building a ‘city of military glory’. Fleet command actively participated
in conceptualizing that reconstruction.578 Therefore, after the Second World War
Sevastopol emerged as a city whose only purpose was to be a military base. In addition to
hosting the base, the city was built to socialize men in a very particular military tradition.
As Admiral Kasatonov and pro-Ukrainian officers appeared on the opposite sides of the
imaginary barricades, this whole fleet infrastructure was employed to fight the dissent.
Every instance of the military units transferring under Ukrainian command was followed
by a press statement of the Black Sea Fleet press-service and/or a commander himself
calling its legitimacy into question. Those statements usually included accusations of
illegal seizure of ships, and “one sided solution of the fleet’s problems” which were
contrary to the Russia-Ukraine agreements on the fleet.579 As it is already clear, the
commanders of the ships that pledged allegiance to Ukraine lost their positions
immediately. On July 2, 1992 the newspaper Slava Sevastopolia informed that the
personnel of the minesweeper boat “Sygnalshyk” together with its captain pledged
allegiance to Ukraine.580 The newspaper said that the commander of the ship, 3rd rank
captain Teymar Suleimanov, was temporarily discharged from his position by the unit
command and that the same day representatives of the Ukrainian ministry of defense
were not allowed into the ship.581 Yevhen Lupakov mentioned captain Suleimanov in his
interview as well. According to Lupakov, the discharge was not temporary, but
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permanent. The fleet command accused captain Suleimanov, an Uzbek, of being a
“Ukrainian nationalist”.582
The attacks that Admiral Kasatonov made regarding the officers of the newly created
Ukrainian navy forces were aimed to question Ukrainian officers’ honor. From the formal
point of view there was nothing wrong with the officers who were willing to serve in
Ukraine. Therefore, the fleet command questioned their personal integrity, honesty and
by extension – masculinity. This also allowed them to wage an ‘undeclared war’ (term
used by Mykola Savchenko in title of his memories) and not recognize an obvious
struggle that everyone knew about. On July 4, 1992 the newspaper Slava Sevastopolia
dedicated its front page to the transcript of a press-conference by the commander of the
Black Sea Fleet Admiral Kasatonov, regarding the general state of affairs with the fleet
and political struggles around it. Commander Kasatonov felt free to express his personal
views on politics around the fleet and actions of Ukrainian servicemen (his former
colleagues).583 The tone in which Admiral Kasatonov mentioned representatives of the
newly created Ukrainian fleet comes out in the interviews as slightly imperious. When
answering the question about his relationships with the rear admiral Boris Kozhyn (the
first commander of the Ukrainian fleet), Admiral Kasatonov said:
“...Boris Borisovich said they are good. Comrades, this is a mistake. We have
no relationships. He positioned himself that way. His people from the operative
group [of the Ukrainian fleet] positioned themselves that way – they peek,
oversee, overhear, climb fences of military bases, render provocative
impending [it is unclear what exactly Kasatonov meant], collect some kind of
information.”584
Kasatonov also added that he “had condolence” for Boris Kozhyn when he was appointed
as a commander of the garrison, because “how can a man fulfill his obligations, that he
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cannot fulfil” due to the absence of military units under his command.585 The message
that was given to the newspaper readers was very clear: the Russian fleet and Russian
command are serious trustworthy institutions that do not engage with dishonorable
actions like low-key espionage or conspiracy. The Russian side fulfills all agreements
and does not break them. Only a tiny number of servicemen, according to Kasatonov,
expressed their desire to serve in the Ukrainian fleet, despite the supposedly provocative
psychological pressure, conducted by the Ukrainian operative group. Answering a
question about the minesweeper boat “Sygnalshyk” Kasatonov characterized its switch to
Ukraine’s command as “nationalistic action, illegal, unauthorized”.586 He then says that
the ship commander was not event present on the ship at the time, while simultaneously
slandering him: “the commander of the ship Suleimanov zips around: one day he asks to
let him join his brothers to protect Azerbaijan with a gun, the other day he asks to release
his brother, then he talks about the unity of the fleet and moratorium [on its
separation].”587 Chis characteristic of Suleimanov also suggested that the person was not
able to hold on to his opinion and his word. This made him a bad officer, unworthy to be
in the fleet, or to command the ship, be an example to the crew he had under his
authority.
Declaring the enemy’s victory ‘unworthy’, decreasing its value and turning it into a moral
defeat is a common military response to losses, according to Wolfgang Schivelbusch.588
In this case the motivations behind the Kasatonov’s statements appear to be similar
attempts to devalue Ukraine’s victories within the Black Sea Fleet. The moral victory,
according to the admiral, was on the side of the (Russian) Black Sea Fleet. The
characteristic that Kasatonov gives to the Ukrainian officers again seem creates a
perception of moral superiority of the speaker and his fleet. ‘Peeking, overseeing,
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overhearing, climbing fences’, is a behavior unworthy of a navy officer and standards of
proper behavior. In that quote, Kasatonov did not just comment on the events, but
characterized his opponents as unworthy spies. To confirm that, many of the Ukrainian
officers who came to serve in a newly created Ukrainian navy were formally discharged
from their previous place of service for humiliating reasons and given no right to
continue to wear uniform – a measure that had been previously applied exclusively to
criminals.589 That was another attack on their honor, and the honor of the Ukrainian navy.
An attack on the enemy’s masculinity, by attacking his military prowess or prestige, was
a common instrument of the Soviet cultural and political tradition. One of the issues that
Erica Fraser discusses in her monograph is the use of sexualized and feminized images of
Western diplomats, politicians and military officers in the Soviet visual culture: “By
portraying foreign military authorities as feminized, queer, or in some ways sexually
deviant, Krokodil introduced an explicitly gendered framework for adjudicating Soviet
military strength”.590 She argues, for instance that there was an important aspect of the
Cold War that constituted “masculinity contests” between the opponents.591 Similarly,
Maya Eichler analyses the first Russia-Chechen war as a competition of a militarized,
honored Russian masculinity against the aggressive masculinity of Chechens.592
Kasatonov’s comments seem to arise out of that discourse of military masculinity,
therefore, his further actions and statements were based on the premised that there was a
single ‘true’ fleet in Sevastopol – the Black Sea Fleet.
Crimean newspapers, especially Krymskaia Pravda contributed to the forging of the
image of proper manliness in the military. In early 1992 the Ukrainian Ministry of
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Defense decided to remove Major General Kuznetsov from a position of commander of
the army corps, located in Simferopol. In response to his dismissal, the general refused to
dismiss; he further received public support from the pro-Russian Republican Movement
of Crimea as well as the informational support of the Krymskaia Pravda itself.593 The
reason for the dismissal, according to the newspaper material was that general Kuznetsov
said he would not fight against Russia in a hypothetical scenario of international conflict.
In any military of any country this of course would constitute a serious enough reason for
dismissal. However, in Crimea the newspaper and the general himself presented a
situation as a dishonorable action of the Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense. General
Kuznetsov was described as a paragon of honesty and consciousness. The newspaper
materials contrasted Major General Kuznetsov with his opponents specifically in relation
to their honor. Over the course of May, 1992 Krymskaia Pravda published at least five
articles, dedicated to the protest of general Kuznetsov.594 They all described him as an
honorable officer, who could not violate the standards of officer’s honor and was
repressed for that by Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense. Eventually, after a month of
collective protests and hunger strike, Major General Kuznetsov decided to move to
political career and ran for the Crimean Supreme Council.595 A personal characteristic of
the candidate during the electoral campaign connected his traits of character and his
military profession to manliness. In an article dedicated to his political nomination,
general Kuznetsov was described as a hardworking, patriotic person, who was always
ready to help those in need, “this is why Valeriy’s choice of an exclusively manly
profession – defender of the Fatherland is not a coincidence”. 596
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The conflicts on the Black Sea Fleet were evaluated by standards of officer’s honor as
well. On July 21, 1992 the command of the patrol vessel SKR-112 gave an order to raise
a Ukrainian flag and to move to the port of Odesa. This story became very famous for the
level of tension it created. The fleet command ordered the dissenting ship to stop and
even organized a chase by the navy and air force. This almost led to an armed collision
between two countries. The story of SKR-112 became a small victory for the Ukrainian
side and a loss for the Russian side. On July 24, 1992 Slava Sevastopolia dedicated its
front page to the press-conference given by Admiral Kasatonov, where he again
presented his view on the conflicting events between Russian and Ukrainian servicemen
and commented on the future of the Ukrainian fleet.597 The case of SKR-112
demonstrated that the real situation in the fleet was different from the narrative of the
Russian command. The goal of Admiral Kasatonov, therefore, was to diminish the
victory of the Ukrainian side. According to the admiral, only a half of the personnel of
the SKR-112 pledged allegiance to Ukraine; 15 out of 66 servicemen kept their old
pledge, while 8 more servicemen pledged allegiance to the Commonwealth of
Independent States.598 He also said that he knew about the allegiance of the ship
commander lieutenant captain Nastenko and the commander of the brigade headquarters
2nd rank captain Zhybarev. However, “they were not removed from their positions [...]
although you know my approach [to this kind of situations] [...]They gave me a word of
officer’s honor and swore that they would not get out of control and would not allow
illegal actions.”599 Kasatonov continued by saying that captain Zhybarev was removed
from his position for “forging documents and covering the facts of embezzlement of
weapon on another ship.”600 Yet again Kasatonov accused his Ukrainian opponents of not
using the “civilized” methods (but “cheap provocations”).601
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Kasatonov’s attacks were an example of instrumentalization of gendered language in
order to promote colonial power: he supported the authority of the institution that he
represented by claiming that the emerging competitors to his power were ‘lesser men.’
This press-conference confirmed the narrative of the Ukrainian officers, who claimed that
Russian command conducted psychological pressure against them. No agreement
between Russia and Ukraine at that point forbade pledging allegiance to Ukraine. In fact,
every serviceman had a right to choose their allegiance. However, the Black Sea Fleet
command treated Ukrainian officers as traitors and criminals. Nowadays, it would be
hard to find out the true reason for the removal of captain Zhybarev from his position.
However, it seems that charges of ‘forging documents’ that was mentioned by
Kasatonov, fits into his general narrative about Ukrainian officers being ‘small’,
‘dishonest’, ‘uncivilized’ people, who would always betray their word of an officer. As
much as this press-conference was meant to cover the real situation in the fleet, it was
also a way for the command to present their own narrative about the conflict and to get a
victory on the informational battleground, which could help cover the loss of the military
ship. Cases such as the one with SKR-112 made it harder for the Russian command to
demonstrate the loyalty of the vast majority of the fleet personnel to the idea of the
Russian Black Sea Fleet. It was still important, however, to show that the desire to serve
in the Ukrainian army was an exception, rather than a rule. Even on the SKR-112,
according to the fleet command, Ukrainian loyalty was not shared by the majority.
The logic of informational warfare and psychological pressure against the Ukrainian navy
forces allowed Admiral Kasatonov and the fleet chain of command to not acknowledge
the existence of a conflict between the navies of Ukraine and Russia. In April 1993 a
group of Ukrainian officers publicly addressed the chairman of the Ukrainian parliament
Ivan Pliushch, asking for protection against the psychological warfare waged against
them by the command of the Black Sea Fleet.602 In response Slava Sevastopolia
published a full interview with the chairman of the Officers’ Coordination Council of the
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Black Sea Fleet603 1st rank captain V. Volodin. Captain Volodin emphasized that the
responsibility for the conflict lay solely with the Ukrainian officers. Further, he said that
the letter “cites fantastic factoids that those servicemen who demonstrated loyalty to
Ukraine are being kicked from the Black Sea Fleet, that they are forbidden to appear in
their military units”.604 In fact, multiple stories of the Ukrainian officers showed exactly
that, but for some reason the fleet command refused to acknowledge the existence of such
policies.
The comments that Admiral Kasatonov made publicly suggested that the Black Sea Fleet
was on the defensive against the aggressive actions of the Ukrainian officers. In the
meantime, Admiral Kasatonov regularly informed the public that Ukrainian officers and
military cadets are “befooled people, because the Ukrainian fleet will not need that many
navy officers”.

605
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phrase, which characterizes the generally dismissive attitude that the Black Sea Fleet
command portrayed as it tried to inculcate disdain for Ukraine in public perception.
After Admiral Kasatonov became the deputy commander of the Russian navy forces and
moved to Moscow (in 1992), he continued making statements on the issues of
Sevastopol, accusing Ukraine of starting the conflict with Russia. One such interviews,
for example, talked about the “forceful Ukrainization” of the fleet by the “destructive
forces” among the Ukrainian navy. According to Kasatonov, the flying of the Russian
navy flags on the Black Sea Fleet ships was a response of the fleet personnel to the
aggressive actions of Ukraine.606 In this interview Kasatonov tied the separation of the
Black Sea Fleet to the “fall of the system” that led to a general poverty of the military
personnel.607 This connection between the economy, the unity of the fleet, the status of
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Sevastopol, and the Russian military presence in the city became one of the major myths
in the post-Soviet Sevastopol. According to that myth, the wealth of the population of
Sevastopol directly depended on a united and mighty fleet. And such fleet could only be
Russian, because the Ukrainian state was not capable of funding its own navy forces.
There was a clear contrast in characterization of the Black Sea Fleet and Ukrainian navy
forces in Crimean newspapers. In 1992 Krymskaia Pravda on different occasion gave
personal characteristics of the commanders of the both military formations. The article
dedicated to Vice-Admiral Kozhyn, a commander of the Ukrainian navy, was titled “The
admiral came through the garden” (Admiral prishel ogorodami). The article accused
admiral Kozhyn of corruption, but more importantly, it accused the commander of the
Ukrainian navy of not having enough courage (muzhestvo – bravery, manhood) to warn
his colleagues in the Black Sea Fleet that he was going to transfer to the Ukrainian navy:
“I personally really doubt that everything is normal, if the commander of the
Navy Forces comes to the [captain’s] bridge through gardens and everyone
thinks this is fine”.608
The metaphor of ‘coming through gardens’ means to sneak around, to move to the goal
secretly, behind everyone’s back. The main argument of the article was that ViceAdmiral Kozhyn took the commander’s position in a dishonorable way and this
undermined an honor of the whole Ukrainian navy.
In contrast to this image of Kozhyn, the same newspaper published a characteristic of
Admiral Kasatonov just a month later. According to that characteristic, Admiral
Kasatonov continued the best traditions that existed in the Russian navy:
“In the old Russian [Russkii – ethnic term, but in this case the author did not
differentiate] fleet a navy elite was being cultivated, only noblemen could
become officers. A fruit bearing tree chopped to its root left behind some sad
and bright memories about the Russian navy officer, as a gauge of devotion to
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duty, nobleness of communication, culture, soaked in [his] blood, high
reverence to women. Those people are gone, but traditions persisted.”609
The argumentation in favor of the presence of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol was
based exclusively on the perception of the Russian prestige, Russian patriotism and
Russian history. The fact that the Black Sea Fleet formally remained under the joint
command, was funded by both countries and received conscripts in equal proportions
from Ukraine and Russia, remained completely outside of the narrative. As demonstrated
above, media played an important role in supporting that prestige. Apart from regular
publications about the heroic past of the city of Sevastopol and its navy, Slava
Sevastopolia regularly published interviews with various commanding officers of the
Black Sea Fleet. Journalists usually behaved very favorably towards the officers of the
Black Sea Fleet. For example, in an interview with a rear admiral A.A. Penkin (an
assistant to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet) both the reporter and the respondent
spoke about the unity of Sevastopol and “the fleet”, about “our memory”, “our
people”.610 During the interview rear admiral Penkin once again started with reciting the
grand narrative of Sevastopol’s ‘glorious history’, and reminded the readers (although
there was hardly any necessity for that, considering the daily content of Slava
Sevastopolia) of a link between the past and the present glory of Sevastopol and its fleet.
At times, the reporter, E. Yurzditskaia, turned to an open adulation, one of the questions
incorporated a statement that “nobody doubts the wisdom of the fleet command”. A few
paragraphs earlier, the journalist asked rear admiral Penkin to confirm that the fleet
“would be a guarantor of our peace”.611 The image of the Black Sea Fleet was supposed
to be an image of the defender, guarantor of stability and peace. That image was of
course very patrimonial, the peace was to be given to Sevastopolians by means of the
presence of the Russian military, which officially was not yet Russian, but international.
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Ironically, the same reporter E. Yurzditskaia, had an interview with the commander of the
Ukrainian navy, vice-admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovainyi. While the interview with an
advisor to the Black Sea Fleet commander rear admiral Penkin took the front page of the
issue, the interview with the commander of the Ukrainian fleet was to be found on the
third page. In addition to that, almost every question for the vice admiral from the
journalist contained accusations and open disrespect, not common towards the high
ranking navy officers. Immediately after the introduction to the interview the journalist
posed a question that looked more like a prelude for a debate:
“I address you on behalf of Sevastopolians and I undoubtedly want to touch on
the atmosphere of co-existence. The very entrance of the Ukrainian navy forces
into Sevastopol was painful because the city has been a base of the Black Sea
Fleet since the dawn of time [ispokon vekov]. There are common traditions
[between the fleet and the city], every family is related to the sea in one way or
another. The ideology of the Ukrainian navy forces was created ‘on the knee’
[at bench scale, very quickly, without deep consideration], its founders were
the people of land [sukhoputnye – people of land, as opposed to people of sea]:
a colonel of the military department at the Lviv institute, former commander of
the automobile battalion etc. […] The fleet itself cannot provoke
condemnation, but certain personalities who were at the basis of its [fleet’s]
creation were surprising, they did not add to its [fleet’s] honor. How are you
planning to proceed with the personnel policy?”612
The second half of this statement/question contradicts its first half. The reporter makes an
extreme effort, trying to say that it is not the Ukrainian fleet itself that is a problem, but
the fact that it was created by ‘land people’ and consisted of officers with questionable
reputation. But earlier in the statement she emphasized that the problem was exactly in
the fact that the fleet was Ukrainian. The presence of the Ukrainian fleet in the ports of
the city contradicted the settler colonial historical narrative, according to which, ‘the
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dawn of time’ was just two centuries ago. It was by means of the ‘wise’ Black Sea Fleet
command and this very newspaper, Slava Sevastopolia, that the honor and reputation of
the Ukrainian navy officers was damaged, but now it was a commander of the Ukrainian
fleet who had to take responsibility for that.
Every mentioning of the Black Sea Fleet (which attached to the history of the ‘Russian’
fleet without need for any explicit reference) associated with the words ‘glory’, ‘honor’,
and ‘loyalty’.613 On the other hand, the Ukrainian navy came up in association with
scandals and ‘provocations’ for which the Ukrainian side was held accountable every
time. In addition to being a complete opposite to the Russian fleet (e.g. ‘not glorious’,
‘dishonorable’, and, more importantly, ‘not loyal’) the Ukrainian fleet was also ‘poor’
and ‘greedy’, just like the Ukrainian state. For example, this is how Slava Sevastopolia
commented on the Ukrainian demands to receive rent payments for the Ukrainian land
that was in use of the Russian military bases. Once again, Russian side is presumably on
the defensive here, while the Ukrainian side poses ‘unreasonable demands’ and desires to
live off the Russia’s funds:
“One gets the impression that this is an approbation of an option of lease of
Sevastopol by Russia. The Ukrainian side sees in it [in the idea, or in Russia] a
sort of a magic tablecloth [skatert’ samobranka614]. It looks tempting [for
Ukraine] to be able to use the lease to force Russia to serve everything
according to the menu, created by Kyiv”.615
Starting in 1994 the economic aspect of the Russian prestige in Sevastopol became even
more powerful. The municipal government of Moscow, headed by Yurii Luzhkov,
established a financial fund ‘Moscow – Sevastopol’ that financed the construction of the
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housing and cultural institutions for the servicemen of the Black Sea Fleet. By the way,
that same fund provided financial support for the ‘Russian Community of Sevastopol’, a
pro-Russian movement within the city. In late December 1994 Yurii Luzhkov, as well as
the whole government of Moscow and the Russian ambassador to Ukraine participated in
distribution of the apartment keys.616 The housing complex was constructed within just 9
months. During further years Moscow’s municipal government built more than one such
apartment complex for the Russian officers and their families. In 1999, for example, they
constructed a primary and secondary school for children of the Russian officers. Every
such event appeared on the front page of Slava Sevastopolia and was celebrated as an
enormous help from Russia.617 Simultaneously, the newspaper often published articles
about the financial hardships of the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian government right
beside the articles regarding the Russian aid.618
The fact that Russian financial support of the Russian prestige in Sevastopol was a matter
of foreign policy was stated openly: Sevastopol was considered an ‘outpost’ of Russia on
the territory of Crimea and Ukraine in general.619 During his speech to the Russian state
Duma in 1994, Admiral Baltin said: “From a political perspective, Sevastopol with its
clearly expressed mentality is the last chance for Russian to strengthen its positions in
Crimea”.620 This was the admiral’s reaction to the political crisis between the Crimean
president Meshkov and the Crimean Supreme council that ended with the interference of
the Ukrainian government. In those circumstances the role of the fleet as a political
institution on the territory of a foreign state increased tremendously. It became a display
that was supposed to advertise the ‘Russian prosperity’ among the residents of Sevastopol
and Ukrainian servicemen. The Russian military contingent in Sevastopol received
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special care, housing and unprecedently high salaries, not just by the standards of the
Russian navy, but especially in comparison to the Ukrainian servicemen.
After the Ukraine-Russian agreement of 1997 that separated the two fleets in Sevastopol,
the sole function and purpose of the Russian Black Sea Fleet was to maintain the myth
about the glorious Russian past of Sevastopol (and Crimea), and about Russian military
might and prestige. Due to its reduced technological potential and geography, for the
most part of the 2000s, the Russian Black Sea Fleet could hardly perform any important
strategic functions in the area. It still however, was capable of overshadowing the
Ukrainian navy forces and the Ukrainian military presence in the city of Sevastopol,
demonstrating who was the real master on the land. The demonstration again, was mostly
in the spheres of economy, history and social memory. Russian officers received
increased financial support from the state, compared to that of Ukrainian servicemen.
Russian officers were provided housing and schooling for their children. That was in
addition to the whole city infrastructure, media, sites of memory, cultural events etc, that
continued to support and reinforce the historical mythology. The unspoken competition
between the Russian and the Ukrainian fleet continued the whole time. Even fireworks
and parades, organized during the Fleet Day celebrations, became a matter of competition
– with the city residents discussing whose parade and fire show, Ukrainian or Russian,
was more impressive. This competition was again a battle over masculinity and prestige:
over which fleet is mightier, whose officers are more ‘manly’, whose fireworks are more
impressive. Ultimately, it was a competition between the two states over the minds and
identity of the population, an unspoken understanding that people choose their identity
according to their perception of prestige.

5.4

Conclusion

The hybridity of the settler colonial institutions in Crimea significantly reduced the level
of control that Ukraine had over this territory and increased an ‘invisible’ presence of the
Russian political, military and financial agents. From the formal standpoint Crimea
existed under the sovereignty of Ukraine, the institutions in Crimea formally were not
Russian. This made the political conflict in Crimea look like in was an internal problem
of Ukraine with the local separatist groups. The conflict, however, was international, also
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often not acknowledged by the Russian side. It was due to the hybridity of the Black Sea
Fleet and local Crimean authorities that Russia received the negotiating position
regarding the fleet in the first place. Initially, right after the fall of the Soviet Union, a
general assumption was that Ukraine would take control over the Black Sea Fleet. ProUkrainian officers of the fleet started an active campaign, trying to achieve that goal. But
due to indecisiveness of the Ukrainian state, Russian politicians received time for
mobilization and taking control over the process. After the conflict over the fleet became
international, every meeting between the Ukrainian and Russian presidents postponed the
approval of the final decision. This, in turn, demoralized the pro-Ukrainian portion of the
fleet, mobilized the pro-Russian movement and gave time to the fleet command to get rid
of the pro-Ukrainian officers within the fleet.
The question of the fleet suddenly became important for President Yeltsin personally, as
well as for the opposition to his government. The way the historical myth about
Sevastopol, Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet was invoked in the Russian political
discourse suggests that various political forces used this topic for the internal political
competition. The control over the military on the territory of a (formerly) subordinate
state preserved control. The level of influence that Russian politicians had in Crimea
allowed them to artificially create a point of internal instability within Ukraine and use
this instability to influence Ukraine’s policies. Structures of the Black Sea Fleet
conducted reconnaissance, infiltrated Ukrainian armed forces, supported and mobilized
the local pro-Russian movement, conducted informational operations on the territory of
Crimea. All this remained in the sphere of ‘unspoken’ as the high-standing Russian
politicians usually refrained from radical anti-Ukrainian statements regarding Ukraine.
In addition to preserving its own control, Russian institutions started a fight against the
Ukrainian presence on the peninsula. Russian state tried to support the dominance of the
image of its greatness and mightiness within Crimea, in addition it diminished the image
of Ukrainian statehood and its armed forces. Not only this meant to turn the Crimean
population on the pro-Russian side, Russian informational resources went to an enormous
extent to encourage Crimean residents to serve in the Black Sea Fleet. Any fleet is an
institution that is highly dependent on skilled professionals. The informational attacks
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against the Ukrainian officers’ manliness and honor ultimately were a fight for the loyalty
of Crimean population: future servicemen and their parents. If the fleet was a place ‘to
become a man,’ it was important to make sure everyone knew which fleet would breed
that.
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6

Conclusions

This research demonstrates that the analysis of settler colonialism is not limited to the
history of Western imperial studies and might (and should) be applied elsewhere. The
application of settler colonial theory to the history of Crimea does not just open room for
alternative narratives of the peninsula’s past, present and future. It begins the process of
decolonization from its very basics – academic knowledge that has so far been entangled
in imperial mythology. The focus on the history of the Russian and Soviet settler
colonialism in Crimea also challenges the narrative, according to which the Russian
Empire does not fit into the analytical schemes of Western imperial historiography.
Instead, this study demonstrates, that Russian and Soviet empires often operated within a
similar imperial logic as their Western counterparts. And while there have been some
obvious nuances in the logic of the Russian and Soviet settler colonial project, the general
idea of the indigenous displacement (physical, cultural, linguistical, historical –
discoursal) persisted. The Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and the contemporary
Russian Federation all worked to construct Crimea as a ‘natively Russian’ land by
removing the indigenous peoples (Crimean Tatars in particular, as the largest and most
politically organized of the groups) and marginalizing their cultures and histories.
The uniqueness of the Crimean case as well as the historical period – the early postSoviet years after 1991 – is that for the first time in about 200 years Crimean Peninsula
appeared outside of the imperial sovereignty of the Russia-centered empire. Unlike many
other settler colonies, Crimea did not gain independence from the metropole (did not
even seek that independence) but appeared on the periphery of a yet another independent
state – Ukraine – that had just started a state-building and decolonization project of its
own. This separation between Crimea and its metropole was even more hurtful because it
enhanced the identity crisis that the Russian nation experienced after losing much of its
empire. Crimea and Sevastopol in particular, together with the Black Sea Fleet that was
stationed there, served as an important factor in the internal Russian political debates.
This was due to the historical importance of the Crimean space for Russian national
thought. The Crimean settler colony therefore serves as a good example of the
entrapment that the imperial narrative imposes on its colonies and on the metropole itself.
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The Russian colonial narrative about Crimea defined the direction in which the postSoviet peninsula developed, but also it forced Russian public discourse to interfere into
Crimea as well as into the rest of Ukraine.
The political struggles of 1990s in Crimea and about Crimea were in fact a struggle about
the preservation of the settler colonial status quo. Different players in this political game
needed the preservation of the status quo for different reasons. Local Crimean elites were
simply interested in preservation of their personal power and were not willing to dissolve
inside the larger state projects of Ukraine or Russia. Their only chance for the
preservation of their power was to ‘freeze’ the Soviet Union on a territory of a single
peninsula. Advocating for Crimea as an in-between space ultimately was an advocacy for
the status that Crimea had during Soviet times. This advocacy of course happened within
the cultural and political discourse of the Soviet past which at that point had hardly have
a chance to fully become ‘past.’ The competition of local Crimean elites, people like
Mykola Bahrov and later Yurii Meshkov, with the government in Kyiv was only possible
within the mode of ‘in-between space.’ The presence of Russia, its authority as a (former)
metropole and its entrapment in its own imperial myth provided Crimean politicians with
some leverage in their political fights for ‘autonomy.’
The Crimean example is a yet another demonstration that decolonization does not happen
automatically with the fall of the empire. As shown extensively by other studies of
colonialism, imperial inequality is never limited to the legal inequality. Whether the
premise (formal reason for discrimination) is race, gender, nationality or something else,
the pattern of imperial oppression is more or less the same. Colonization always happens
on the level of culture and psychology, in addition to other spaces. Settler colonization as
a “structure, not an event” should be understood broadly; settler colonization changes the
discourse, the reality in which colonizers and colonized operate. The fall of the Soviet
Union did not erase the settler colonial institutions that formulated, reproduced and
supported settler colonialism on the peninsula. The structural displacement of Crimean
Tatars and Ukrainians throughout 1990s, as well as before that, persisted and only
adapted to the new post-Soviet reality in which the metropole appeared within a different
state. Both Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian decolonization movements as well as the
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development of the Ukrainian statehood challenged the settler colonial status quo in
Crimea, and provoked resistance, but never erased the settler colonial structures.
There were two immediate challenges to the efforts of the settler colonial institutions to
retain power – those were Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar decolonization movements. Both
those movements provided alternative narratives about Crimea and demonstrated the
presence of a ‘reality’ that was being erased from public discourse. The Ukrainian
movement was part of the larger state-building project that was happening in the country
in general. It was based on the understanding that there were certain Russified regions of
the country where the presence of Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian language needed to be
restored. Members of those movements often acted within the logic of the empire that
they were fighting – inversing the norms of the Soviet society into what they saw as
Ukrainian norms, by using methods that were informed by the Soviet practices. While
trying to decolonize they often stayed within the cultural norms, created for the Ukrainian
culture in the Soviet Union. In the case of Crimea, for instance, this decolonization
project often involved elements of (re-) colonization. While many of them supported the
attempts of Crimean Tatars to restore their rights of the indigenous people, others
repeated the narrative of the colonial empire and feared that giving ‘too much’ power to
Crimean Tatars might challenge Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Ukrainian activists were
not numerous, but very active. Their cultural initiatives often crossed the thin line (that
mostly existed only in their own consciousness) between culture and politics. At the end
of the day, although not indigenous, Ukrainians of Crimea were in a position of a
colonized people and therefore their cultural initiatives were inherently political.
Crimean Tatars, in turn, represented a local Crimean decolonization project. They were
better organized, but their existence within the Crimean space posed greater danger to the
settler colonial institutions. The repatriation of the people that had ‘Crimean’ written into
their name disrupted all the settler colonial myth about ‘multinationality’ of the
peninsula. That is not to say that Crimea historically was not a multinational space, it was
just that the dominant national group that retained power historically had nothing to do
with that multinationalism. Whether actively or not, Crimean settler colonial institutions
were aware of their foreign nature. Their fight against Crimean Tatar national sovereignty
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and indigeneity eventually turned into promoting one’s own indigeneity in a form of
‘multinationalism.’ The Crimean Tatar fight for land, meanwhile, demonstrated a way of
indigenous resistance to the attempts of the institutions of power to reduce the effects of
decolonization. The logic of settler colonialism reduced the indigenous access to land and
by extension – to economic and political resources. Unfortunately, the Crimean Tatar
movement often had to resist not just the local Crimean authorities, but the Ukrainian
state as well. For many years Ukrainian post-communist elites saw in Crimean Tatars a
threat to the state, rather than allies.
As in other settler colonies and colonial relations, the control over the narrative, the
ability and an exclusive right of the settler colonial institutions to define the ‘truth’ was
one of the main instruments of reproduction of the settler colonial status quo. Local
Crimean newspapers, as well as the Russian media space that was still present in Crimea
played an important role in forging the local Crimean ‘multinational identity,’
reproducing traditional cultural stereotypes about Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar
‘nationalists’ and effectively marginalized those decolonization movements. Because the
support of settler colonial regime meant as little change as possible, a lot of cultural and
political messages, as well as the historical grand narrative, were directly inherited from
the Soviet times. The role of history, or rather – a public construction of collective image
of the past was meant to answer questions about the future. And because the historical
narrative spoke about Russian Crimea and the Russian Black Sea Fleet, that often was an
important enough reason to believe that Russia should retain its control within the
Crimean space. The control over the truth served as a justification for the continuation of
the settler colonial policies of the local Crimean elites. Eventually, the logic of the
narrative was to create an image of Crimea as a space with a single political opinion.
Those who resisted this image – Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar activists – were
proclaimed ‘alien’ to Crimea. This in turn was meant to mobilize Crimeans against an
external threat.
The power of the construct of unilaterally pro-Russian Crimea is yet to be realized.
Eventually it created a self-fulfilling circle in which everyone ‘was meant’ to think the
same way ‘as did everyone else.’ This not only supported Russian political influence on

283

the peninsula, this image changed the way Ukrainian and international politicians (as well
as scholars) approached the Crimea question. The settler colonial monopoly over the
truth empowered Russian claims to this space while erasing alternative narratives that
Ukrainian state-building projects could rely on. The story of Russia’s annexation of
Crimea in 2014 and Ukraine’s as well as international continued response to that
annexation suggests a lack of knowledge about Crimea; since a popular perception of the
peninsula is a result of a Russian imperial construct. The role of Western observers and
their support of the dominant imperial narrative under the façade of democratization is a
topic that requires further analysis. Russian authorities as well as Crimean elites managed
to successfully employ the rhetoric of democracy, human right and international law (and
continue to do so today) in order to promote the colonial agenda. The inability of the
West to identify this problem, as well as the dominance of Russia within the academic
research of the Eastern Europe often created a situation when decolonization processes
were slowed not just by the criticism of the former empire, but also with ‘objective’
criticism from the Western ‘arbiters.’
The presence of Russia in this image is obvious and invisible at once. From the beginning
settler colonialism always constitutes foreign invasion. Therefore, the very presence of
local Crimean settler colonial institutions is an effect of the Russian imperial invasion.
Analyzing this invasion as a ‘conflict that did not happen’ or in any other way that
normalizes it contributes to the enforcement of the settler colonial myth. Crimean settler
colonial institutions, never broke ties with the metropole, after the Soviet Union
disappeared. Russian political, informational, economic as well as military presence in
Crimea guaranteed the preservation of the status quo that Crimean authorities fought for.
Russian-controlled institutions on the territory of Crimea, mostly the Black Sea Fleet,
appeared in an in-between space, where they technically operated under joint sovereignty
of Ukraine and Russia, but in fact remained an extension of the Russia’s political,
informational and military power. Efforts of the Black Sea Fleet command reduced a
potential challenge that could come with the creation of Ukrainian naval forces.
Repressions against Ukrainian officers that came from the fleet command, as well as
cooperation of the Black Sea Fleet with the local Crimean authorities demonstrated the
extent to which military presence in Crimea was important for Russia, as well as for the
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local settler colonial institutions. The presence of the Black Sea Fleet enabled open
activity of the Russian military intelligence and security services on the territory of
Crimea – a topic that awaits further in-depth research. Russian politicians and financial
institutions financed the pro-Russian movement in Crimea, in addition to mass
propaganda. Considering the cooperation with the local Crimean settler colonial
institutions, for much of 1990s Russia had more influence over Crimea that Ukraine
itself. This allowed the Russian government to use Crimea as a pressure point against the
Ukrainian government and influence Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policies. In the
meantime, the absence of open aggression against Crimea facilitated the preservation of
‘democratic image’ in interactions with the West and reception of the financial aid and
investment that Russian Federation was so in need of at the time.
This project has room for further research, particularly in two directions. The first is the
role of women in Crimean post-Soviet political and social processes. Scholarship of
settler colonialism pays specific attention to the role of women in settler colonies, as they
are the ones that created the settler society. They reshape settlers into ‘locals,’ children of
the colonizers, who claim indigeneity in the colonized land. While women were present
on the margins of political debates, post-Soviet settler colonial society kept trying to limit
the space of their operation to domestic sphere. This was contrary to the official Soviet
policies of gender equality that, as shown by multiple studies, looked different on paper
than in real life. A limited number of sources, even in newspapers, however, demonstrate
female presence in mediating inter-ethnic and other clashes inside Crimea. Women were
very active in social, cultural and political life on all sides of the imaginary barricades,
contrary to multiple statements in newspapers that ‘woman’s place is at home’ with
children. The second important topic to consider is the role of church in Crimean politics.
The history of cooperation between the Russian Orthodox hierarchy with the KGB is a
known fact, although not deeply researched. In the Crimean space the Russian Orthodox
church because a yet another influential institution that promoted the pro-Russian
ideology among the believers. It also served as a basis for pro-Russian paramilitary
organizations; Crimean Orthodox hierarchy often coordinated their actions with the
command of the Black Sea Fleet.
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The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 only confirmed the settler colonial nature
the life on the peninsula, as well as the policies of the Russian state. The fact that
Crimean Tatars became the primary target of repressions confirms that for the settler’s
empire the existence of indigenous people on the colonized territory serves as the main
threat to the colonizer’s myth. Russian security services’ attempt to look for ‘Muslim
terrorism’ demonstrates structural racism of FSB as an institution of power. Meanwhile,
systematic settlement of the occupied peninsula with Russian citizens shows that settler
policies remain the primary method of taking control over the occupied land. Since 2014
Russian state propaganda, as well as Russian state institutions have not demonstrated
anything new in terms of the narrative or methods of control. They displaced the
indigenous (not just physically, but culturally and politically), brought settlers, reinforced
the settler’s myth about ‘historically Russian Crimea’ and appealed to the democratic
practices by holding a so called “referendum” on the status of the peninsula while
Russian propaganda once again created a myth of “peaceful reunification.”
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